The New Anglo-Saxons:

Race, Place, and the Production of a Geopolitical Discourse

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Science

with a

Major in Geography

in the

College of Graduate Studies

University of Idaho

by

David G. Russell

Major Professor: Steven M. Radil, Ph.D.

Committee Members: Thomas Ptak, Ph.D.; Sean Quinlan, Ph.D.

Department Administrator: Raymond J. Dezzani, Ph.D.

May 2019

Authorization to Submit Thesis

This thesis of David G. Russell, submitted for the degree of Master of Science with a Major in Geography and titled "The New Anglo-Saxons: Race, Place, and the Production of a Geopolitical Discourse" has been reviewed in final form. Permission, as indicated by the signatures and dates below, is now granted to submit final copies to the College of Graduate Studies for approval.

Major Professor: _____ Date: _____
Steven M. Radil, Ph.D.

Committee Members: _____ Date: _____
Thomas Ptak, Ph.D.

_____ Date: _____
Sean Quinlan, Ph.D.

Department
Administrator: _____ Date: _____
Raymond J. Dezzani, Ph.D.

Abstract

This thesis presents a case study in the genesis and spread of a geopolitical ideology by elites in academia. The academic and political movement of Anglo-Saxonism is conceptualized as a geopolitical discourse created and disseminated by conscious agents. A review of the relevant literature reveals that in many works of critical geopolitics, scholars have taken a view of discourse emphasizing the agency of powerful individuals in deploying geopolitical discourses for their political ends (Müller 2008). In spite of the emphasis on agency, these approaches neglect the meta-narratives of their agents themselves, preferring instead to juxtapose texts and the contexts in which their producers operated and infer intentionality. Instead of taking this approach, I investigate the motives and intentions of two English-speaking historians of the late 19th century—Edward Augustus Freeman and Herbert Baxter Adams—by examining archival material for their own statements about the reasons for and the inspirations behind the production of their texts. Subsequently, I analyze the particular spatial and place-based imageries these two historians deployed in their works, showing how the historians' consciousness of their production of a discourse shaped the presence and form of this imagery.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not be possible without the support of my committee. I would especially like to thank my advisor, Dr. Steve Radil, whose patient mentorship, deep insights, and kind encouragement have defined this graduate program as a wholly fulfilling experience that has made me a geographer. Dr. Tom Ptak helped to introduce me to ideas about place and rigor in human geography. In Dr. Sean Quinlan's class, I encountered the broad themes and criticisms of the literature on discourse for the first time. The entire Department of Geography has provided a great and supportive environment. I would also be remiss if I did not mention my undergraduate mentors at Middlebury College: Dr. Robert Greeley, who showed me real enthusiasm for geography and scholarship in general; Dr. Febe Armanios and Dr. Rebecca Bennette, who taught me the methods of historical inquiry; and Dr. Michael Geisler, in whose first year seminar I discovered Anglo-Saxonism.

My archival research travel was supported by a Travel Award from the Graduate and Professional Student Association at the University of Idaho, and by funds allotted by the University of Idaho's Department of Geography to Dr. Radil. I would also like to thank and acknowledge the friendly and helpful staff at the University Archives at the Sheridan Libraries of Johns Hopkins University, and at the University of Manchester Libraries Special Collections, housed at the John Rylands Library.

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family: to David, Jamie, Kelley, and Scout, and to my grandparents, and to my girlfriend, Ariana. Without their love and support I wouldn't have gotten anywhere.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Introduction

For nearly a century after the American Revolution began, the United States endured a tense and sometimes violent relationship with the British Empire, and anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist Anglophobia characterized much of the rhetoric surrounding this relationship (Tulloch 1977, Kramer 2002, Tuffnell 2011). By the beginning of the First World War in 1914, however, feelings of camaraderie between what were termed the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race abounded. The September 1915 edition of Political Science Quarterly noted that even the idea of a full political federation between the United States and the British Empire had "taken hold of too many minds to be pronounced a mere fancy or delusion." Just two years later, the United States entered the ongoing First World War alongside the British Empire.

These sudden shifts in diplomatic relations and in public opinion originated in an academic idea known as Anglo-Saxonism, one advanced by historians on both sides of the Atlantic. Anglo-Saxonism glorified the Anglo-Saxon race and its descendants in general for their superior qualities over other races and lauded the free, democratic socio-political institutions that Anglo-Saxons produced (Anderson 1981). Proponents of this ideology pointed to and wrote about institutions shared between English-speaking peoples around the world and used them to claim a common racial lineage, which in turn implied a need for closer political union in the present day. In this thesis, I investigate the spread of Anglo-Saxonism by conceptualizing it as a geopolitical discourse that was created and disseminated by conscious agents. Accordingly, I use archival materials produced by two key historians in the movement, Edward Augustus Freeman and Herbert Baxter Adams, to consider the question of their agency when producing their works of Anglo-Saxonism.

In pursuing such a project, I draw primarily on the literature of critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics has been dominated by a concept of discourse analysis emphasizing the agency of its subjects in contrast to the poststructuralist roots of many of its themes (Müller 2008), but this often means inferring the motives and intentionality of agents that may only be reproducing a discourse by juxtaposing the texts they produce with the contexts in which they operate. For my study, I present texts and contexts alongside statements from Freeman and Adams themselves about their own efforts. These statements have potential to show the agency behind the discourse and help to bridge the crucial and conscious link between text and context.

I have structured my thesis into four chapters. First, I complete a Literature Review of relevant works of critical geopolitics alongside the lineages of important concepts such as hegemony, discourse, and structuration. Second, I give a brief overview of the historical background of Anglo-

Saxonism and describe the discursive forms it took and the rhetorical strategies its proponents used. Third, I present my argument that Freeman and Adams acted intentionally in producing the texts that constituted the beginnings of Anglo-Saxonism. Fourth, I investigate the prevalent concern with the histories of local socio-political institutions and the leveraging of topophilic, place-based imagery that characterizes much of Freeman and Adams's work, arguing that this concern constitutes a conscious strategy influenced by their intention to disseminate Anglo-Saxonism as broadly as possible. I conclude by tracing the lineage of Anglo-Saxonism to examine its impact on the foreign relations of the United States and the British Empire.

CHAPTER 1: Literature Review and Methods

1.1 Literature Review

I propose to study the phenomenon of Anglo-Saxonism by conceptualizing it as a hegemonic geopolitical discourse and by examining the intentionality of the human agents producing it. I am particularly interested in how the elites of a geopolitical order—specifically, geopoliticians and the "'wise men' of strategy" (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 195)—aspire to and maintain hegemony through the dissemination of an ideology. To begin to do this, I need to engage critically with how hegemony and discourse are understood in the critical geopolitics literature, which also necessitates an understanding of the dualism and scalar nature of structure and agency. The overall stances I take on these issues are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Stances on Key Debates

Key debates	Stance in this thesis
Hegemony	Geographers commonly define a hegemon as a state dominant in the global political economy (World Systems perspectives), or a style of geopolitical world order evident in discourses and reproduced discursively. I lean towards the second definition while emphasizing that discourses can be hegemonic at small geographic scales or only among small groups.
Discourse	Discourse has been interpreted through both poststructuralist and agency-based lenses. I move away from the poststructuralist Foucauldian interpretation of discourse to one which emphasizes the agency of human individuals bound up in discourses.
Structure/Agency	I adopt the stance of structuration: social structures and individual humans interact in a reciprocal way, producing and reproducing discursive meanings.
Agency in Critical Geopolitics	The agency concept of discourse analysis in critical geopolitics tends to infer the intentions of agents producing texts given their context. Instead, I will investigate the intentions of these actors by looking at their own statements about their work.
Type of Discourse Analysis	Proximate context, focus on Intentions, Critical stance (Müller 2010).

In brief, I intend to show how the most prevalent conceptions of hegemony and discourse are overly structural and deterministic in the critical geopolitics literature, while the marriage of the two in later works began to give an increasing importance to the agency of individual humans in reproducing structures. Though it springs partially out of this latter tradition, critical geopolitics has

struggled with the concept of agency when it comes to the actors involved in reproducing the geopolitical discourses the subdiscipline aims to critique. In particular, what Müller (2008) terms the agency concept of critical geopolitics (e.g., Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, Ó Tuathail 1996 and 2006, Browning and Joenniemi 2004, Ackleson 2005) tends to juxtapose texts and their context and infer the motives of the producers of the texts from ironies and contradictions of the juxtaposition rather than presenting firmer proof of intentionality.

1.1.1 Hegemony

Discourse analysis, both in the social sciences in general and human geography in particular, can be divided into two main strands: structuralist and poststructuralist (Lees 2004, 102; Dittmer 2010). The structuralist strand stems primarily from Marxist understandings of political economy and critiques of ideology, where discourse serves as an instrument of hegemony or "leadership without the necessary resort to force" (Dahlman 2009, 102). Here, the concept of hegemony has been most influenced by and associated with the writings of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (e.g., 1957). For Gramsci and others that followed his work, it is cultural leadership through civil society that enables hegemons—be they states, classes, or other identity groups—to maintain their power (Said 1979, 7). Hegemony, in this sense, is a way of explaining power not as coercion but as obedience: hegemony is a structure that conditions individuals en masse to obey.

Gramsci strays from the strictly deterministic structuralism that often characterizes Marxist materialist views of history (where all aspects of a society—including culture and politics—are just part of a superstructure protecting the way the society provisions itself materially) by using his idea of hegemony to synthesize materialism with an idea of history as conflict between value systems (Gramsci 1957, 67). More traditional Marxists would identify the relationship between the economic base of society and its ideological and political superstructure as a unidirectional one, with the economic base—the society's means of provisioning itself—determining and explaining everything else. Gramsci, on the other hand, found this relationship to be "reciprocal, complex, and changing [because] politics, ideas, and culture could have overriding powers" over purely materialist economics (Peet 1998, 129). While Gramsci acknowledges the importance of the individuality of man, he notes that it "is not the sole element to be considered" as man's relationships with other men and with his environment are also important factors to be considered (Gramsci 1957, 77). Most importantly, man is "a conformist to some conformity, he is always man-mass or man-collective" (Gramsci 1957, 59). Such a generalizing view of the individual subverts him or her to structures in this approach.

Conceptions of hegemony have been applied to works of political geography in significantly different ways. While Gramsci conceived of a hegemon as a class, Peter Taylor (1999, 20–21; Taylor and Flint 2000) instead defines a hegemon as a "prescient [territorial] state and its civil society," that attains and maintains political dominance over other states by creating "new modernities" in which values systems that benefit the hegemon are widely adopted. In this framework, hegemons come and go in cycles, during which the periods of actual global hegemony are rare, occurring only three times in history: in succession, Dutch mercantilism in the mid-seventeenth century, British industrialism in the mid-nineteenth century, and American consumerism in the mid-twentieth century (Taylor and Flint 2000, 67). This way of looking at hegemony is a way of connecting the questions of classical geopolitics—those dealing with the process of the rise and fall of one dominant state—with those of World Systems Perspectives, especially using Kondratieff waves to model the "economic pulse of the capitalist world economy" (Flint 2010, 2833). The cultural and social consensus-creating aspect of geopolitical hegemony is included, but it is the economic structure that is given precedence in this approach.

Another set of geographers take a different approach to the application of hegemony to understandings of geopolitical world orders. Agnew and Corbridge (1995, 17) emphasize the work that "routinized and incorporated … practices and ideological representations" do to "give an order its 'normality' and 'commonsensical' acceptability to the actors involved in it." This is a popular interpretation of hegemony found within and without geography (e.g., Skey 2009, Billig 1995). Here, geopolitical orders need not be dominated by a single state: "global hegemony presupposes the establishment of a dominant block of élites in different states that accept fundamental premises about the nature of the world economy and inter-state relations" (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 17). Shifts in the "social organization of the world economy" are important but not determining (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 17). Modern world history can be divided into periods of dominance not by a state, but by a hegemonic geopolitical discourse or mode of representation: civilizational geopolitics (1815–1875), naturalized geopolitics (1875–1945), and ideological geopolitics (1945–1990) (Agnew 1998, 86; Agnew 1999; Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 46). In this view, the type of geopolitics itself is the hegemon (see also Kearns 2003, 173).

In this thesis, I will take much of Agnew and Corbridge's (1995, 17) conception of hegemony, particularly their Gramscian focus on the "'commonsensiscal' acceptability" of a geopolitical order. I will also, however, recognize that hegemony operates at many scales other than just that of global politics and the world economy. A discourse does not need to govern the whole body of geopolitical interactions in a given time period to be hegemonic in a certain

'commonsensical' way at a local or regional scale, or among a certain social class: the important defining characteristic is its acceptance among a certain group as normal, common sense. I will focus on attempts to promote a certain ideology to hegemonic status (primarily among a certain elite social class), rather than looking at the condition of hegemony itself. Striving for this promotion to hegemony can be seen as scaling hegemony up, increasing the number of groups which consider certain values—like those called "Anglo-Saxon" by Freeman and Adams—to be common sense. This slightly different view of hegemony will be more applicable to the small scale at which my study will focus.

1.1.2 Discourse and Deconstruction

Importantly, Agnew and Corbridge use the idea of using the concept of discourse to investigate geopolitical hegemony. Even when it is applied narrowly to textual analysis, discourse is more than just language: it consists of "ways of acting, interacting, feeling, believing, valuing, and using various sorts of objects, symbols, tools, and technologies" to produce and understand meaning (Gee 2006, 7). It can be further defined as the link between text and the context governing that text, from how its producers think the text will be understood to how it is actually interpreted (Müller 2010); analyzing the discourse uses the language of a text to identify the contextual structure. This kind of analysis involves examining the consensus-creating aspect of hegemony present in the texts of elites as a result of the "unconscious adoptions of rules of living, thinking, and speaking" implicit in those texts (Agnew and Corbridge 1995: 47). Applied specifically to hegemony in the geopolitical sense, discourse analysis focuses on "the deployment of representations of space which guide the spatial practices central to a geopolitical order" (*ibid.*).

Discourses, especially as laid out in the work of Michel Foucault, need not be hegemonic, however: perhaps they can be deployed in the service of hegemony, such as certain discourses around sexuality have been (Foucault 1990, 127), but they are not necessarily hegemonic, as discourses can compete with each other. Even in *Mastering Space*, Agnew and Corbridge (1995, 65) acknowledge that their third period of hegemony in geopolitics—that of "Ideological Geopolitics" (1945–1990)— was characterized primarily by two competing conceptions of how to order the world economy (capitalism versus communism). Discourses may also be hegemonic at some scales but not at others. To use the language of the horizontal conception of scale laid out by Cox (1998, 1), discourses might dominate in the spaces of dependence for certain organizations that then try to leverage them in spaces of engagement where they vie for hegemony at that scale. In some ways, the idea of a discourse is most useful as a way of looking at how Gramscian hegemony works on the small scale of individual interactions. Instead of a structure dominating a population, power is relational, "produced

from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another" (Foucault 1990, 93).

This power is intricately bound up with knowledge, and the two imply each other: "regimes of power define what counts as a meaningful utterance, what topics are to be investigated, how facts are to be produced … Equally, however, all regimes of power are constituted by discursive formations" (Bevir 1999, 66). The idea that power influences the production of knowledge—and even makes it possible in the first place—is at the heart of critical geopolitics. Ó Tuathail (1996, 2) writes about how geography, especially in Early Modern Europe, should be understood to be as much a verb as a noun: geographers, employed by the state and producing guarded secrets, were "geo-graphing." State-funded expeditions of exploration were key not only to the competitions between European empires as they appropriated the territories of the rest of the world, but they were also fundamental to the origin of empiricism (Livingstone 1992, 33). Despite carefully maintained appearances of objectivity, however, "the geographic vision is never innocent. It is always a wish posing as analysis" (Kearns 2003, 174). Pointing out the irony between claimed neutrality and bias bound up with power is a key Foucauldian inheritance.

To what extent understandings of discourse are deterministic and structural is a hotly contested topic. In one of his foundational books on discourse in the study of history, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault states that his book "does not belong … to the debate on structure" (Foucault 2002, 17). Instead, Foucault said that his work is often misread: not only is it not about structure, it is also not about power. It is, first and foremost, about how individuals are transformed into subjects: individuals who are simply objects of power given meaning and identity only by participating in discourses (Müller 2008, 327). Mark Bevir (1999, 67) draws attention to the crucial distinction between autonomy and agency as it applies to subjects in Foucault's work. Autonomous subjects can act outside of their contexts; Foucault and Bevir agree that such actions outside contexts are impossible. Agents, however, can make choices within contexts; structures enable some paths and close off others, but individuals can choose which path they go down. Subjects of discourses can still be agents: power, unlike violence, must entail a capacity for resistance, and any discourse, even a hegemonic one, will still find individuals exposed to it but resisting or dissenting in some way (Bevir 1999, 68–73).

It is important to recognize that discourses are only constraining because they are enabling. As contradictory as this sounds, this is the beating poststructuralist heart of discourse as a structure: discourses limit an individual's choices to those within "a certain bounded field of possibilities" by only enabling certain options rather than others (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 193). That this is

different from constraining a subject's options is crucial: it means that subjects, in Foucault's definition of a discourse, do not exist at all without the structures that give them socially-constructed identities and enable them to do certain things and think certain ways (Bevir 1999). In this sense, individuals (as subjects) can really only reproduce discourses, rather than create them from scratch.

Discourses both create and enable subjects. That discourses actually create the subjects operating within them is a point often elided in other, less radical interpretations of discourse: for example, Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 193) define the critical study of the discourses of geopolitics as "the study of the socio-cultural resources and rules by which geographies of international politics get written." Here, Ó Tuathail and Agnew take discourses to be "socio-cultural resources and rules" drawn upon by agents to write the "geographies of international politics." This is subtly but importantly different from also holding that discourses create their subjects in the first place, and this diversion from a rigidly Foucauldian conception of discourse is necessary to give critical geopolitics its critical aspect.

The relationship between critical studies and discourse analysis is a fraught one. In the critical Marxist tradition, hegemony is often understood to work "to induce the oppressed to consent to their exploitation and misery" (Peet 1998, 129). The socialist, then, should dutifully adopt a counter-hegemonic stance and seek to "peel away obfuscation to reveal the truth of a situation" (Cresswell 2013, 212). Critical geopolitics lives up to its name in this respect (Müller 2008, 325). As has been noted by many critics of postmodernity (e.g., Harvey 1990), however, a hallmark of the postmodern condition is an overwhelming relativism. When all knowledge is contingent upon related power regimes, no "truth" can claim a monopoly on the truth, and the intentions of the subjects who reproduce power in their relations and discourse in their texts are subverted to structural causes and effects.

Edward Said frames this dilemma in a helpful way, writing that "unlike Michel Foucault … I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation" (Said 1979, 23). The purpose of focusing on the imprint of individuals on a discourse is part of an effort to understand a discourse as "a kind of willed human work", where the term "willed" brings the focus back to the agency of the individuals producing the discourse (Said 1979, 15). In this way, Said's work on Orientalism represents a kind of fusion of the structuralist and poststructuralist strands of discourse analysis that Lees (2004, 103) lays out. This refocusing of discourse analysis is helpful, and to take it a step further will involve getting at not just the "imprint" of individual authors alone, but their intentions to make an imprint as well.

Poststructuralist discourse analysis can take on its most critical form when it is paired with the related idea of deconstruction. Associated mainly with the work of Jacques Derrida, a student of Foucault, deconstruction is a method that aims "to oppose and undermine claims to truth, certainty and authority" in texts, to point out that assumptions made and implied in texts work only within a system of knowledge and simultaneously reinforce it (Wylie 2006, 299). The critical potential of deconstructive methods is great but fraught with some contradictions: one the one hand, "deconstruction is a critical method because it can be applied to all attempts to presence, centre, purify, divide, classify and exclude"—like applications of Gramscian hegemony, it contests claims of absolute truth or common sense knowledge in such a way that destabilizes existing power structures (Wylie 2006, 301). On the other hand, at its heart, Derridean deconstruction is very much a poststructuralist method with its overwhelming focus on the text itself and the text alone: its structure and its effects, not the intentions of its author (McKee 2003, 67; Harvey 1990, 49).

Derridean deconstruction in its most critical form has enjoyed a particular prominence in the subfield of critical geopolitics with its focus on the construction of geopolitical imaginations (Müller 2008, 323; Wylie 2006 301; *e.g*, Ó Tuathail 1996). Ó Tuathail (1996, 63–73) gives an extended explanation for the importance and presence of deconstruction in his seminal work on critical geopolitics, and he explicitly states his aim of "avoid[ing] the narrow textuality of the more literal uses of Derridean deconstructionism." The context of the text, and, importantly, the context in which its author operated, should occupy as crucial a spot as the text itself does. Ó Tuathail proceeds to problematize "the logocentric infrastructures that make 'geopolitics' or any spatialization of the global political scene possible," taking as his main target the authority and objectivity given to sight in Western thought.

1.1.3 Hegemonic Discourse and Reasserting Agency

Instead of following Said and only looking at the "imprint" that individuals have on the process of the production and reproduction of a discourse, I will try to look at the conscious intentions of these individuals. The idea of discourses as both enabling and restricting and the idea that agents are not free from their contexts but can still choose from options within them to take a nuanced stance is in between completely deterministic and agency-based framings. These ideas entail moving away from Foucault's agency-averse framing of individuals as only subjects of a discourse (Bevir 1999). Two works in particular have been crucial in staking out this middle ground between structure and agency and in synthesizing Gramscian hegemony with Foucauldian discourse.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 3) situate their work as a synthesis of the concepts of Marxist Gramscian hegemony and Foucauldian discourse, branding themselves "post-Marxist." Essentially,

they try to move on from the "rationalism of classical Marxism" and towards using discourse as a way to frame and explain hegemonies as "discursive surface[s]" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 3). As Slater (2003, 86) explains, a postmodern view would have to treat Marxist thought as arbitrary "totalizing discourse," valid only internally, but Laclau and Mouffe make the case that there are still Marxist concepts and ideas that can "still be deployed in ways that address the contemporary scene."

The key concept here as it relates to discourse analysis is that Laclau and Mouffe incorporate the concept of ideology into their analysis. Ideology "supplements Foucault's formless, diffuse conception of power by giving it an indispensable reason, direction and agent," a kind of middle ground between notions of hegemony and those of power/knowledge and discourse (Sutherland 2005, 188–9). Hegemony becomes a way to examine "the fixation of contingent meaning … through discourses" (Müller 2008, 331). In other words, Laclau and Mouffe conceptualize hegemony as restricting possible meanings to those defined by a certain set of discourses: it is the primacy of some discourses over others. Any hegemonic system will always have room for competing ideologies, even dissident resistance, and it is in a (limited) choice between discourses that the agency of individuals comes into play (Dittmer 2010). Texts are polysemic in that their meaning is only one of many possibilities: it is contingent upon what discourses are hegemonic in the context of the text's production (Müller 2016, 51). For example, geography is often understood to be simply the study and record of location, characteristics already possessed by the earth; in another, earlier, sense, however, the term can refer to the "active writing of the earth," not a characteristic of the earth nor even a science but an imperial endeavor (Ó Tuathail 1996, 2).

Just before Laclau and Mouffe published their seminal Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Anthony Giddens staked out the foundations of another nuanced approach to structure and agency that he called structuration. The structuration perspective involves viewing "human social activities … [as] recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means hereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible" (Giddens 1984, 2). Humans are knowledgeable agents: they can discursively describe the conditions and consequences of their actions, what they do and why they do it. There is, however, a difference between conceptualizing humans as purposeful agents who can explain their actions and extracting those actions and choices from the contexts that have driven them. The relationship between agent and structure is recursive, and both are necessary to understand the functioning of the other. It is the various functionings of this relationship that merit attention from a structurational perspective. Structures only exist in the activities of actors, who in turn act according to the rules and resources

through which the structures restrict and enable them. Both are therefore "produced and reproduced [only] in interaction" (Giddens 1984, 25).

Müller (2008, 325) notes that structuration has made its way deep into critical geopolitics, even if it is not commonly acknowledged. Likewise, Laclau and Mouffe's interpretation of ideology as a synthesis of the concepts of hegemony and discourse have proven to be influential in critical geopolitics without much fanfare (Müller 2008, 325). That both structuration and ideology allow for a greater focus on the role of agents in producing and reproducing geopolitical discourses has been important for critical geopolitics and will be important for my thesis. In particular, I find structuration to be an ideal middle ground between complete agency approaches and structural ones. I do not conceive of the individual subjects of my research as autonomous agents even though I try to show their intentionality; instead, I recognize that their choices (on the one hand) and their influences, proximate contexts, and social milieu (on the other hand) interact in a reciprocal way.

Questions of agency and structure are intimately bound up with those of consciousness (Bevir 1999, 72), and Giddens (1984, 6–8 and 281–295) includes a theory of consciousness in everyday life with his ideas on structuration. Instead of Freud's ego/super-ego/id framing of human consciousness, Giddens posits an analogous framework consisting of discursive consciousness, practical consciousness, and unconscious motives. In these terms, an individual's day-to-day life typically consists of a series of intentional actions that the individual can justify when questioned: the individual is conscious of their intentions in a practical way. Discursive consciousness involves an awareness of the broader conditions that limit and enable their actions and in which their actions will play out. However, even in the case of discursive consciousness, and individual might be partially motivated by unconscious motives of which they are unaware. Finally, even conscious actions can feed back into the process of perpetuating structures unintentionally. With these two observations of unintended consequences and unconscious motivations in mind, I will link the texts consciously produced by the subjects of my research both to the ways their works were influenced by their contexts and to how they played out in the broader historical discursive milieu.

1.1.4 Discourse and Agency in Critical Geopolitics

The birth of critical geopolitics as a subdiscipline of geography is generally accepted to have come with the publication of Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew's 1992 article in Political Geography entitled "Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy" (Dodds 2001). What sets critical geopolitics apart from other ways of studying geopolitics is a fascination with "the representation of geopolitics, rather than an analysis of events themselves" (Flint 2010, 2831). Scholars look for and analyze "geopolitical visions" (Dijkink 1996), finding them

constructed and deployed in the works of geopolitical leaders (e.g., Ó Tuathail 2006), in popular media (e.g., Sharp 1996), or in the works of the geographers of classical geopolitics (e.g., Ó Tuathail 1996). The individuals who become the objects of study in this work are conceptualized as agents with agency well beyond that afforded to the subjects of discourse in a Foucauldian sense—not only are their choices from among those enabled discursively emphasized, but they are seen as manipulating and deploying the dominant discourses to their own political ends. The principles of structuration still hold, if sometimes loosely: these agents of geopolitics produce and reproduce discursive structures reciprocally (Müller 2008, 325).

While structuralist views of discourse in political geography exist (e.g., Mattissek and Reuber 2004), what Müller (2008, 325) terms the "agency concept of discourse" has dominated the subdiscipline of critical geopolitics, becoming, in his words, "somewhat of a 'classic' defining concept for numerous empirical studies employing discourse to conceptualize geopolitics." In the agency concept, geopolitical discourses enable agents to do certain things in their texts, and they do so for political ends. It is "through discourse that leaders act," and not the other way around, even if the fact that discourses only enable certain courses of action constrains the agency of the leaders slightly (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 190). The term "agency" is used to describe this conception of discourse because it focuses on the "intentional creation, recreation, and transformation of a discourse" by individuals (Müller 2008, 326).

Most often, the power investigated by the deconstruction of geopolitical discourses is that associated with a hegemonic, territorial state: producing geopolitical theory in particular is often designed "to aid the practice of statecraft and further the power of the state" (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192; Kearns 2003, 165). This narrow application of discourse allows critical geopolitics to be critical through its focus on elite actors associated with the state. The dominant way of analyzing geopolitical discourses is by looking at how these elite actors draw on discourses for their own ends, to include the ends of the state (Müller 2008).

Even though the first of Ó Tuathail and Agnew's theses of critical geopolitics asserts that the study of geopolitics should involve the "comprehensive study of statecraft as a set of social practices", not confined to the texts of the 'wise men' of geopolitics (1992, 194), it is the latter that is the predominant focus of much of the work done in the sub-field (Müller 2008). That is not to say that there are not significant exceptions to this norm. Other studies (e.g., Sharp 1996, Dittmer 2005) take popular media institutions as the producers of hegemony (Sharp 1996, 558). The key contribution of such studies is showing that geopolitical discourses do not simply "trickle down" from elite texts to popular ones—popular texts can be important discursive sites as well (Müller 2016, 51).

The role of popular texts and institutions as discursive sites is still one of production, operating at "the very nexus of power/knowledge central to the workings of geopolitics" for a specific purpose: "to promote particular views and actions of people in their own society" (Sharp 1996, 567–8). The institutions and the individuals working in them are still themselves discursively constituted, but the motives behind drawing on the discourses in a specific way are still the object of study. In this way, these works studying 'popular geopolitics' operate under similar epistemological frameworks to those used by those works taking powerful individuals as the subjects of their research.

The agency concept of discourse in critical geopolitics has been subjected to criticism from several sides. Perhaps predictably, its poststructuralist underpinnings   have drawn fire from structuralists who conceive of critical studies in a different light. Responding to Ó Tuathail's work in particular, Neil Smith notes the irony "that poststructuralism actually tempts a reformed positivism" in such a way that the Ó Tuathail's critique of visualism does not allow for a critique of the perspective doing the critiquing (2000: 368). From the other end of the epistemological spectrum, Müller (2008, 334; see also Mattisek and Glasze 2016, 43–44) critiques the agency concept of discourse in critical geopolitics as "not adequately reflect[ing] the poststructuralist decentring of the subject and the contingency of discourses." To Müller, an agency concept of discourse is not even truly a poststructuralist perspective at all: such a perspective seeks to avoid the deterministic nature of structuralism, but still, "it is not the individual that structures and manipulates discourse but vice versa — discourses speak through the individual (Müller 2008, 326). Other scholars have noted a lack of well-defined methodology when it comes to discourse analysis (e.g., Müller 2010, Kelly 2006), and some have even defended the continuing relevance of the classical geopolitical visions that critical geopolitics seeks to undermine (Kelly 2006, Haverluk et. al. 2014).

My critique of the agency concept of discourse in critical geopolitics is not that it imbues its subjects with agency: it is how the presence of agency is often not proven explicitly. The agency concept is at its best when scholars present direct statements from the agents they study that regard their intentions in pursuing their discursive strategies. For example, when Ó Tuathail writes about Halford Mackinder's geopolitical strategies, he is sure to provide a quote from Mackinder himself detailing why he contributed to the production of a discourse of heartlands and geopolitics, saying that "Our aim must be to make our whole people think Imperially." Similarly, Ó Tuathail describes how Mackinder consciously strove to disseminate his ideas rather than simply producing them (Ó Tuathail 1996, 88–89). In this way, Ó Tuathail presents the assertions of agency from the individual that links the text to the context.

This kind of direct evidence is often absent from critical geopolitics, which instead substitutes a juxtaposition of the discourses of texts with the contexts in which the agents who produced them operated, inducing intentionality because the context proves that the subjects had to have been acting according to the constraints or opportunities provided by the context. This approach is most often defined by contrasting the alleged objectivism of the texts—their preoccupation with "ocularist" empiricism, for example—with the obvious and ironic motives the hypocritical agents must have had given their geopolitical interests (Ó Tuathail 1996, 143). Ó Tuathail (1996, 1) observes that geography is "often assumed to be innocent" but is instead governed by histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space." As an example, he contrasts the allegedly "dispassionate" nature of the internationalist geopolitical studies produced by the Council on Foreign Relations when in fact such internationalism was "very much in the economic self-interest of members of the council" (Ó Tuathail 1996, 152).

Such an approach needlessly limits itself to the texts and contexts of a discourse. It is the reciprocal micro-dynamics of the production and reproduction of a discourse that will be important to my thesis: I do not claim that the agents involved in producing Anglo-Saxonism were autonomous subjects who had complete agency over their choices. I do, however, value their own statements about their intentions and motives as the critical, small-scale link between the large-scale geopolitical contexts and the discourses they helped produce and reproduce. In looking for particular statements made by subjects to prove consciousness, I will adhere to the structuration-inspired underpinnings of the agency concept of critical geopolitics, but I will go about proving the existence of intentions and motives in a different way.

1.1.5 Typologies of Discourse Analysis

In his attempt to advance a more coherent and consistent terminology for discourse analysis in critical geopolitics, Müller (2010) describes three methodological axes along which discourse analysis in works of critical geopolitics can vary. Here, discourse is the link between text and the context in which the texts are embedded; analyzing the discourse uses the language (verbal or not) of a text to identify the contextual structure. Applied specifically to hegemony in the geopolitical sense, discourse analysis focuses on "the deployment of representations of space which guide the spatial practices central to a geopolitical order."

Discourse analysis in critical geopolitics has attracted critiques pointing out a lack of methodological rigor and even consensus on what discourse analysis entails (Müller 2010, Kelly 2006, Dittmer 2010). In particular, Anglophone approaches to discourse analysis in geography tend to be "characterized by a literary style of writing" in contrast to the more empirical methods favored in

France and Germany (Mattisek and Glasze 2016, 46). In an attempt to advance a systemization of methods of discourse analysis in geography, Müller (2010) attempts to classify the factors that might distinguish one discursive methodology from another. Discursive methodologies might vary along three axes: first, that of context. Scholars might examine a text focusing on its distal contexts (the rules of the political and social conditions that govern the form of the text) or its proximate contexts (the dynamics of the particular context in which the text is found). For example, a proximate reading of a student-teacher interaction would center itself on the power dynamics in that particular classroom rather than the broader societal context. The second axis details the approach to analysis and how the intentionality of the authors of the text is dealt with. On one hand, analysts of the discourse could consider the author as the producer of meaning and assume the intentionality of textual production and its social context (intentional). On the other, analysts could take a post-structuralist approach and disregard the intentions of the author, focusing instead on the rules and productions of the discourse itself as a societal or political phenomenon (structural). Finally, the third axis regards the political stance of the analysts of the discourse—either detached or critical.

Müller notes that, traditionally, discourse analyses are distant, intentional, and critical (here, he refers to works using an agency concept of discourse like Ó Tuathail 1996 and 2006, for example). Most works of critical geopolitics focus on the broader societal contexts of discourse rather than the proximate, immediate one (Müller 2008), and the choice of data reflects this focus: scholars analyze the speeches (but not personal texts) of 'great men' or the contents of popular media to inform their descriptions of the discursive structures at play (e.g., Ó Tuathail 2006, Dittmer 2005). In my opinion, a solely distal approach limits itself in that it tends to consider all discursive evidence of rules and norms as indicative of power dynamics within a large-scale, hegemonic, geopolitical context when that might not be the case, such as when it is the proximate context that influences a text the most. In other words, critical geopolitics and discourse analysis within a geopolitical context suffer from a problem of scale, perhaps an understandable one: the discipline primarily and traditionally focuses on the relationships between states at a global or a regional scale, so it is easy to lose sight of how discourses really play out on small scales from a local place to the individual. Works with such a small-scale focus have thus far been the purview of feminist geopolitics (e.g., Dowler and Sharp 2001), which do employ structurational ideas and Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) notions of practice as part of discourse in looking at everyday practices and their embeddedness in discourse.

Some recent analyses have been more proximate, structural, and critical, taking the forms of ethnographies of how geopolitical discursive orders determine parts of everyday life (e.g., Hyndman 2004, Megoran 2005, Sundberg 2008). These, however, elide the agency of the individuals in

question. As argued above, I think that agency is an underutilized or inappropriately utilized concept in critical geopolitics, so the discourse analysis in my thesis will be Proximate, Intentional, and Critical. My choice to focus on the proximate context of discourse production is where my thesis will differ from the agency concept of critical geopolitics (which tends to be distant, intentional, and critical—see Muller 2008), and this is because I think that the intentions of actors in the production of a discourse can best be examined at the small scale. Therefore, my analysis centers on the scale of the individual—predominately the historians Edward Augustus Freeman and Herbert Baxter Adams—and I will examine their intentions in a critical light.

Discourse analyses must lie somewhere along a spectrum of constructionism, from the relativist claim that nothing exists outside of the discourse (at one extreme) to the more conventional epistemological stance that an ideology is a contortion of an objective reality (Lees 2004, 104). The latter position lends itself more readily to critique as texts can be shown to misrepresent objective truths, perhaps intentionally to achieve certain goals. The former position, after all, logically involves a critique of all structured knowledge, not just that created by the discourse at hand. This can make an academic study—the entire purpose of which is "to make an opaque reality clearer [and] a complex world more graspable"—impossible from an epistemological perspective (Wylie 2006). At the same time, claiming that there is an objective reality against which textual representations of it can be compared and shown to be intentional contortions might run against true poststructuralist sensibilities (see, for example, the critiques of Müller 2008 and Mattisek and Glaze 2016). An epistemologically balanced position would be to focus on the reciprocity and reflexivity of language and show that it both reflects and constructs reality (Gee 2005, 97). This is the epistemological position I take. As a middle ground approach to discourse and reality, it resembles and complements structuration's approach to structure and agency.

1.2 Research Questions and Methods

Figure 1: Materials from the Herbert Baxter Adams Papers, University Archives at the Sheridan Libraries of Johns Hopkins University

The data, methods, and research questions for this project were bound together in a recursive relationship that I have outlined before reaching their final forms. I began this project with a general knowledge of the historiography of Anglo-Saxonism: what the main ideas were and who historians considered to be the more important figures in the movement.[1] I used this general knowledge as a starting point to learn more about how I might situate a study of Anglo-Saxonism within critical geopolitics. As section 1.1 of this Chapter shows, I took an interest in the question of agency in discourse analysis, especially in the context of critical geopolitics but in the social sciences in general. Martin Müller (2016, 53) notes that "textual deconstruction in critical geopolitics … has an uneasy relationship with notions of agency." Notions of agency seemed to me to be a challenging but also under-examined way of looking at individuals who produce the texts of geopolitics.

---

[1] My encounter with Anglo-Saxonism actually began my first year as an undergraduate student at Middlebury College. While wandering the library's stacks, I found a red-bound copy of Sinclair Kennedy's The Pan-Angles (1914), a call for the federation of the English-speaking peoples on the basis of common racial heritage and shared democratic institutions. My fascination with Pan-Anglism as a movement stuck, and I wrote my undergraduate thesis in History on the topic. I recognized that there were geographic themes underpinning the narratives and argumentation of Pan-Anglism, but I would have to wait until beginning coursework at the University of Idaho as a Master's student in Geography to explore these themes.

With this in mind, I decided to look for what I will call meta-narratives: what the producers of texts said about those texts. That approach meant gathering statements about published works and not necessarily from them: I needed to read other kinds of documents like correspondence and notes. So, I sought out archives. Because of time and funding constraints, I limited myself to visiting two archives. First, I listed the key figures of Anglo-Saxonism and searched for their papers. Then, I compared them to each other to assess which combination of archives would provide the most cohesive story and the best and most plentiful data.

I settled on visiting the archives of Herbert Baxter Adams and Edward Augustus Freeman, located at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom, respectively. These men were historians working in the mid- to late-19th century in Britain and the United States, respectively, and together they were two of the leading figures in pioneering the Teutonic Origins Theory—the core of Anglo-Saxonism—that gained popularity among Anglo-American historians in the late 19th century. Their stories were intertwined: Freeman was "the Prince of the Teutonists" who proselytized the Teutonic Origins Theory in England, and Adams took up Freeman's cause on the other side of the Atlantic (Anderson 1981, 39). They corresponded regularly, meaning that I often encountered Adams's letters among Freeman's papers and vice versa.

Each archive was also extensive, a necessary characteristic for this kind of project. The contents of Freeman's and Adams's archives include manuscripts of published works, research notes, lecture notes, personal and professional correspondence, newspaper clippings relevant to their work or interests, and, in Freeman's case, sketches and hand-drawn maps for his books. Since the texts of these archives are plentiful and accessible, and because they contain both publicly-disseminated works (contributions to a public discourse around Anglo-Saxonism) and personal documents detailing the production of those works (meta-narratives), I relied primarily on these texts for the data for my thesis (417 documents chosen from the archives for relevance; see Appendix A for the full list).

Before traveling to the archives in May 2018, I drew up a list of certain things I wanted to find. I would not be able to go through all the archival material as both archives were substantial: Adams's papers measured 28.5 cubic feet in boxes, and Freeman's were 29.5 linear feet on a shelf. I decided to look for two main kinds of statements among the documents I read: first, usages of geographic metaphor and imagery in argumentation (this is a project about a geopolitical ideology, after all); and second, evidence that Freeman and Adams produced and disseminated their texts in an intentional and conscious way. I have provided a list (Table 2) showing verbatim the things I looked for in the archives:

Table 2: What I hoped to find in the archives

Geography in Argumentation	Place-based experiences (Freeman in Greece, English places)
	Maps, other peoples/races, othering
	Specific historical examples and how they're used
	EAF 3/4 (maps for books): what place names are used? Saxon or Norman?
Statements Related to Agency	What influences there were on their work; what consciousness there was about their doing something new, changing a discourse
	Efforts to disseminate work
	Why they wrote what they did, for what purpose

With these main research goals in mind, I used the respective catalogs online to select the boxes and folders among whose contents I would be mostly likely to find the kinds of statements I wanted. I focused mainly on correspondence between the major players of Anglo-Saxonism. Appendix A lists the boxes I flagged for review before arriving at the archive and compares them to what I ended up reviewing once there. Of course, this was a limited approach, but necessarily so because of the constraints of time and funding. Reviewing every single document in both archives would entail several months of constant review, which was beyond the scope of this thesis. Each day, I would tell the staff members at the archives which boxes I would like to review the next day. Often, this was informed by the documents I had read that day: for example, I came across several mentions of James Bryce in the correspondence between Adams and Freeman, so I ordered the box containing Adams's correspondence with Bryce for the next day. Sometimes, what I had ordered turned out to be far less useful than I had hoped. For instance, I had asked to see the boxes containing Freeman's manuscripts for several of his books, assuming they would at least contain outlines and marginal notes. These were pre-typewriter days, however,[2] and the manuscripts were simply thousands of pages on which Freeman had hand-written the text of his books to be sent to the printer.

I should mention briefly the impact of visiting the archives in person. Physically handling materials like correspondence tends to ground the research and the individuals being studied. In my case, investigating the lives of 19th century academics while operating in a 21st century academic environment meant constant reminders that these individuals were humans leading lives in recognizable contexts. In a letter to Adams, William Howe Tolman wrote of his understanding that "a

---

[2] I found the cursive handwriting style of the day somewhat difficult to read at first. I was overjoyed when Adams sent Freeman a typed letter filled with enthusiasm for his new typewriter.

large amount of compensation which lecturers before Universities receive is paid in glory;" as such, he would appreciate a "sufficiently 'non-modest'" honorarium for his lecture (HBA 1/16).[3] I am sure that many of today's scholars can relate to that sentiment.

After I finished my time in the archives, I summarized the main themes of what I had found. I used these themes to formulate the research questions I will detail below (in Table 3 and section 1.2.1). Next, I began to delve into the literature of critical geopolitics that I presented above. Alongside this literature, I read through work by Michel Foucault (Foucault 1990 and 2002; Bevir 1999) and Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1984, 6–7; Mathieu 2009, Kebede 2011) to help me formulate an epistemological framework for my project with respect to agency and structure.

In terms of a more specific methodology, I drew from the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). The DHA is particularly appropriate as a template for my analysis because of its critical focus on discursive material produced by those in power and its stance on the structuralism of discourse. The DHA "critically analyzes the language use of those in power" because texts produced by powerful individuals are "means to gain and maintain power" (*ibid.*, 88). The DHA takes a position on structure and agency similar to the one I have outlined above, conceiving of discourses as both "socially constituted and socially constitutive" (*ibid.*, 89). Of the five main discursive strategies that Reisigl and Wodak (*ibid.*, 94) propose investigating with the DHA, I found statements exhibiting strategies of nomination (constructing actors/objects/phenomena discursively by naming them in a different way), argumentation (using fallacies in justifying a truth regime), and perspectivization (framing the speaker/writer's position and involvement with or distance from the text). I add to these strategies those of simplification (Kwon et. al. 2013, 283) and assimilation (Wodak et. al. 1999, 33), which aim to create a vision of (spatial) homogeneity and narrative simplicity by ignoring complexity and heterogeneity.

The first steps of the DHA apply to collecting and preparing the data for all of my research questions, so I present them here (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 96):

1. Identify the main topics of the discourse and its main actors: I reviewed the historical

literature on Anglo-Saxonism and a later but related political movement, Pan-Anglism. These

---

[3] A note on citation: I will name the source (e.g., letter from Adams to D.C. Gilman, 3 July 1882) and give its location in the archives according to the archive's own internal reference system. Sources from Johns Hopkins Libraries (Herbert Baxter Adams Papers) will appear as HBA Series#/Box# (/Folder# when applicable), and sources from the John Rylands Library (Papers of Edward Augustus Freeman) will appear as EAF Series#/Sub-series#/Item#. Texts published by these two historians and encountered in the archives will be cited separately. Any emphasis within quotes (words bolded, italicized, underlined, or struck through) are original. Text within brackets [] indicates my comments or summaries. Ellipses (…) indicate removed text.

sources led me to recognize Edward Augustus Freeman and Herbert Baxter Adams as two of the most prominent figures in the movement of Anglo-Saxonism. Their archives also happened to be very large (over 25 linear feet for each archive) and contained a mix of published works, lecture and personal notes, and personal correspondence. Given the prominence of the two historians and the size of their archives, I selected them as the subjects of my analysis.

2. Collect data: Both archives supplied extensive catalogs of their contents, from which I selected which documents to review (the archives being too large to review in their entireties). My review of the historical literature in Step 1 also led me to the names of the other prominent historians and politicians involved with Anglo-Saxonism, so I chose to review the correspondence between them and my two subjects. I also reviewed notes the two historians prepared for either writing published works whose content was relevant to Anglo-Saxonism or lectures whose content was relevant to Anglo-Saxonism. Both inside and outside of the archives, I read through their published works that dealt with the themes of Anglo-Saxonism. In Freeman's case, I studied the scrapbook he maintained while giving a lecture tour in the United States (1881–1882). This scrapbook primarily contained newspaper clippings responding to his tour and his published works.

3. Prepare data: Within the texts that I chose to examine, I searched for and selected the specific statements that were most relevant to my project. Since my research questions were not yet formulated, I searched broadly, selecting statements containing references to the historians' own published works, to their academic lineage, and to similar historical revisionist movements with analogous geopolitical implications; or statements involving spatial metaphor used to further arguments about the English-speaking peoples. In addition, I assigned the texts containing these statements to specific genres based on their type: published work, notes, or correspondence (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 90). After formulating my research questions, I flagged the statements for relevance to a certain research question. I kept all of my data (selected statements, details and genre of the text in which they were found, and flags for relevancy to a research question) in a single word processor file so that I could easily search the document.

4. Formulation of the following research questions, each with attendant hypotheses and more specific methods: With these questions formulated, I flagged the statements selected in Step 3 according to what research question(s) they were most relevant. Each of the three research questions (1 through 3) corresponds with a chapter (2 through 4).

1.2.1 Research Questions

Table 3: Research Questions

Research Questions
1. What was the geopolitical discourse of Anglo-Saxonism? How and why were certain spatial visions deployed as a part of Anglo-Saxonism, and what other rhetorical devices were used?
2. Was Anglo-Saxonism—as a movement of both historical revisionism and geopolitical ideology—the product of intentional agents acting consciously?
3. Why did Freeman and Adams focus on the history of local institutions and emotional connections to places when their overarching themes were distinctly global in scope? Why study the minute and the small-scale when global geopolitical hegemony was the objective?

        Since Anglo-Saxonism as an historical phenomenon is understudied from an historical perspective (see, however, Anderson 1981, Horsman 1981, Brundage and Cosgrove 2007), and has not been touched by the subdiscipline of critical geopolitics, the second chapter of my thesis begins with a brief narrative of the origins of Anglo-Saxonism, and the Epilogue to the thesis details its growth and effects. I use the archival texts alongside published works on Anglo-Saxonism and its historical context to narrate the construction of new, revisionist retellings of history that ended up having far-reaching effects on such political and diplomatic events as the Anglo-American Rapprochement.

        The second, third, and fourth chapters answer my three research questions (shown in Table 2 below) by analyzing the texts I gathered at the two respective archives. Textual analysis should get at how people make sense of the world (McKee 2003). So, my ultimate goal in analyzing these texts is to reconstruct the worldview of Freeman and Adams, particularly as they pertained to their respective writings and their views on race in contemporary geopolitics. While the methods of textual discourse analysis in human geography are rarely defined explicitly, they commonly focus on two touchstones: the context or social setting in which the text is produced and interpreted, and the structure and rhetoric of the text itself (Lees 2004, Dittmer 2010). All three of my research questions involve elements of each touchstone.

1. What was the geopolitical discourse of Anglo-Saxonism? How and why were certain spatial visions deployed as a part of Anglo-Saxonism, and what other rhetorical devices were used?

Hypothesis: Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism used geographic imagery as a discursive technique to give Anglo-Saxonism the aura of objectivity and common sense (Ó Tuathail 1996, 30) that produce its truth regime (Lees 2004, 102).

Methods: I looked for spatial imagery of historical narratives (e.g., Freeman's Three Homes thesis, or the often-cited declaration that history moves west) as cases of language put to a "world building" task (Gee 2005). Using the techniques of the Discourse-Historical Approach, I looked for examples of nomination strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94), for strategies of simplification (Kwon et. al. 2013) and assimilation (Wodak et. al. 1999), and for uses of place names as synecdoche (*ibid.*). These strategies are detailed above. For example, Freeman's naming of Saxony ("Old England"), England, and New England as the "Three Homes of the English" constitutes a nomination strategy of discourse. By naming the three geographic regions as he does, he constructs a "geopolitical vision" of those spaces that claims both the spaces and peoples of several different nationalities as kin to the English-speaking peoples (Dijkink 1996).

2. Was Anglo-Saxonism—as a movement of both historical revisionism and geopolitical ideology—the product of intentional agents acting consciously?

Hypothesis: Yes. Their documents indicate that they were aware that they were breaking with the dominant theories accepted in their discipline and in political discourse. They also displayed both an eagerness to disseminate their ideas and a striking awareness of the potential power of geopolitical ideologies done right.

Methods: Studying the conscious intentions of actors does not fit neatly into any of the outlined categories of discourse analysis (e.g., Lees 2004, Dittmer 2010): it is not just looking at the societal context of a text or its rhetorical structure since the text itself has to be used as evidence used to reconstruct not the discourse but the agent. There are not clear precedents for this kind of approach in geography, nor does the DHA address agency sufficiently. Given this novelty, I had to seek out and combine different approaches as best as possible. In particular, I looked at intentions through the lens of the discursive construction of agency (van Leeuwen 2000, Scollon 2001); and I looked at consciousness using Giddens's (1984) concept of discursive consciousness.

First, I gathered statements about the purposes of their texts to examine how Freeman and Adams created a discourse of agency about themselves. Discourses of agency can take several forms, and here I followed Scollon (2001) and van Leeuwen (2000). Scollon

advocates a theory of anticipatory discourse, finding the conception of human agency held by the individual in question. This conception can be summarized as the individual's stance towards the efficacy of his or her own actions in the future, defined by two axes (*ibid.*, 106; see Figure 2 below). On one axis is a spectrum of epistemological stances towards the future, ranging from oracular to probabilistic to agnostic ('I can know the future' to 'I cannot know the future'). On an agency axis, the spectrum ranges from fatalistic to agentive ('my actions will have no effect' to 'my actions will have my intended effect'). Scollon maintains that an individual's anticipation of the future will intersect with the social context to produce actions or texts (*ibid.*, 105). In this way, anticipatory discourse seeks to understand the context of a text or action.

oracular

Knowledge Axis

fatalistic ——————————————————— agentive

Agency Axis

agnostic
Figure 1, Scollon 2001, 106

Figure 2: Scollon's Knowledge/Agency Framework (author's reproduction)

In a related vein, van Leeuwen (2000, 71) identifies the three elements necessary for the discursive production of purposeful action: a purposeful action to be described; the purpose of that action (a state or an end result); and a "purpose link," the relationship between the action and the purpose. The "purpose link" will generally be set off with "to," as in, "serves to" or "aims to." Although van Leeuwen describes the discursive construction of the purposes of social practices, the same methods he outlines could apply to the discursive construction of the purposes of an individual's own texts or actions.

The discursive production of purpose is closely related to the production of agency when actions or texts are linked to an individual: as van Leeuwen writes: "social actors whose actions are explicitly constructed as purposeful … are discursively empowered as intentional agents" (*ibid.*, 72). Of course, actors can also be discursively disempowered as agents: van

Leeuwen (*ibid.*, 72) details how "the purposeful action itself, the 'method,' the 'procedure,' [can be] constructed as achieving the purpose" causing human agency to disappear from view. Similarly, Wodak et. al. (1999, 35) look at "the ways in which agents are rendered anonymous or agency more generally is obscured by use of the passive voice, the use of the three tropes of personification, synecdoche and metonymy, and the use of deictic 'we.'"

Sometimes, an individual's statements about other texts can involve identifying the discursive structures at play in that individual's decision-making. This awareness can be called "discursive consciousness" (Giddens 1984, 6–7; Mathieu 2009, Kebede 2011). Giddens proposes a stratified model of the acting self, with three levels (Kebede 2011 explains this well). On one level of this model, actors have unconscious motives. On the next level, actors know how to navigate the discursive structures that order their lives, but cannot give accounts of them. Finally, actors can exhibit discursive consciousness, where they know what they are doing and can also give accounts of their action that describe discursive structures do. Since discursive consciousness involves giving accounts of the purposes and intentions behind an action, it lends itself to any argument about agency.

As Mathieu (2009, 179) notes, it is an actor's giving an account of his or her action that is important to the idea of "discursive consciousness." As such, a critique of Giddens's idea is that it assumes that producing actions and producing accounts are the same (*ibid.*, 180). Of course, what an actor thinks about his context, what account he gives of his actions, and what really produced the actions could be three entirely different things. At the very least, however, we can compare what an actor says about his context at different moments and critique the inconsistencies internal to his discourse about consciousness. To this, I turned to the deconstructive techniques of the discourse-immanent critique as it is deployed in the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 88).

Here, I looked for discussions of other ideas and projects similar to Anglo-Saxonism in published works as a means of exploring the discursive consciousness of these agents. I flagged inconsistencies between how Freeman or Adams positioned themselves relative to analogous racialized movements of historical scholarship and how they conceived of their own, theorizing that these inconsistencies in perspectivization strategies (*ibid.*, 88)— especially where the two historians criticize the other movements—showcase an awareness of the danger of political ideologies based in racial theories and their simultaneous willingness to produce them.

3. Why did Freeman and Adams focus on the history of local institutions and emotional connections to places when their overarching themes were distinctly global in scope? Why study the minute and the small-scale when global geopolitical hegemony was the objective?

Hypothesis: Studying the small-scale evolution of institutions in place effectively grounds the research and enables effective outreach to local populations and amateur historians. Adams in particular recognized the effectiveness of such a tactic alongside the power of appealing to people's emotional attachment to place. Also, studying the histories of institutions linked to a certain race allowed a slightly more nuanced position on how malleable membership in a racial group is, and to what extent it can incorporate new members of different heritages.

Methods: To answer this research question, I looked for statements about local research and local outreach strategies alongside deep description of particular places. I then compared Freeman and Adams's perspectives on place and scale to the geographic literature on place and scale to interrogate the strategies used by Freeman and Adams. Some accounts of the research and outreach strategies used by Freeman and Adams will incorporate existing historiography, but I made more use of the techniques of the Discourse-Historical Approach when dealing with texts evoking an emotional connection to place.

1.2.2 A Final Note about Methods

I should note that while I think that this archives-based approach to agency is critical geopolitics is a viable one for this case study, I recognize its limits. I believe that this study works partly because of how prolific these two men were in their journals, notes, and correspondence. Such a wealth of documents is a scholar's dream, and any scholarly work using the methods I outline here will be constrained to studying only those who left behind texts of a specific kind. The intentions and motives of the illiterate of a society—almost always those who are disprivileged in many different ways as well—will be harder to ascertain because they generally do not leave behind the same amount of personal texts documenting their lives. I do not want to argue that the critical study of geopolitics should continue to be restricted to the works of great statesmen and wise men of strategy. However, they are important and influential sources, and should be objects of critique: moreover, an agency approach allows for the assignment of guilt or innocence where a structural, deterministic perspective would not (Bevir 1999, 71). For these reasons, I attempt this proximate and intentional discourse analysis even if the methods will not necessarily be applicable to all other studies of the intentionality of individuals.

CHAPTER 2: What Was Anglo-Saxonism?

2.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the production and spread of Anglo-Saxonism as a geopolitical discourse. While Anglo-Saxonism has attracted some attention from historians (e.g., Perkins 1968, Horsman 1981, Anderson 1981, Martellone 1994, Kramer 2002, Brundage and Cosgrove 2007) and scholars of International Relations (e.g., Bell 2007, Vucetic 2011), it has not received attention from geographers. In this chapter, I will define Anglo-Saxonism and briefly trace its origins, development, and contemporary social and intellectual context, relying on existing historiography. Next, I will analyze the main rhetorical structures of Anglo-Saxonism: the grand narrative of a racial heritage linked to a path across space; the implicit and explicit construction of a hierarchy of races; and the origin of Anglo-Saxonism among an elite social class.

Anglo-Saxonism was the discursive production of an idealized Anglo-Saxon race whose lineage of free and democratic socio-political institutions could be traced continuously from Roman times to the present. In practice, the term Anglo-Saxon came to refer to the white, English-speaking peoples of the British Empire and the United States. It also came to describe a whole range of political institutions and concepts both ancient and modern, from moots to Parliaments to common law to Protestantism to capitalism to parishes. By the 1850s, Anglo-Saxon identity had been leveraged for political purposes many times (Horsman 1981); my interest is in how it became an international collective identity for some elites of the white, English-speaking world in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

2.2 Early Usages of "Anglo-Saxons" and the Beginnings of the Teutonic Origins Theory

2.2.1 Setting the Stage

By the mid-nineteenth century, the memory of the historical Anglo-Saxons was already associated with free and individualist democratic institutions (Horsman 1981, Vucetic 2011, 26). As early as the English Reformation, Anglo-Saxon precedents of a church independent from Rome were researched and invoked as support for Henry VIII's break with the Papacy; the new Anglican church subsequently sponsored the study of the Anglo-Saxon language and their religious practices (Horsman 1981, 10). In the post-Revolutionary United States, Thomas Jefferson expressed the sentiments of many new Americans of his generation when he held that "the very act of revolution … [reinforced] their links with their Anglo-Saxon ancestors." This thesis was supported by widely disseminated texts on Roman-era Germanic tribes written by Tacitus, Montesquieu, and Paul de Rapin-Thoyras (*ibid.*, 16–23).

These invocations of Anglo-Saxon heritage were for internal use relative to the state, justifying the political actions of elite agents of the state by appealing to Anglo-Saxon identity. The early part of the nineteenth century saw a slightly different use of Anglo-Saxon terminology, and it came when the colonizing English and Americans encountered other races that could be discursively defined as inferior. This inferiority, often defined by loss of territory, was then offered as further proof of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race (*ibid.*, 62–3). In this sense, Anglo-Saxonism was deployed looking outwards to justify the interactions of the "Anglo-Saxons" with Others, but the in-group defined by the term "Anglo-Saxon" was still limited by the boundaries of the state. The Epilogue to this thesis will cover this distinction and the evolution of Anglo-Saxonist stances relative to the state in greater detail.

The mid- to late-nineteenth century saw three developments that set the stage for the emergence of Anglo-Saxonism. First was an explosion of classifications of humans according to races, an ontology that was strengthened by its "discursive coalition with science" (Vucetic 2011, 27). Races were immutable categories that could be empirically ranked within hierarchies of fitness that could fluctuate according to natural selection (Walter Bagehot's 1872 Physics and Politics and Benjamin Kidd's 1894 Social Evolution applied evolutionary hypothesis to society and encouraged imperialist expansion in the name of race fitness). One of the races produced in these discourses was the Teutonic, consisting generally of German, Dutch, and Anglo-Saxon (read: white, English-speaking) peoples.

Figure 3: Map from Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe* (1881)

Second was a growing interest in tracing the historical lineage and continuity of socio-political institutions. The German historian Barthold George Niebuhr studied the continuity of Roman laws and institutions, and in doing so became "the real founder of the modern science of institutional history" (Adams 1895; see also page 12 of Adams's 30 November 1894 typescript for a lecture on "Is History Past Politics?" HBA 3/32/21). Two English historians popularized Niebuhr's brand of institutional history in England: Thomas Arnold and Sir Francis Palgrave, who found in the continuity of old Roman institutions "the key to the great riddle of general medieval history" (Adams 1895, 233). During this time, English historians began to chart in earnest the institutional history of constitutionalism in England as the "centerpiece" of their history (Anderson 1981, 38; Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 29).

Third and finally, some scholars began an interest in Anglo-Saxons as a branch of the Teutonic race, carrying democratic institutions with them to England from Germany. J.M. Kemble's 1839 *Codex Diplomaticus* and his 1849 treatise on The Saxons in England were written with a firm "conviction that the true origin of English national life was to be sought in the period of the Teutonic settlements," when Anglo-Saxon tribes from what is now northwestern Germany carried their democratic institutions with them as they conquered parts of the British Isles (Cronne 1943, 80). The Saxons in England constituted "the first fully articulated theory of the Teutonic origins of free government" (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 29), and was therefore the genesis of what came to be known as the Teutonic Origins Theory. Because of the importance placed on the Anglo-Saxons as the carriers of Teutonic institutions, supporters of the Teutonic Origins Theory could be termed Anglo-Saxonists.

2.2.2 Background on E.A. Freeman and H.B. Adams

This thesis focuses on the works of two Anglo-Saxonist historians of this era, the Englishman Edward Augustus Freeman (1823–1892) and the American Herbert Baxter Adams (1850–1901). As detailed in Chapter 1, I chose to focus on these two men partially because of the extensive papers they left behind, but also because they were the key figures in the production and dissemination of Anglo-Saxonist ideas. As noted above, references to Anglo-Saxons and their democratic ways and racialized histories of "peoples" were already part of the discursive fabric of the English-speaking world by the mid-nineteenth century. The main contribution of Freeman, Adams, and their colleagues was to link racial understandings of history with the growing field of histories of institutions and to broaden the

definition of the race of Anglo-Saxons to include white English-speaking peoples from around the British Empire and the United States.

Figure 4: Edward Augustus Freeman (left) and Herbert Baxter Adams (right)

Freeman's friend James Bryce described Freeman's life as "comparatively uneventful, as that of learned men in our time usually is" (1892, 497). Freeman was born near Birmingham in 1823, educated at Oxford (Trinity College), and lived later as "a country gentleman" of Somerleaze, Somerset. His family's wealth allowed him to "dispense with the need for a gainful profession" (*ibid.*). This meant that Freeman was free to pursue his hobbies. First among these hobbies was his passion for history, of course: it was "the love as well as the labour of his life" (*ibid.*). It translated to an enthusiasm for contemporary politics as well: Freeman actively participated in the local government of Somerset County and published fiercely political articles in periodicals (*ibid.*, 501). The only real employment of his life was as a fellow at Trinity College for the two years after receiving his degree and again as Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford for the last eight years of his life.

Freeman's interest in medieval history in general started early: when he was just 23, Freeman wrote an extended essay on "The Effects of the Conquest of England by the Normans" (1846, EAF 3/3/4). The mid-nineteenth century was also a time of revived cultural interest in the medieval era, and the influence of Romantic literature on Freeman and other English historians of the Middle Ages should not be understated (Cronne 1943, 82; Horsman 1981, 40–41). Freeman readily acknowledged

his love of Sir Walter Scott's novels in particular (see Freeman's undated essay on "Books that have Helped me," EAF 2/2/259).

A young Freeman had also encountered the work of the English historian J.M. Kemble early in life. Kemble's 1839 *Codex Diplomaticus* and his 1849 treatise on *The Saxons in England* were written with a firm "conviction that the true origin of English national life was to be sought in the period of the Teutonic settlements," when Anglo-Saxon tribes from what is now northwestern Germany carried their democratic institutions with them as they conquered parts of the British Isles (Cronne 1943, 80). The Saxons in England constituted "the first fully articulated theory of the Teutonic origins of free government" (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 29), and was therefore the genesis of what came to be known as the Teutonic Origins Theory.

Freeman's first major step into historical scholarship was to detail the continuity of Anglo-Saxon institutions after the Norman Conquest of England (Freeman 1867–1879), advancing Kemble's Teutonic Origins Theory into a later time period (to the 11th and 12th centuries rather than the 5th and 6th). Freeman's work placed him within the Whiggish school of historiography, characterized by a belief in history as incremental progress in the improvement of legal and political institutions, "moving majestically forward toward greater inclusion and freedom" (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 3). When retellings of the history of the English race became stories of progress towards greater liberty, it became easy to claim that a knack for self-government was an inherently racial trait. Freeman stood alongside fellow English historians John Richard Green and William Stubbs as the three most prominent historians of the Whiggish school (*ibid.*).

While Green's prominence in academia waned and Stubbs stuck mainly to less popular but more scholarly work, Freeman became somewhat of a sensation. Known as the "Prince of the Teutonists," he began to elaborate and popularize a racialized version of the Teutonic Origins Theory of Anglo-Saxon institutions (Anderson 1981, 39). In his 1881–1882 lecture tour of the United States, Freeman introduced audiences to his thesis of the "Three Homes of the English," invoking a vision of a path of racial heritage that stretched across particular spaces. While Adams later lauded the tour's success (HBA 2/21/12), later historians saw it as "disastrous" and over-simplified pedantry (Tulloch 1977, 827).

In addition to his ponderous tomes, Freeman published extensively in periodicals. Indeed, these articles were perhaps more influential than his books themselves (McNiven 1990, 31). Freeman wrote about present politics as much as he did past history, focusing especially on a campaign against cruelty to animals and on the Eastern Question of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. His stance

towards the Eastern Question was clear: Freeman hated the Turks because of his sympathy with the "Christians of the East," viewing that conflict as a sort of clash of civilizations (Bryce 1892, 502). This stance was imbued with racism: as Parker (1981, 840) writes, "having postulated a superior [Anglo-Saxon] race, Freeman fell to ridiculing and denouncing supposedly inferior races" (see section 2.3.2 of this chapter for more on Freeman's racist views). He seems to have been a Liberal in his policies and a conservative at heart; he supported Prime Minister William Gladstone's Home Rule for Ireland platform just because it would get Irish politicians out of Parliament (Bryce 1892, 501).

Despite Freeman's fame and prolific output, he was really only a private citizen indulging a hobby until 1884, when he was appointed to the Regius Professorship of Modern History at Oxford. He held this position for eight years until his death in 1892 while conducting archaeological fieldwork in the south of Spain. While Anglo-Saxonist interpretations of history would go on to have a significant geopolitical impact in the decades following his death (see Chapter 5 of this thesis), Freeman's legacy as an historian would be mixed. Even his friend James Bryce saw that Freeman focused almost exclusively on history as "a record of political events," ignoring other aspects of human life like art (except for architecture), culture, and economics (Bryce 1892, 499). His work was also attacked for its inaccuracies and narrow focus on only the details that supported his arguments (Lerner 1963). Racial interpretations of history would continue to gain popularity, but among historians the Teutonic Origins Theory began to fall from favor with the critiques of Freeman's work (*ibid.*).

Adams led a similarly uneventful life, as Bryce might put it. After studying at Phillips Exeter Academy and Amherst College in his home state of Massachusetts, Herbert Baxter Adams left to study for his Doctorate at Heidelberg University in the newly-formed German Empire. At Heidelberg, Adams studied the history of international affairs under his advisor, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli. He also encountered Barthold George Niebuhr's ideas on the importance of institutional history (Higham 1984, 1226). Niebuhr studied the continuity of Roman laws and institutions, and Adams named him "the real founder of the modern science of institutional history" (Adams 1895; see also page 12 of Adams's 30 November 1894 typescript for a lecture on "Is History Past Politics?" H.B. Adams Papers 3/32/21). One course at Heidelberg proved to be a "decisive experience in shaping Adams's historical thought," according to Cunningham (1981, 269–270). In a seminar on medieval history, Adams was exposed to one of the great historiographical debates of his day: whether the medieval institution of the town and its charter liberties was descended from Roman municipalities or Teutonic tribal arrangements. As one might expect, Adams fell into the latter camp.

Adams went on to cultivate an intense interest in the study of local Teutonic institutions, as showcased in one of his few publications, "The Germanic Origins of New England Towns" (Adams 1882a). This piece carried the Teutonic Origins Theory to an American audience, alleging Teutonic lineage for democratic institutions in the United States: to Adams, "the tree of English liberty certainly roots in German soil" (ibid., 13). Adams provided an in-depth analysis of how New England towns exhibited democratic characteristics that traced their origins to Germanic tribes in the time of the Romans. Analysis of legal-political institutions on such a small scale was no trivial matter, according to Adams: "in New England especially, towns were the primordial cells of the body politic." In the similarity of the New England town meetings to the moots of Saxon towns, Adams saw that "the tree of English liberty certainly roots in German soil" (ibid., 11, 13).

Upon his return to the United States, Adams secured a fellowship at the new Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, billing himself as a scholar professionally trained in the "New Historical School." At the time, the German school of historiography engaged in a "scientific" approach to history, a positivist approach that assumed the ability of the historian to remain completely neutral and approach historical evidence critically (Cunningham 1976, 244). Johns Hopkins was founded on the model of a German university, and Adams stayed on as a professor until his death in 1901.

During his 1876–1900 career at Johns Hopkins, Adams exerted a profound influence on the teaching of history in American higher education (Cunningham 1976, 244). He was a popular lecturer among students at both Johns Hopkins and at Smith College. A great irony of Adams's legacy is that he became known for the professionalization of historical scholarship with the founding of the American Historical Association: much of his efforts, however, involved reaching out to non-professionals (Higham 1984, 1227). Inspired by a belief in the authenticity of local knowledge, Adams led and encouraged outreach to local historical societies and amateur historians (see Chapter Four of this thesis). He also led the University Extension Movement in the U.S., engaging with what we would now call non-traditional students (Higham 1984, 1227). Finally, he helped to design history curricula for secondary schools (HBA 1/6).

Adams was not known as a strong scholar, but he was still an influential mentor to the next generation of American historians (Higham 1984, 1229). In particular, he passed on his fascination with local institutions, his adherence to the positivist German school of historiography, his interest in race in international politics, and his belief in the importance of stepping down from the ivory tower of academia (Cunningham 1976). Adams counted the future U.S. president Woodrow Wilson and the historian Frederick Jackson Turner among his students. Turner moved on from Adams's teachings,

advocating a theory of environmental determinism over the racial determinism of Anglo-Saxonism (Bassin 2003). Still, he continued to report his outreach to locals and local historians faithfully to Adams. While Wilson took more of an interest in national-level institutions and the discontinuities between Britain and the United States, he retained an internationalist view of world cooperation based on the institutions of the English-speaking world (Higham 1984, 1234; see also Wilson's correspondence with Adams, HBA 1/17).

2.3 The Rhetoric and Characteristics of Anglo-Saxonism

2.3.1 Spatial Visions: The Three Homes Thesis

At the heart of the Teutonic Origins Theory that spawned Anglo-Saxonism was a conception of Teutonic lineage that followed a clear path through both space and time. In a lecture on "Ethnology" (HBA 2/21/12), Adams called geography and chronology "the two eyes of history." The rhetoric Freeman used to argue the point of racial lineage was intensely geographic. It constitutes what Dijkink (1996) would call a "geopolitical vision," giving an explicit spatiality to the historical spread of a race and its institutions. As I investigate this geopolitical vision, I will use the techniques of the poststructuralist strand of critical geopolitics discourse analysis (Lees 2004, Dittmer 2010) to show how texts produced by Freeman created a "truth regime" involving spatial visions. In this strand of discourse analysis, discourses are taken not as representations of reality, but as creating their own systems of allegedly objective "truth" (Lees 2004, 102). For more specific textual analysis, I will also use methods of the Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak et. al. 1999, Reisigl and Wodak 2009, Kwon et. al. 2013) to identify specific rhetorical devices and the roles they play in creating this truth regime.

I call Freeman's geographic and historical truth regime his Three Homes Thesis. The lectures Freeman gave in the United States in 1881–1882 were mostly titled "The English People in their Three Homes." In a later summary of the lectures given in Baltimore, Adams defined the Three Homes: "The English branch of the great Germanic family of nations has had three distinct homes, one which Freeman described as Old England in Schleswig [in northwestern Germany], Middle England or what we call Old England, and New England or broadly speaking these United States of America" (HBA 2/21/12).

Figure 5: Author's Visualization of Freeman's Three Homes Thesis

So, the English people, the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons and the inheritors of their institutions, had taken these three spaces as homes. In geographically examining this idea, three key rhetorical strategies stand out: first, the idea of spatial expansion over time as 'natural' for the English people. For example, when lecturing about Freeman's Three Homes Thesis, Adams connected it to the idea that "historical progress has been one grand, continuous western march" (HBA 2/12/21). Taking this idea even further, Adams described the spread of Teutonic institutions westward to America as "so quiet, so unobtrusive, so gradual, so like the growth of vegetation in spring time—in short, so natural" (Adams 1882a, 5).

Of course, the idea of English speakers and institutions spreading only westward is quite simplified. Adams and Freeman's omission even of the other white, English-speaking inhabitants of the British Empire—such as those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa—from his Three Homes Thesis is striking. The omission here indicates an extreme oversimplification of history that make the argument possible. As Kwon et. al. (2013, 283) explain, simplification can be an effective rhetorical strategy when it reduces a complex story down to a simple one easily understood. The effect is to allow an emotional and visceral story to be shared without cumbersome details. Here, mentioning the presence of "Anglo-Saxons" all around the world, or the presence of other races in the United States or British Empire would ruin the Three Homes Thesis, or at the very least require a great deal of burdensome explanation. The solution is to simplify the story to communicate it more effectively.

The second key rhetorical strategy is the act of defining and naming the Three Homes as an example of a nomination strategy of discourse, where an actor (in this case, Freeman) constructs actors, objects, or phenomena (in this case, places) discursively by naming them in a noticeably different way from the norm (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94). As Chapter 4 will discuss, the origins of toponyms and etymologies in general attracted the interest of Freeman and Adams. Calling New England or England itself a "Home" of the English does not sound too unusual, given that those are their common names, but calling part of Germany "Old England" is certainly provocative. Its intended effect, of course, is to establish a continuity of racial heritage and institutions that includes German places as its source. In the Boston Advertiser's account of one of Freeman's 1881 lectures in the United States (EAF 5/1/10), Freeman justified his naming strategy:

> *"As the term New England is limited to a part of this country, so there is a part of the continent which is more strictly England. It is that part known as Angelnd. In England, Wessex, Sussex, and Essex are the names of the people and the name of the land, and it is probably that the name of the people there, and also on the continent, is older than the name of the land. Much the same thing has happened in Scotland. The home of the Scots was in Ireland, but we call the colonial home by the race name, just as we call the country of the English colonists by their race name. I do not take an unwarranted liberty in calling my country New Angeland [sic], or the oldest country, as Old Angelnd [sic]. But I cannot limit the latter name to a corner of the duchy of Sleswick [Schleswig]. I must carry It beyond the Elbe, beyond the mouth of the Scheldt, perhaps even to the mouth of the Saone. And it is historically accurate to give the name of New England a wider sense than the general one, so it is legitimate to extend the meaning of England."*

Nomination strategies mix with simplification strategies when it comes to calling places by their "race name." Freeman uses the example of Scotland as a place given a race name. According to Freeman, the Scots were originally from Ireland, but colonized Scotland and gave it the name of their "race." Similarly, the English colonists of New England gave it their name. So, Freeman argues that the name "Old England" can be retroactively applied to practically the whole of Germany. The maps for Freeman's Historical Geography of Europe (1881), show a similar theme: political entities are grouped by the race to which they allegedly belonged, even though the various kingdoms were not necessarily at peace with each other (see Figure 1, Appendix A). This smoothing over of differences for the sake of argument constitutes a discursive strategy of assimilation, aiming "to create … spatial (territorial) similarity and homogeneity" (Wodak et. al. 1999, 33). The effect, in this case, is to

portray a simplified struggle of race versus race in which the currency of the conflict is territory. By claiming three homes for the English people, Freeman advances an argument for the superiority of that race given its prowess at expansion (see also how contemporary maps of the British Empire showcased its vast territorial extent, e.g., Driver 2010).

The third notable rhetorical strategy used in the Three Homes Thesis is Freeman's usage of place names as synecdoche to explain his reasoning further, found also in the above passage. Synecdoche is a particular discursive strategy where the name of a part is used to refer to the whole, or vice versa (Wodak et. al. 1999, 44). For example, one could refer to soldiers engaging in an operation by saying "boots on the ground." It serves to construct sameness or inclusion between objects. Freeman notes that New England is only a part of the United States just as "Angelnd" is only a part of England. If these names can be extended in their spatial extent in this way, the name England can also be applied to other places that share the racial heritage Freeman is trying to prove. The interplay between a nomination strategy and synecdoche help Freeman to justify his claim "it is legitimate to extend the meaning of England."

Freeman used the discursive strategies of simplification (and assimilation), nomination, and synecdoche to paint a clear picture of the spatial path the Anglo-Saxon branch of the Teutonic race took in spreading its institutions from their "Old" home in Germany. In this way, the Three Homes Thesis was a clear "geopolitical vision" that told an historical story. Just as importantly, it also had implications for contemporary politics. Freeman's use of a strategy of assimilation to describe all of the Three Homes as homogeneous in terms of their racial composition could later be used as a call for greater political cooperation among the branches of that race, regardless of the "home" in which they lived.

2.3.2 Race and Racism in Anglo-Saxonism

In this section, I will discuss the racist views of Freeman and Adams to give context to the racialized ideology they promoted. Despite their focus on socio-political institutions as the carriers of a racial character, the published Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric of Freeman and Adams contains scant references to other races. This omission is curious given the importance that threatening Others typically play in similarly nationalist or racist ideologies: demarcating domestic space from a threatening Other is a classic geopolitical discursive strategy often critiqued in critical geopolitics (Müller 2008, 323; Williams 2003, 358–361; see also Said 1979 for the importance of an Other against which an identity is defined). As the Epilogue to this thesis will detail, the lack of a trumped-up threat to Anglo-Saxons might have kept it from a broad popular appeal, as it was perceived threats of common enemies (the Russian and German Empires and an increase in immigration) that would

lead to a widespread acceptance of Anglo-American friendship (Anderson 1981, Martellone 1994). Dijkink (1996, 9) suggests that the discursive creation of a pan-national identity typically involves "the necessity of an alien threat to evoke supra-national identification," and in the case of Anglo-Saxonism, that idea seems to have been borne out.

Dijkink's assertion aside, identities can also be constructed primarily on common traits (Hooson 1994, 3; Smith 1991, 4). In their discussion of the discursive strategies of nation-building, Wodak et. al. (1999, 33) note that what they call "constructive strategies" promote "unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation," and it is the former strategies that characterize the identity-constructing texts of Adams and Freeman. Adams especially emphasized the common roots of different 'races' as opposed to their disjunctures: he described ethnology as the "genealogy of nations," akin to tracing one's own family history (from a lecture on "Ethnology," HBA 2/21/12). To Adams, such a genealogy showed continuity throughout the whole of human history: the lecture went on to recommend that Americans "extend our historical piety and embrace the thought of Mother Europe and of an ancestral line of peoples reaching back to the pastoral life of the mother of nations, Central Asia, Asia the great mother of us all" (*ibid.*). He describes "a race-feeling, Racengefuehl" that draws people together, lecturing that "it is a remarkable fact that all history is based upon this race-feeling, this consciousness of distinctions in blood" (*ibid.*).

The existence and exclusion (and inferiority) of races not of Anglo-Saxon descent is usually implicit in Adams's work though he rarely referenced races other than those he considered "Anglo-Saxons," even in his personal correspondence. Instead, Adams routinely used "'we' in the service of 'linguistic imperialism,'" to use the terms of Wodak et. al. (1999, 45). Take, for example, the following sentence: "Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are only the development of those germs of liberty first planted in the communal customs of our Saxon forefathers" (Adams 1882a, 23). The phrase "our Saxon forefathers" is doing quite a bit of work in this sentence: if he meant to describe Anglo-Saxon institutions as the predecessors of American institutions, he could just as easily have said "the communal customs of the Anglo-Saxons," or something to that effect. Instead, he gives a clear indication of who he considers to be part of the larger group: those Americans and Britons thought to be descended from Anglo-Saxons.

Sometimes, however, Adams's prejudices against non-Anglo-Saxon peoples shone through. Aside from a brief reference to Slavs as "a mongrel stock" (from a lecture on "Early Germanic Institutions," HBA 2/21/10), Adams harbored an intense dislike of American Jews, complaining to Freeman (in a letter dated 9 June 1882, EAF 1/7/1–13) that "President Gilman [of Johns Hopkins] will be importing a few more Israelites into our University Realm before long. We have got three

now. One Jew applied to be a Fellow in History. His name was Rosenthal! and I "plucked" him. I [instead] nominated a graduate student from Canada named Gould, who has been here a year and has written a good paper on Local Government in Pennsylvania…." Adams mocks the Jewish student's name and identifies him only as a Jew; the Canadian student, on the other hand, enjoys the luxury of having his work (on a topic interesting to Adams, no less) praised. Just as salient in this passage is Adams's complaint that three Jewish scholars are working alongside him at the same university.

Adams's main complaint against Jews in his department specifically was that he objected to "putting a premium upon Oriental studies … at the expense of English studies and Modern History and Modern Politics, represented in this University by more than one hundred students of English blood" (letter to Freeman, dated 1 May 1884, EAF 1/7/1–13). This single sentence contains a great deal of information about the way in which Adams was constructing the "English" identity versus "Jewish" or "Oriental" identities. Aside from the simple prioritization of "English studies" over "Oriental studies" is the assertion that "Oriental studies" are not included in "Modern History and Modern Politics"—that they are irrelevant to the modern world. His equation of the students "of English blood" and the study of modern history and politics is another interesting rhetorical device.

Freeman was a little more forthcoming when it came to his racist biases, and some of his views on both African-Americans and Irish-Americans are particularly horrendous (see Parker 1981 on "The Racial Ideas of E.A. Freeman"). In both a private letter to John Richard Green (26 December 1881, EAF 1/8) and in a very public article (Freeman 1882, EAF 2/2/181), Freeman wrote that "My sentiment that it would be well if every Irishman killed a nigger and was hanged for it meets with favour both North and South. So it must be right. The only object … I sometimes hear is that, without Irish and Niggers, they would have no servants." In the letter to Green, he cites an unnamed book by Jefferson Davis to say that "The shades of niggerdom be endless; some be all but apes, some, all but Aryans. No doubt this mainly comes from mixture with Aryans, but I suspect …. that it comes also from originated difference" since Europeans brought slaves to the Americas from different parts of Africa. These occasional references to the inferiority of African-Americans, Jewish Americans, and Irish-Americans show the biases that underpinned Freeman's and Adams's conceptions of the world's racial hierarchy.

That most of the above examples of racist thought come from private correspondence is important. With the exception of subtle creations of in- and out-groups (as in Adams's use of "we") and Freeman's explicit comments on Irish- and African-Americans, racial biases only shine through when Adams and Freeman correspond with their friends and colleagues in confidence. I believe that this relative omission in published texts constitutes another example of the discursive strategy of

simplification (Kwon et. al. 2013, 283). When constructing a grand narrative of racial homogeneity, other races are inconvenient. Leave them out, and the story of a unified branch of the Teutonic race expanding across space becomes much easier to tell.

2.3.3 The Elitism of Anglo-Saxonism

Ignoring other races was partly possible in early Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric because of its popularity solely among an elite and homogeneous transatlantic group. Anglo-Saxonism, especially in its origins and earliest forms, was an elite movement that tried to gain popular appeal to only mixed success. Kramer (2002, 1326) credits "the success of Anglo-Saxonism as a racial-exceptionalist bridge between the United States and the British Empire" as "due in part to the social, familial, intellectual, and literary networks that tied elite Americans and Britons together." Tulloch (1977, 825) describes the increase of Anglo-American goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic as "effected by a small body of academics, jurists and intellectuals whose writings in learned journals, legal textbooks and works of comparative politics lacked extensive appeal." Higham (1984, 1228) explains the appeal of Teutonist and specifically Anglo-Saxonist ideas to elite Americans by pointing to the "strongly libertarian inflection" given to these ideas by English historians.

Freeman acknowledged publicly the significance of the elite setting in which his lecture tour occurred. In his essay "Some Impressions of the United States," published in The Fortnightly Review in August 1882 (Freeman 1882, 122–134; EAF 2/2/181), Freeman warned that the "impressions" at hand would be "frightfully one-sided. It is not easy to write quite impartially of a land in which a man has received so cordial a welcome and such constant and unmixed kindness as I received in America. … I was naturally thrown mainly among men whose thoughts and pursuits had some kind of likeness to my own. I lived chiefly with professors, lawyers, a sprinkling of statesmen, men of thought and information of various kinds."

Even the audiences that came to see Freeman's lectures seemed to belong to an elite social class. In an account of one of his lectures in New York City, the New York Times (20 October 1881, EAF 5/1/10) described the audience that attended as "both cultured and cosmopolitan," and that it "welcomed him warmly." While Freeman was still in Baltimore (on 22 November 1881, EAF 1/8), he wrote to John Richard Green that he was "very happy so far: the cultivated [emphasis added] Americans are as desirable people as you could wish for … a goodly stock to be in."

As happy Freeman might have been with the "cultivated" character of his American hosts, they represented only a small fraction of the American population. Following Freeman's lecture tour, Adams composed notes on the lecture to be given as a summary (HBA 2/21/12). In these notes,

Adams described "the object of [Freeman's] course" as "to show to popular American audiences [emphasis added] that there is really no dividing wall between England and America or between England and Germany." If Freeman's reception was in fact largely elite in its composition, then the goal of disseminating the Teutonic Origins Theory to "popular American audiences" failed. Indeed, the newspaper clippings that Freeman saved from his journey point to this shortcoming (EAF 5/1/10). The clippings contain responses to Freeman's lecture tour, and are generally positive reviews (of 164 articles, 93 were positive): the negative reviews come from periodicals such as The Catholic Review and the Jewish World.

Even some positive reviews contained amusing critiques of Freeman's style and fervor, noting his "crusty temper" or his "comical insistence on his theory of the unity of the English," of which he was "altogether too sure" (respectively: the New York Herald, 8 October 1881; the Commercial Advertiser, 14 November 1882; and an undated and unnamed article, all in EAF 5/1/10). Even Adams admitted the "wearisome persistence" with which Freeman argued his points (HBA 2/21/12). The most biting criticisms came, however, from those Americans who did not identify with an English heritage, Anglo-Saxon or otherwise. The Catholic Review published an article entitled "Mr. Freeman and the Irish in America" (EAF 5/1/10; undated, but it refers to Freeman's August 1882 article in The Fortnightly Review), critiquing Freeman's lectures as appealing only to the most elite of Americans, and that Freeman mistook them as representative of the entire population. The mockery the article makes of this class of Americans is worth quoting at length:

> *"Mr. Freeman, when he came over here, was taken hold of by a little coterie, eager always to capture any English lion, even though the animal in question be really an ass in a lion's skin. These are of the Anglo-American Mania Colony, all of whom profess to date back from the Mayflower or thereabouts. They are apt to forget that the colonies of North America have by dint of blood and death-struggle with England grown into the great Republic of the United States. They are more anxious to be English than American, and are welcome to their choice. They are of the watery blood and sandy grit that constituted the Tory during the Revolutionary War."*

As the next section of this chapter will show, the key limit to Anglo-Saxonism at this stage was this very elitist character (Vucetic 2011, 23). Historians (e.g., Blake 1945, 236–241; Perkins 1968, 6) have posited that the main reason a proposed 1897 treaty between the United States and the British Empire failed was the fear of otherwise Anglophilic American Senators alienating their (mostly Irish) constituents. Foreshadowing Dijkink, a successful appeal to broader American

audiences would have to wait until common threats posed by enemy states brought the general populations of the British Empire and the United States together.

2.3.5 Adams's Legacy: Wilson, Turner, and Hosmer

Despite his success as an inspiring lecturer and mentor, Adams was not noted for the strength of his scholarship. In fact, his theses of institutional continuity (and the racial basis for it) were often contradicted by his own students. Adams did not bother to debate them, but often accepted their conclusions (Higham 1984, 1229–1236). While his protege James K. Hosmer would follow exactly in his footsteps and even take Anglo-Saxonism further (see the next section), two of Adams's slightly dissident students, Woodrow Wilson and Frederick Jackson Turner, would go on to influence global politics and historical scholarship to a tremendous degree. Wilson began to take more of an interest in national institutions and the discontinuities between Britain and the United States (Higham 1984, 1234). Still, the internationalist view that Wilson championed during World War I and the Paris Peace Conference can at least partially be attributed to Adams's teachings on comparative politics (Wilson expressed his appreciation for these courses in correspondence with Adams; HBA, 1/17).

One of the Adams's most significant legacies was his import of the methods of the new "Scientific History" from Germany to the universities of the United States (Cunningham 1976, 244). Cunningham writes that "this new school of historiography was essentially an adaptation of German scholarship to American usages, and its leading proponents had, like Adams, been professionally trained in German universities" (*ibid.*, 244). Practitioners of "Scientific History" claimed "a methodologically critical [and rigorous] approach to historical evidence," based on "the premises and principles of the natural sciences" and undistorted by the historian's own biases (Bassin 2003, 19).

There was a contradiction at the heart of applying "Scientific History" to the study of national character, however. Bassin (2003, 20–21) explains this well, writing that "a universalizing social science wanted to explain how all societies were essentially similar … while exceptionalist, nationalist historiography was concerned with demonstrating how and why societies did in fact differ, and indeed naturally." A possible way out of this dilemma was environmental determinism, a belief that geographic location in a certain natural environment will cause both organisms and human institutions thought to function as organisms (like the state) to develop in a certain way.

By the mid-1890s, many historians, led by none other than Herbert Baxter Adams's student Frederick Jackson Turner, turned back to national exceptionalist views of American history as environmental determinism took over from racial determinism (Bassin 2003). Turner's frontier hypothesis of 1893 (Turner 1963 [1893]) quickly became "the single most popular and enduring

historical explanation of the genesis and character of the American nation-hood ever offered" (Bassin 2003, 19). In Turner's view, it was the expansion into and taming of the American West that turned European settlers into Americans: American history boiled down to "the record of 'European germs developing in an American environment'" (*ibid.*, following Turner 1963 [1893]). This narrative holds that the environment forged the national character of the United States into something completely different from its European roots. In taking such a stance, it allows for both a "Scientific" approach of positivist cause-and-effect and an exceptionalist American nationalism. The American race was unique, and, moreover, it needed to continue to expand to maintain that peculiar national character.

Tulloch (1977, 828) describes Anglo-Saxonism (in the context of the work of James Bryce, a contemporary and friend of both Adams and Freeman) as emphasizing racial origins, "a premise which is essentially contra-Turner, which emphasizes racial as against environmental determinants, people rather than place [emphasis added] and which asserts that the line of democratization is latitudinal and not longitudinal." However, Anglo-Saxonism alleged some environmental determinants, just earlier on chronologically, and Tulloch writes that "[some] historians tend to exaggerate Turner's novelty—in many ways the graduate of Johns Hopkins simply replaced the Teutonic by the Mississippi forests" (*ibid.*).

I take some issue with Tulloch's characterization of Anglo-Saxonism as a movement focusing on racial rather than environmental determinants, or on "people rather than place" (*ibid.*). As Chapter 4 of this thesis will show, Anglo-Saxonist historians and especially Adams framed their work as institutional history, focusing on the local institutions of small towns as "the germs of [American] state and national life" (Adams 1882a, 5). In this sense, an obsession with place, the microscale, and the physical environment was an important feature of Anglo-Saxonism. In contrast to theories of environmental determinism like Turner's Frontier Thesis, however, Anglo-Saxonism focused on how people transform and create places, rather than on how places shape people. Even a chapter of Freeman's Historical Geography of Europe (1881) entitled "Effects of Geography on History" mostly describes the paths different races took in their migrations and the contours of expanding and contracting empires.

While Wilson and Turner strayed from their mentor's exact path, Anglo-Saxonism continued to gain popularity. Even before Adams's other student, James K. Hosmer, began publishing, other historians took up the glorification of Anglo-Saxons and gave Anglo-Saxonism urgency and popularity by connecting it to contemporary issues. In particular, historian John Fiske and pastor and social reformer Josiah Strong acknowledged and legitimized popular fears of non-Anglo-Saxon immigration (Fiske 1885, Strong 1885). Fiske even served as president of the Immigration Restriction

League while he resurrected the national exceptionalist idea of Manifest Destiny and gave it the international racial exceptionalist bent of Anglo-Saxonism (Anderson 1981, 56). Strong's (1885) book *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* served to popularize theories of racial Darwinism by turning that secular doctrine into a part of God's plan (Anderson 1981, 32–34). Strong reuses some tropes of Anglo-Saxonism, but gives them an evangelical flavor. To Strong, God "is training the Anglo-Saxon race" for "the final competition of races." Because of their role as God's missionary people on earth, "it is chiefly to the English and American peoples that we must look for the evangelization of the world" (Strong 1885, 174–175, 161). Hosmer (1890) would go on to play on these racist fears of immigration to advocate for greater cooperation between the English-speaking peoples of the world, helping to popularize Anglo-Saxonism and lead it into the next stage of its development into a political ideology with specific goals.

2.4 Conclusion

Ó Tuathail (1996, 33) notes the importance of spatializing history as an effective discursive strategy in creating an allegedly objective truth regime, and Freeman's Three Homes Thesis fits that interpretation well. The most salient of Freeman's rhetorical devices is the use of simplification (Kwon et. al. 2013) and the related strategy of assimilation (Wodak et. al. 1999), both of which involve omitting details that disprove or distract from the main point: in this case, the expansion of a homogeneous branch of the Teutonic race across space. This commitment to strategies of simplification explain why Adams and Freeman exhibited explicitly racist attitudes in private correspondence but generally left them out in their published works. This omission worked perfectly well when it came to attempts to appeal to the relatively homogenous elite classes on both sides of the Atlantic, but it encountered resistance among Americans who did not identify with Anglo-Saxon heritage, particularly Irish-Americans and Jewish Americans. The task of appealing to a broader swath of the English-speaking peoples would fall to the successors of Freeman and Adams, who played on racist fears of immigrants and geopolitical threats.

CHAPTER 3: Intentionality and Geopolitical Discourse

3.1 Intentionality and the Discursive Production of Agency through Context

In this chapter, I will argue that the discursive production of a context to one's work produces a parallel discourse of one's agency in producing that work. The context of the text can include its purpose, its predicted effect, its influences, and its relationship with other texts and similar ideas. I begin by looking at how Adams and his student, James Hosmer, constructed the action of producing their texts as purposeful, using the literature on the discursive production of purpose and agency (van Leeuwen 2000, Scollon 2001). Next, I examine how Adams constructed the idea of academic lineage, the influence of others on his own texts. I argue that this discursive construction reduces Adams's agency by showing his work as dependent on others, but that it also serves to empower and defend his work by situating it in the company of an accepted body of literature. Finally, I take a striking inconsistency in two texts published by Freeman and use the textual analysis techniques of the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2009) to show that Freeman's inconsistent positioning relative to Anglo-Saxonism and a similar set of ideas shows what Giddens (1984, 7) would call discursive consciousness. My conclusion is that Freeman, Adams, and Hosmer were intentional and conscious agents of discursive change.

3.2 The Construction of Purpose

Adams laid out the intentions behind his and Freeman's work in clear terms, empowering both actors as agentive. A letter from Adams to the president of Johns Hopkins, D.C. Gilman (3 July 1882, HBA 1/18), Adams pitches two ideas: first, that "it will be a good thing for the University if we can ally with us the Historical Societies and quasi historians in all the seaboard States." This statement refers to Adams's interest in outreach to local historical societies, covered in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis. In the statement itself, Adams describes a purposeful action (the alliance with local historical societies) and the purpose ("a good thing for the University"), with the purpose link implied.

This statement becomes an empowerment of Adams as an agent when the rhetorical role of the pronoun "we" is considered. Adams claims that "a good thing for the University" will be the alliance between historical societies and "us." What is the link between "us" doing something and "the University?" The answer is that this is a metonymic use of "we" (Wodak et. al. 1999, 47), specifically "we" as synecdoche. By using the pronoun "we," Adams groups himself with Gilman and with the University as a whole. This use of a part (two individuals associated with the University) to refer to a whole (the University) is a classic example of synecdoche, and its effect is to empower Adams by drawing Gilman and the University into a whole that includes him. Gilman and Johns

Hopkins then become enabling resources on which Adams will draw to execute his plan, empowering him as even more agentive.

The second idea Adams pitched to Gilman is "a feasible plan of cooperation" with English historians. The reason behind this plan was that "there is a particular propriety in united English effort in the direction of historical science; for the history of the two countries is one." More explicitly, Adams states that "the whole tenor of our researches at the J.H.U. is to show the continuity of English institutions in American [sic]." This is a perfect example of a purposeful statement: the purposeful action is "our researches at the J.H.U.," and the purpose link is the "to" clause containing the purpose itself, which is "to show the continuity of English institutions" in the United States. Again using "we" as synecdoche, Adams constructs his own agency by grouping himself with the institutional resources of Johns Hopkins.

Adams even adds in a spatial metaphor for the travel of knowledge and prestige, writing that cooperation with English historians would be like having "a scientific tentacle reaching over England and drawing life to our little Baltimore centre from the best intellectual resources of the old world" (*ibid.*). Examined closely, this statement also qualifies Adams's conception of his own agency. Van Leeuwen (2000, 74) notes that when an action and its purpose are viewed as a mechanism, "human agency disappears from view and the purposeful action itself, the 'method,' the 'procedure,' is constructed as achieving the purpose." The outcome of the project Adams wishes to launch will be positive, but here the project itself, referred to metaphorically as a "scientific tentacle," will do the work. I contend that while this metaphor removes Adams himself from the picture, rendering himself less agentive, it still constructs the idea of a community of scholars who become resources upon which Adams's plan will draw. Describing himself as able to draw on "the best intellectual resources of the old world" (*ibid.*) sounds impressive and serves to support Adams's construction of his abilities as agentive.

Adams goes on to make a similar statement about the cooperation with "State Historical Societies," the cooperation with which "will seems naturally to evolve into … more satisfactory historical representation for England, Old and New." These statements, however, did not exist in isolation, as they formed part of the same letter to Gilman in which he asserts his own intentionality and therefore agency. With this context in mind, we can consider Adams's stance as agentive but also involving a conception of himself as part of a larger project. As the next section (3.3.1) will detail, Adams constructed his own agency as only moderately agentive because of the credit he gives his predecessors.

Adams also constructed Freeman's lecture tour as purposeful and therefore agentive. When giving a lecture summarizing Freeman's earlier lecture (HBA 2/21/12), Adams asserted that "the object of [Freeman's lecture tour] was to show to popular American audiences that there is really no dividing wall between England and America or between England and Germany. We are all parts of one common stock." This is a clear statement of intention and subsequently empowers Freeman as agentive. To Adams, the tour was also a great success (despite what some newspapers wrote: see section 2.2.3 of this thesis). In an 1894 lecture entitled "Is History Past Politics?" (HBA 1/18/21), Adams rejoiced that the idea of history as the result of politics in the past (and that present politics will yield future history) "has made a profound if not a permanent impress upon the minds of many young Americans. It has entered into their consciousness and into their studies of institutional history."

I contend that this latter statement shows Adams's rhetoric as operating on a level of discursive consciousness (Giddens 1984, 6; Kebede 2011). Giddens defines discursive consciousness as the ability to give accounts for one's actions that include an understanding of the discursive structures at play (see section 3.1 of this chapter). In this claim, Adams described the success of the idea of institutional history, one that has entered into the consciousness of "many young Americans" (HBA 1/18/21). Combined with his statements constructing himself as an agentive evangelist for this same idea, Adams's account of the success of this idea shows that he has some conception of his own navigation of discursive structures.

As mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Adams's student James K. Hosmer would go on to help popularize Anglo-Saxonism by playing on fears of immigration into the United States, and he would become one of the first to advocate for a full federation between the United States and the British Empire on the grounds of race and shared institutions (see Hosmer 1890 and Anderson 1981). Hosmer's correspondence and his published works paint a picture of an historian extremely conscious of the intended purposes of his historical scholarship as political propaganda. In a letter to Adams (6 February 1888, HBA 1/8), Hosmer wrote that "I write my book in the intent of a closer interdependence among the great branches of the English-speaking race." This stance towards the intent of his book shows Hosmer as an actor confident in his own agency and purposes.

Hosmer was also clear about how his book(s) would foster that "closer interdependence": he would need to make the ideas of Anglo-Saxonism accessible to a popular audience. When writing a book about Samuel Adams as a hero who used the Anglo-Saxon institution of town meetings to help bring about American independence (Hosmer 1886), he wrote to Adams that "something less voluminous will have a better chance to get hold of the world and make [Samuel Adams] properly

known" (5 April 1883 letter from Hosmer to Adams, HBA 1/8). In Hosmer's view, his book would need to be short and to the point for his ideas to be accessible to a broad audience (for the record, the resulting book was 456 pages long).

Hosmer described the niche that his 1890 book A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom would fill in its Preface (Hosmer 1890, vi):

> *"While works upon the constitutional history, both of England and America, abound, they for the most part appeal, both as to size and style, rather to the scholar and the statesman, than to the general reader and the youthful student. Moreover, in such works it has too seldom happened that the constitutional history of the English-speaking race has been regarded en solidarité: but in this way it is both proper and expedient to regard that history. ... There ought to be room for a book succinct and simple in its terms, which should tell to busy men and to youth in the class-room, the story of Anglo-Saxon freedom…"*

Between this passage and his declaration of his intent to induce the "closer interdependence" between the English-speaking peoples, Hosmer made the purpose of his work clear in explicit terms. In so doing, he empowers himself discursively. In Scollon's framework, Hosmer takes on a stance towards the future that is agentive and at least somewhat prophetic: he was confident that his book would have a positive impact on Anglo-American relations (Scollon 2001, 106). Taking this passage alongside his concerns about effecting a "closer interdependence" among the English-speaking peoples of the world, Hosmer saw the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism as limited in its appeal, and he actively sought to correct that.

With these statements of purpose, Adams and Hosmer construct themselves and Freeman as agents of discursive change according to van Leeuwen's framework. In addition, Adams positioned himself as influential and able to draw on certain enabling resources by associating himself with institutions like Johns Hopkins University. Adams and Hosmer also exhibited a consciousness of the discursive structures which they would need to navigate and influence in order to spread their way of looking at the world. All told, this evidence points to Adams and Hosmer as intentional and conscious agents in spreading the ideas of Anglo-Saxonism.

3.3 The Construction of Academic Lineage

3.3.1 Influence and Close Position as Limiting Agency

Just as modern-day academia obsesses over citations and the intellectual genealogies of individual scholars, so too did the Anglo-Saxonist historians of the late 19th century, as this section

will show. Later works of history about Freeman and Adams detail their academic lineage (e.g., Cronne 1943, 80–81), but I am interested in what Freeman and Adams themselves said about their influences. I argue that statements about the influences on one's work (or on another's work) constitute strategies of perspectivization (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94), where actors frame their points of view and their involvement with or distance from a text or a discourse as a whole. I also argue that statements about academic influence make an argument about the agency of the actor: framing a work as influenced by other works or actors renders the producer of the work less agentive, but it also supports the work by associating it with extant scholarship. On the other hand, distancing a work from influences or from similar works clearly produces a discourse of intentionality and agency around the actor who produced the work.

So, put more simply, acknowledging the influences on your work means acknowledging that you are not solely responsible for it: others had a hand in its production (intentionally or unintentionally). When you say that your work was not influenced by others, however, or that your work breaks with what was done previously, you empower yourself as an agent. This kind of argument has appeared in organization studies (see Näsänen and Vanharanta 2016). Given its general scarcity elsewhere, however, I frame this idea as an extension of Scollon's (2001) Anticipatory Discourse and van Leeuwen's (2000) ideas on the discursive production of purpose. Both of these concepts include studying how actors can construct their actions (or those of others) as purposeful and therefore agentive. I extend this and argue that actors can construct their actions and themselves as agentive or less agentive by situating their work relative to its influences and its originality.

Adams (1882b, 414) situates his work firmly in the discipline of institutional history, and describes that discipline as new, "one of modern growth." Along those lines, he describes the scholars of the generation before him—including Freeman, William Stubbs—as the "pioneer investigators" of the discipline (*ibid.*). Pushing even further back in time, he identifies their predecessors as even more intrepid: without the organization and translation of documents performed by historians like Francis Palgrave and J.M. Kemble, Adams writes, "the study of Saxon institutions was not possible" (*ibid.*).

When Adams credits his predecessors as "pioneer investigators" without whom the work of his discipline would be impossible, his words complete two related tasks. First, a "relationship" building task (Gee 2005, 12): Adams situates himself as allies with and indebted to these earlier scholars. Second, he gives the two groups of actors (his predecessors and himself) two different levels of agency by representing himself as indebted to them: his predecessors are agentive, while he himself is almost fatalistic (Scollon 2001, 106), essentially unable to produce his work without the work that came before him.

Adams treated certain German scholars as influencing Adams's English predecessors in a similar way to how they influenced him. In an 1894 lecture on "Is History Past Politics?" (HBA 1/18/21, page 12), Adams detailed the significance of Barthold George Niebuhr, "who may be called the real founder of the modern science of institutional history." According to Adams, Niebuhr's "critical and institutional methods" influenced "the whole modern school of German and English historians" (*ibid.*). In Adams's recounting, Niebuhr's ideas were "transmitted to England through [Thomas] Arnold, Freeman, Goldwin Smith, and J.R. Seeley" (*ibid.*, 18). Elsewhere (in his essay on *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns*, Adams 1882a, 11), Adams wrote that English historians were only first made aware of the fact that "the tree of English liberty … roots in German soil" by "the labors of … patient German specialists," whom he then names.

To Erwin Nasse of the University of Bonn, Adams extended even more recognition. Adams wrote that Nasse's work on "the agricultural community of the middle ages and inclosures [sic]" was nothing less than "epoch-making in the history of real property and of communal institutions in Great Britain. It awakened English lawyers to a consciousness of the survival in their very midst of a system of local land tenure older than the Feudal system and dating back at least to the time of the Saxon conquest of Britain" (Adams 1882a, 18).

Adams (1895, 233) even went so far as to situate Freeman's work as well, writing that "Freeman's philosophy of history was in no small degree determined by the influence of three of his English contemporaries," Thomas Arnold, Francis Palgrave, and George Finlay. "Determined in no small degree" is a strong statement of influence, and it subsequently robs Freeman of much agency in the matter. Adams attributes specific qualities of Freeman's beliefs to his predecessors: to Arnold, "that history is man's continuous life in civic society;" to Palgrave, the idea that medieval history was really the story of the continuity of Roman institutions; and to Finlay, the writing of medieval and modern history "for a political purpose."

This discursive construction of influence on a body of texts has the effect of reducing the discursively constituted agency of the individual producing those texts. It allows Adams to "pass the buck" for his ideas, so to speak (Näsänen and Vanharanta 2016). On the other hand, constructing academic lineage or influence can have a positive and somewhat agentive effect when positioning one's work. Associating oneself or one's work with others(') can also have the effect of strengthening it against attacks. Just as Adams's use of "we" as synecdoche empowered him as an agent who draws on enabling resources, positioning his work within a larger body of literature and scholars gives him social capital: it associates his work with work that is already accepted, empowering him in a way. But because it still situates him as indebted to his predecessors, it does not increase his autonomy.

Because of these mixed effects of constructing an academic lineage on one's agency, I contend that this strategy gives Adams and Hosmer only a small amount of agency. When viewed in light of their purposeful and discursively conscious statements, however, the image of Adams and Hosmer as conscious agents still stands.

3.3.2 Critique and Distancing as Increasing Agency

Of course, just as the crediting other actors with influence reduces one's own discursively produced agency, so too does distancing oneself from them increase agency. Despite his great love of all things German, especially German scholarship, Adams did make some small efforts to distance himself from his German mentors. For all of his praise of Von Holst (see the previous section), Adams did criticize Von Holst in a letter to Freeman (on 12 January 1885, EAF 1/7/1–13), writing that Von Holst paid too little attention to the legacy of English institutions in the United States. In another letter to Freeman (on 1 May 1884, EAF 1/7/1–13), Adams also complained that "we are importing over-much of the Teutonic Gelehrsamkeit [German for "scholarship" or "erudition"] into the Johns Hopkins University." Such a statement seems almost unimaginable coming from Adams, but it is perhaps required for Adams to define his own work apart from its German influences, even in a personal letter.

Walter Bagehot's 1867 The English Constitution is considered one of the seminal texts of constitutional history, a historical sub-discipline that was closely intertwined with Anglo-Saxonist institutional history, but generally less racialized (Anderson 1981, 29–30; Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 29). In a letter from Freeman to Bagehot, Freeman submitted his own article for publication but was met with resistance. Unfortunately, this letter does not survive, but the reply from Bagehot (dated 27 November 1864, EAF 1/7/16–17) does. The main point of discrepancy appears to have been Freeman's love of American systems of governance at all scales and his insistence on their similarity to English institutions.

Bagehot writes, "perhaps it is English prejudice, but I was a little inclined to think your tone a trifle too favourable to the American form of Presidential government" because "the American Presidentship is at least expressly indicative of a defective society." Of course, one can be forgiven for thinking American politics exceptionally "defective" in 1864 (with the Civil War still raging). The key takeaway here, however, is that Bagehot and probably Freeman are describing a difference between their work. This evidence is not at all conclusive to supporting Freeman's construction of his own agency, but the approach of looking for "break points" like this could be useful to other scholars of the discursive construction of agency in critical geopolitics.

Of course, distancing one's work from a predecessor's or contemporary's can also take the form of pure insult. Adams took after Freeman's break with Bagehot in a particularly vicious way. In a brief "Biographical Sketch" of Bagehot (HBA 3/32/5), Adams wrote that "There are sentences in his works which are no more English than they are Chinese." The hypothetical graduate student researcher might well laugh out loud in the middle of the archive upon reading such a brutal evisceration of another's prose.

Hosmer, ever one to tout his agency and that of his colleagues, lays out an empowerment of Freeman and Adams as agents of discursive change (1890, vii–ix). He calls Freeman the "founder" of the "new historical school," whose "most characteristic publications" are those edited by Adams at Johns Hopkins (*ibid.*, viii–ix). In this passage, Freeman and Adams are linked together as doing something new and different from the scholars whose work is criticized in the previous page. As detailed in section 3.2, Hosmer saw his role as spreading Anglo-Saxonist ideas to the masses. In this capacity, he relied on other scholarship, writing that "the present writer, fortifying his judgment as he could, has written his book, following the lead of the scholars most accepted" (*ibid.*, ix). In making this statement, Hosmer qualifies the agency he gives to himself by stating that he has relied on the work of others, but he also bolsters his own arguments by associating them with extant scholarship.

Combined with the discourse of academic lineage as constructing agency in a small way, these few examples of breaks with academic predecessors give Adams, Freeman, and Hosmer more of an agentive position. Combined further with the purposeful statements in section 3.2, these men can be understood as constructing a discourse of their own intentional agency and consciousness. Texts containing links to and breaks with academic influences present a mix of effects on the kinds of agency they construct, especially since linking one's work to prior influences can both bolster its legitimacy (an agentive act) and give credit to one's predecessors (a fatalistic act). Given these contrasting effects of constructing academic lineage, I argue that these statements should be viewed alongside purposeful statements and statements exhibiting discursive consciousness to gain a full picture of an actor's agency.

3.4 Opposing Similar Discourses as Discursive Consciousness

In addition to his ponderously long books, Freeman published extensively in periodicals, and indeed "in many ways Freeman's periodical writing exercised a greater influence upon historical studies than his more elaborate historical works," as Cronne (1943, 87) writes. An 1877 article titled simply "Race and Language" is perhaps one of Freeman's more fascinating articles because he details his views on racialized political ideologies (Freeman 1877, EAF 2/2/145). In this article, Freeman takes on an instance of political rapprochement between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman

Empires wherein Hungarian students, citing historical racial kinship between Magyars (Hungarians) and Turks, presented a sword to an Ottoman general. Freeman comments on the incident in a highly critical, almost mocking way:

> *"As a piece of practical politics, it sounds like Frederick Barbarossa threatening to avenge the defeat of Crassus upon Saladin, or like the French of the Revolutionary wars making the Pope Pius of those days, answerable for the wrongs of Vercingetorix. The thing sounds like comedy, almost like conscious comedy. But it is a kind of comedy which may become tragedy, if the idea from which it springs gets so deeply rooted in men's minds as to lead to any practical consequences. As long as talk of this kind does not get beyond the world of hot-headed students, it may pass for a craze. It would be more than a craze, if it should be so widely taken up on either side that the statesmen on either side find it expedient to profess to take it up also.*

> *"…To make any practical inference from the primeval kindred of Magyar and Turk is indeed pushing the doctrine of race, and of sympathies arising from race, as far as it well can be pushed. … [This idea represents] a whole range of doctrines and sentiments which have in modern days gained a great power over men's minds." (Freeman 1877, 712–713)*

Parker (1981) explains Freeman's hostile stance in this article as a case of racial prejudices applied to contemporary politics. Freeman's views on foreign affairs were "closely related to his views on race," and he was especially hostile to the Ottoman Empire and its Turkish residents, whom he saw as persecuting Christian minorities (*ibid.*, 827). In Parker's view, when Freeman points out that "the importance of the concept of race had lain as much in the existence of race sentiment, a political phenomenon, as in its ethnological validity," he means that the concept of race is morally neutral and can be used for good or ill (*ibid.*, 846). In this case, given Freeman's prejudices against the Turks, he views that race sentiment was being used for ill.

Parker's argument is valid, but there is more to what Freeman writes in his article. Freeman ends up taking a relatively constructivist stance towards the idea of race, arguing that basing political positions on racial sentiment is unreasonable because "there is no such thing as purity of race at all" (Freeman 1877, 729). This argument rests primarily on the idea of assimilation. Freeman offers the example of a hypothetical "adopted member of a new nation. He and his children adopt the language, but their skulls remain the same. "He became one of that gens for all practical, political, historical

purposes. It is only the physiologist who could deny his right to his new position" (*ibid.*, 728). It follows, then, that no existing nation is, in the physiologist's sense of purity, purely Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic, or anything else. All races have assimilated a greater or less amount of foreign elements" (*ibid.*, 729).

Adams would echo this stance later, lecturing that "all history is based upon this race-feeling, this consciousness of distinctions in blood" (HBA 2/21). Note that he uses "this race-feeling" instead of "race," and "consciousness of distinctions in blood" instead of "distinctions in blood." This argument against the then-dominant discourse about the supposed purity of races ends up reinforcing the Anglo-Saxonist focus on institutional history. Rather than measure skulls, Adams and Freeman focused on the continuity of socio-political institutions to show racial lineage and similarity.

These arguments seem more or less internally coherent viewed in isolation. In comparison with another of Freeman's articles, however, contradictions emerge. Just after his visit to the United States over five years after publishing "Race and Language," Freeman published an article about his trip entitled "Some Impressions of the United States" (Freeman 1882, EAF 2/2/181). In it, he calls for the unity of the United States and the British Empire on the basis of exactly the kind of sentiment he rebuked in "Race and Language" five years earlier: a "sympathy arising from race," to use his own words. He wrote that:

> *"To me the English-speaking commonwealth on the American mainland is simply one part of the great English folk, as the English-speaking kingdom in the European island is another part. My whole line of thought and study leads me to think, perhaps more than most me, of the everlasting ties of blood and speech, and less of the accidental separation wrought by political and geographical causes. To me the English folk, wherever they may dwell, whatever may be their form of government, are still one people." (Freeman 1882, 137).*

He goes on to argue that there are limits, specifically "the eternal distinction of colour," that prevent some of the "foreign elements" of American society from assimilating as well as other foreign elements (read: white) would, thus modifying his argument in "Race and Language" (*ibid.*, 329). For the purposes of this section, however, the most interesting part of this article comes from the quote above. Freeman writes that "the English folk … are still one people" because of the "everlasting ties of blood and speech." This argument is incompatible with Freeman's denunciation of applying race sympathies to politics as "comedy … which may become tragedy" (Freeman 1877, 712).

These clear contradictions beg explanation. Did Freeman's views simply evolve over the course of the five intervening years, perhaps because of his visit to the United States? Or are the contradictions evidence of a discursive strategy linked to agency and consciousness behind Freeman's production of a text? Given the available documents, it is difficult to determine. The former is certainly possible, but I will explore the latter.

The Discourse-Historical Approach uses a deconstructive method called discourse-immanent critique, where inconsistencies between two texts from the same discourse (ideally, from the same individual) are flagged for critique (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 88). In these two articles by Freeman ("Race and Language" and "Some Impressions of the United States"), the inconsistencies are flagged above: Freeman criticizes uses of race sentiment for political purposes in one case while advocating it wholesale in another. In this way, they are two exactly opposite uses of strategies of perspectivization (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94): Freeman distances himself from racialized politics in the first instance and endorses it in the second. A critique of this inconsistency in the discourse-immanent style might flag this as Freeman showcasing his chauvinist attitude towards other races: Anglo-Saxons can use race sympathies in political discourses, but others cannot. Such an exceptionalist attitude would fit with the overall rhetoric of the superiority of Anglo-Saxons and their institutions (Anderson 1981).

The critique of the inconsistencies in these articles becomes even more interesting because Freeman exhibits a discursive consciousness in both of them, especially given the order in which they were published. When Freeman writes of the Magyar-Turkish rapprochement as an example of "a whole range of doctrines and sentiments [inspired by race] which have in modern days gained a great power over men's minds," he shows an awareness of the power of racialized ideologies and the fact that they can be either believed or disbelieved (Freeman 1877, 712–713). So not only does Freeman show his awareness of the arbitrariness of race-based politics, he also describes them as hegemonic in his day (with their "great power over men's minds"). Adopting a counter-hegemonic stance—describing an idea as hegemonic and then refuting it—indicates a discursive consciousness.

In the later article, he actually returns to the hegemonic idea of race-based politics: his advocacy for the unity of a people based on "the everlasting ties of blood" shows a simultaneous willingness to add to or even help construct such an ideology. Describing an idea as hegemonic while rejecting it, and then returning to that same idea later with a full-throated endorsement shows that Freeman made a conscious strategic choice. In "Some Impressions of the United States," Freeman goes on to argue that "the feeling of unity between the two severed branches is really present in the American breast, but it needs something special to wake it up" (Freeman 1882, 138). Not only is he advocating the same type of ideology he has decried, he is aware of the fact that it needs to be spread,

that it will not "gain a great power over men's minds" without a push from individuals such as himself.

3.5 Conclusion

Freeman's about-face concerning his perspectives on racialized ideologies in politics is a strong indicator of discursive consciousness and an awareness of what pushing the ideas of Anglo-Saxonism could do. This kind of consciousness, combined with the purposeful statements of agency that come from Adams and Hosmer, make it easier to criticize Anglo-Saxonism as an intentionally-produced discourse of a geopolitical vision. Agency and purpose are important parts of Critical Discourse Analysis, as any completely structuralist and deterministic approach to understanding discourse will not implicate specific individuals. Understanding how agents construe their purposes and understand their agency can allow for a more thorough critique of the texts they produce.

Statements of purpose and statements of consciousness are related, as they both indicate a strong belief in one's own ability to produce an effect and to predict what that effect would be: in Scollon's terms, an oracular and an agentive stance (2001, 106). Arguing that actors are conscious and intentional agents allows for the related argument that discursive strategies can be chosen by these actors in the knowledge or belief that they will have a certain desired effect. In this way, I can link discursive knowledge to the presence and forms of certain discursive structures in texts. I will do this in Chapter 4, Section 5 of this thesis, when I link Adams's conviction about the power of emotional attachment to place to his subsequent use of topophilic language as a rhetorical device. This approach also makes it easier to critique the consistent geopolitical theme of Cartesian perspectivalism, where "the fixed disembodied eye of the geographer qua strategist" can "judge the external world from a detached position" (Ó Tuathail 1996, 30). Using geography and spatial visions can produce a truth regime with claims to objectivity (Lees 2004, 102), but linking these discursive forms to intentionally chosen strategies can undermine any semblance of objectivity.

CHAPTER 4: Place and Local Institutions in Anglo-Saxonism

4.1 Introduction: A Eulogy for E.A. Freeman

In November 1895, three years after Edward A. Freeman's death, Herbert B. Adams published an essay in the Yale Review eulogizing his colleague and friend (Adams 1895, HBA 1/16/16). The essay showcases the unabashedly high esteem in which Adams held Freeman, but it also vividly depicts the concerns with local history and place that characterized the work of both men. In many passages, Adams may as well have been writing about himself and his own work. In particular, Adams's essay highlights two key concerns about place that formed the cornerstones of Anglo-Saxonism in institutional history: first, the idea that the history of local, small-scale sociopolitical institutions is the best way to study the transmission and survival of a national character over the long term. Second is the belief that understanding these institutions and their history in place and alongside their physical locale is essential. As this chapter will show, these core beliefs in the importance of place had a pronounced impact on both the topical content of Anglo-Saxonism (a focus on institutional history) and the actions (outreach alongside discursive strategies) employed by its proponents to disseminate it.

Freeman's scholarship was "many-sided," Adams notes; he was "an historical geographer, a humanist, a philologist, an archaeologist, a specialist in architecture, an accomplished journalist, a literary critic, an historian, and a politician in the best Greek sense" (*ibid.*, 231). While Freeman himself might have objected to the label of "philologist" (see his essay on "Race and Language," 1877), modern historians might find more surprise in the title of "historian" coming in only eighth out of nine descriptors. Historians (e.g., Tulloch 1977, Cronne 1943) tend to claim Freeman as one of their own and try to show the importance of his scholarship to Victorian understandings of the Middle Ages. And yet, Adams's placement of the title "historical geographer" first in this list is no error. Later in the essay, Adams again describes Freeman as "pre-eminently an historical geographer," one who "did for the historical geography of Europe what Karl Ritter did for geography in general" (Adams 1895, 238).

So, Adams understood Freeman to be an historical geographer, one whose work in that field was "the best in the English world" (*ibid.*, 238). In what sense was he a geographer, though, and why did that matter? As I will discuss later in this chapter, Freeman made many of his own maps for his books, but he was more than just a cartographer. In Adams's view, Freeman's work was great because he "studied local history in order to make it tributary to national and European history" (*ibid.*, 238). Local institutional history was where grand narratives of national character were reified in the interactions between people and the physical landscape. Thus, Freeman's works shone for Adams

because they were based upon "exact local studies of English topography," inspired by hilltop views of the English countryside in Freeman's childhood (*ibid.*, 238).

As the previous quote hints, the importance of the local extended not just to topics of study, but to methods as well. In this view, a place and its history can be best understood through physically locating oneself in that place. Adams writes glowingly about Freeman's "life-long habit of exploring places of historic interest;" while preparing to write on the history of Sicily, "he travelled about the island, and thoroughly mastered its historical geography" (*ibid.*, 244). This view on methods had significant implications for who was best positioned to write about the history of a place—Adams exerted tremendous effort in an attempt to enlist local historical societies and graduate students from around the United States (see Higham 1984 and section 4.2 of this chapter). It also meant that Adams considered himself well-positioned to write about the histories of New England and Germany, given his time spent in both of those regions (see his 1882 essay on *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns*, quoted at length below).

In this chapter, I will investigate how Freeman's and Adams's interest in how history plays out at small scales influenced the discursive productions in their texts. First, I will explain how choosing local institutions as topics of study allows for a narrative of the history of a race in relation to its physical environment. Second, I will investigate the strategies used by Adams and his students to reach out to local historians. Finally, I will look at how Adams and Freeman used deep descriptions of the physical and human environments strategically in their texts. In other words, this chapter will help explain the topics chosen by Anglo-Saxonist scholars, their approaches to outreach and methods, and the discursive strategies employed.

4.2 Geographic Perspectives on Place

The concept of "place" is an important and hotly contested one in human geography (Staeheli 2003, 158). Definitions vary widely, but three interpretations of place and its importance stand out: First is the emphasis on human emotional attachments to particular places and landscapes, most associated with the work of Tuan (e.g., 1974, 1979, 1991). Tuan uses the term "topophilia," in which he includes "all of the human being's affective ties with the material environment" (1974, 93). It is the relationship between humans and environment that imbues places with meaning: places "have acquired unique 'faces' through the prolonged interaction between nature and man" (1979, 409). This understanding of place lends itself to explaining political issues involving threats to emotionally-charged landscapes (Tuan 1979, 409); for example, debates over the siting of energy infrastructure (e.g., Devine-Wright 2012).

Second, Agnew (2015 [1987]) provides an understanding of scale that draws on Giddens's (1984) ideas about structuration. To Agnew, place is the intermediary between individual agents and social structures: place is "the geographical context or locality in which agency interpolates social structure" (Agnew 2015 [1987], 41). To use Agnew's terms, social relations are always constituted in a small-scale setting or "locale." The "location" of the locale refers to how that locale interacts with the social and economic processes operating at a wider scale in its geographic area (*ibid.*, 28). Agnew calls emotional connections to place a "sense of place," which can extend beyond the small scale of a locale and can even be leveraged in discourses of nationalism: the nation as a place (Tuan 1974, 100–101; Taylor 1999, 20).

Third and finally is a scalar understanding of place involving physical location. Cox (1998, 2) lays out a framework of "spaces of engagement" and "spaces of dependence" for political institutions and processes. Rather than a hierarchical understanding of scale (such as divisions of local, national, and global: see Flint 2010, 2832), Cox advocates a "networked" approach to scale (Cox 1998, 2). In this approach, social structures are understood to depend upon local, "place-specific conditions for our material well being and our sense of significance," whereas their interactions with each other define spaces of engagement (*ibid.*). Thus, Cox gives the local a preeminent role in how structures are made real.

As the rest of this chapter will show, the core ideas of each of these perspectives on place appeared in the work of Freeman and Adams nearly a century earlier and help to tie together various parts of their strategies. Cox's idea of the local as a space of dependence and Agnew's emphasis on the importance of place to the production and reproduction of social institutions resemble Freeman and Adams's emphasis on the studying the history of local institutions (section 4.3 of this chapter). Topophilic language characterizes passages from Adams's work, and Adams recognized the potential power of appealing to emotional connections to landscapes in that way (section 4.5 of this chapter).

4.3 Why Study Institutions, and Why Study Them at the Local Scale?

From the perspective of historians seeking to create the idea of a racial heritage stretching back centuries, studying institutions rather than individuals allowed for case studies in continuity across time. As Chapter 3 showed, Freeman and especially Adams positioned their work within the discipline of institutional history, which began in the German universities at Heidelberg and Berlin. Though Adams himself studied at Heidelberg (1873–1876), institutional history was already then in vogue among English historians such as Freeman and his colleagues and friends John Richard Green (e.g., A Short History of the English People, 1921 [1874]) and William Stubbs (e.g., The

Constitutional History of England, 1878). The strain of institutional history that defined both its German iteration and its English-speaking one was known as the Teutonic Origins Theory.

According to this theory, the racial heritage of people labelled as "Teutons," originating in northern Germany, consisted of virtues of self-government and liberty that stemmed from the traditional institutions of local government and land administration (Cronne 1943, 80; Anderson 1981, 39; Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 29). A branch of the Teutonic race, the Anglo-Saxons, carried these institutions on to the British Isles and from there to the white, English-speaking parts of the British Empire. These institutions survived everything from the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 to the American Revolution 710 years later to remain the essential backbone of an Anglo-Saxon identity. Further, the theory's adherents argued that the continued existence of these institutions also proved that cherished ideals such as American democracy existed in spite of the Revolution instead of because of it—(English-descended and white) Americans were part of a superior racial heritage that bound them to (English-descended and white) subjects of the British Empire (Higham 1984, 1228).

So, this was a theory predicated on identifying and proving continuity through history and across space. Focusing on institutions allowed historians of the late nineteenth century to trace this continuity easier than they could if they focused on other contemporary themes like chronicling the biographies of so-called "great men." This tracing of institutional history often involved sweeping generalizations, as the definition of what exactly constituted an institution could be stretched quite far (Higham 1984). In an essay on "Constables" (Adams 1883, HBA 3/32/9), Adams points to the traditional appointment of livestock herders called Hog-Reeves or Hog-Constables. Such an office, he argues, could point to an ancient lineage: that "primitive" institution was "inherited by [our] ancestors from the high pasture-lands of Asia, and connecting our Aryan race with all pastoral peoples, if not with primitive savagery" (*ibid.*, 34).

Needing to have someone look after the pigs hardly strikes one as an institution, much less one that could define a race from an Other. Indeed, many of the 'institutions' pointed to as distinctively Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic are vague references to "liberty" and communal use of farmland in a village setting (e.g., Adams 1882a, 13). In this sense, they are more social norms and cultural traditions than discrete organizations produced by social structures in a certain setting, to use Agnew's understanding of institutions (2015 [1987], 31, following Giddens 1984). When more specific institutions were referenced, they had to do with the related ideal of "a self-guarded village community" and its means of "[maintaining] peace within its borders" as in Adams's studies of Constables (Adams 1883, 18) or of "Tithingmen" (Adams 1882b). Other commonly referred to institutions were methods of partitioning land such as parishes or townships, town-meetings or

"moots" (HBA 1/16/8). These institutions contribute to the functioning of a communally governed town, especially as it relates to the management of its territory. Adams explains why he chose to study constables in New England, for instance, by writing that "without a Constable, or some power representing the corporate responsibility of the community for the preservation of the local peace, a Town would be an impossibility" (1883, 21).

4.3.1 Institutions as Showing Long-Term Continuity

Note also that in that quote from Constables, the claimed lineage of the Hog-Reeve is one that stretches back possibly to "primitive savagery." When Freeman visited Johns Hopkins in November 1881, he delivered a lecture on "An Introduction to American Institutional History" (HBA 5/42/14). Part of the lecture focused on a similarly long time-frame for the lineage of certain institutions: in the case of the Anglo-Saxon institutions allegedly present in New England, "they are a part of the general institutions of the English people, or they are again part of the general institutions of the Teutonic race, and there again, part of the general institutions of the whole Aryan family."

With its potentially long time-frame, institutional history could be used as a way of establishing continuity even through what other historians had considered major shifts. Adams claims that the town meetings he describes in *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns* date from pre-feudal times and "survived the crushing weight of feudalism. … Under the very heel of the Norman conquerer, the old communal spirit of the Saxons endured" (Adams 1882a, 21). This narrative echoes the main points of the most well-known of the English Teutonists' work (especially Stubbs 1878 and Freeman 1867–1879). Related institutions such as the English Parish system, a form of territorial organization associated with both the Catholic and Anglican Churches, supposedly dated back even farther. In his notes for a lecture entitled "The English Parish in America" (given before the Peabody Institute on 1 February 1883), Adams claimed that the Parish was just the Church's way of adapting a pagan system of managing land and administering territory (HBA 1/16/8). In his words, "when the Church established itself in England, it accommodated itself to the local situation" (*ibid.*).

4.3.2 Institutions as Connection to the Land

In this way, tracing the history and continuity of these institutions could form a sort of family tree for the races of the world. The reason for studying them at a local scale requires a closer look. As noted above, many of the institutions studied in the work of Anglo-Saxonist institutional historians deal with the management and governance of territory at the scale of the town. These institutions can be thought of as strategies of territoriality, as they are a "geographic strategy that connects society and space" (Penrose 2002, 279). Even if the processes associated with territoriality operate on regional or global scales (or are perceived to operate as such), they are constituted at the smallest of scales:

humans interact with landscapes and transform them into territory locally. A declaration of claiming a bit of land means nothing until people go there and reproduce the functions and interests of the state there. These small scales are composed of what Cox (1998, 2) calls spaces of dependence, where large-scale processes can be observed depending on the "more-or-less localized social relations … of essential interests," that are "place-specific." It follows that if certain institutions are important because they involve management and control of territory, they need to be studied at the scale of the local.

Adams laid out a clear argument for the importance of territory to a political body in an early work. His first published essay at Johns Hopkins was titled "Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Commonwealth" (Adams 1877). Maryland's influence, in Adams's argument, was that its representatives to Congress under the Articles of Confederation effected the passage of a bill forcing states that claimed land west of the Appalachian Mountains to cede it to the federal government. The turnover of western land to the federal government helped to solidify its power and, in turn, the national unity of the United States (*ibid.*, 7). Besides the partial pandering to local historians in Baltimore (more on that in section 4.3 of this chapter), Adams advances a very geographic argument for why this cessation of land was important. It constituted nothing less than "the origin of our territorial government and the true basis of [our] national sovereignty" (*ibid.*, 54).

Adams returns to this argument in his essay on *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns* (1882a, 24), where he writes that "the elements of permanence and continuity in all civil society are based upon the soil and the material interests connected with it. …no state or body politic can possibly endure unless it be grounded upon territorial interests of a stable and lasting character. No state without a people, and no state without land." Higham (1984, 1226) maintains that this line of thinking about territory probably stemmed from Adams's training at Heidelberg. Germany as a self-declared sovereign, territorial nation-state had only recently formed (two years before Adams arrived), so the topic of territory and the state was certainly a timely one (*ibid.*). Adams's own comments on this concept appear to support their German origin. In a letter to Freeman dated 24 February 1882, Adams described his essay on Maryland's influence as looking at "the basis of our permanent and necessary territorial Union, the common domain, the national Mark …" (EAF 1/7/1–13). In other words, Adams viewed territory as essential to a political body, and many of the institutions he chose to study involved territoriality.

4.3.3 The Importance of Place-Names in Nomination Strategies

"Mark" (underlined in the original letter) is an interesting choice of word to describe the territory of the United States. It brings to mind its cognate "march," meaning a borderland, but in the

letter to Freeman, Adams is most probably referencing the term Freeman used to describe a self-contained community occupying a clearing within the woods of a shire or parish (Freeman 1867, 89). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "mark" is an Old English term shared with German (as in "the Mark of Brandenburg") and Old Scandinavian (as in "Denmark"), meaning a territory. Freeman's more specific use of "mark" as the smallest of the Anglo-Saxon territorial units appears to be based on a translation error made by an earlier scholar of Anglo-Saxon institutions, J.M. Kemble (according to the Oxford English Dictionary).

I contend that this intentional (re-)naming constitutes another example of discursive nomination strategy, where agents construct actors, objects, or phenomena discursively by naming them in a noticeably different way from the norm (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94). When Adams asserted that the English Parish system was simply the Church's way of adapting to an already extant pagan institution (HBA 1/16/8), he was ascribing a modern name to what he claimed was an ancient institution with a different name. Generally, however, his arguments worked the other way around. He would either attempt to trace the etymology of the contemporary name for an institution, or he would ascribe an archaic name to a modern institution (as in "mark"). This latter nomination strategy could involve the use of anachronistic terms in works of historical scholarship, such as when Adams used the Anglo-Saxon word "Folkmoot" to describe the communal meetings of the Pilgrims at Plymouth (Adams 1883, 19; HBA 3/32/9).

Much of Adams's work relies on geographic etymology as a nomination strategy, using place-laden language to discursively create the notion of specific 'institutions' that have persisted across centuries and that serve to define the character of a race. As section 4.5 of this chapter will explore in greater detail, toponyms were a particular object of fascination for Adams and he often used them to connect specific places in the United States to German people and history. In a lecture entitled Villes and Plantations (HBA 1/16/8, delivered on 30 January 1883 before the Peabody Institute), Adams claims that the toponymic suffix -ville is "not a corruption of the Romance ville, but a pure survival of the Germanic Weiler, or hamlet, which in Normandy was everywhere established by Teutonic influences." Similarly, Adams claimed that the use of the term "Ward" as a kind of civic territorial unit in New England served as "a very important connecting link between the Parish institutions of Old and New England. … The term Ward is derived from the Saxon Weard or Guard, and is closely connected with the ancient system of Watch and Ward, from which our modern police system has evolved" (Adams 1883, 23; HBA 3/32/9).

Freeman also made a practice of using anachronistic lexical devices when they served his purposes. In a letter to John Richard Green on 18 December 1871, Freeman wrote of their mutual

friend and fellow historian William Stubbs, lamenting that "poor dear Stubbs has lost his last child and seems much worked and boðered in all ways" (EAF 1/8/1–30). English-speakers in the late nineteenth century did not use the "eth" (ð) consonant, but it was commonly used in England before the Norman Conquest of 1066 (Momma and Matto 2008). Either Freeman had been reading Anglo-Saxon texts too much and made a mistake, or the use of the "eth" in spelling the word "bothered" was intentional, a way of showing his allegiance to the Anglo-Saxon ancestors he claimed. The latter seems likeliest, as Freeman also had a habit of referring to the 1066 Battle of Hastings by its alleged Saxon name of Senlac (see, for example, Freeman 1922 [1880], throughout).

4.3.4 Institutions as Allowing for Racial Assimilation

An 1877 essay published by Freeman on Race and Language holds another hint as to why he and his colleagues (like Adams) considered institutional history to be superior to competing the discourses of philology and phrenology. In his long critique of "the doctrine of race, and of sympathies arising from race" (Freeman 1877, 713), Freeman makes the case that studying races through the lens of language or of physical categorization of humans is absurd due to the amount of intermixing that is possible. In his words, "all races have assimilated a greater or less amount of foreign elements. … [So,] not only is language no test of race, but … there is no such thing as purity of race at all" (*ibid.*, 729).

This is an extraordinary argument coming from someone who exhibited extreme racial biases (see his comments on Irish-Americans and African Americans, e.g., Freeman 1882, 327–8) and whose work became the sturdiest foundation for the intensely racialized and racist movement of Anglo-Saxonism. Perhaps his stance on the issue could be explained by its particular context, the (short-lived) rapprochement between Magyars in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Turks in the Ottoman Empire. Freeman hated both empires and their contemporary rulers (Parker 1981). In another light, however, Freeman's aversion to claiming racial purity leaves the study of institutions and their continuity as an alternative to other ways of studying the lineage of a race. If a race can assimilate outsiders, then its institutions, adopted by the assimilated outsiders, will carry on the essence of racial heritage.

4.4 Studying Places in Place

As discussed above, the importance of place and a focus on the local impacted the topics of study of Adams and Freeman and it also impacted the methods and outreach strategies they employed. In short, the emphasis on knowing the local geography of a place stimulated three types of activities: travel to study areas, outreach to local historical societies, and recruitment of students from different parts of the United States to write about local institutions in their hometowns. Adams lauded

the mastery of Sicily's historical geography that Freeman attained just by traveling around the island, writing that it gave him an understanding of the local terrain essential to writing about its history (Adams 1895, 238). As I will discuss in the next section of this chapter (4.5), Adams felt a similar way about his own studies in New England and in Germany. For this section, however, I will briefly detail Adams's efforts to collaborate with local residents of a place interested in its history.

Higham (1982) details Adams's outreach to local historical societies and his focus on the histories of local institutions but missed the common thread of the local that runs between the topics of Adams's study and the methods and strategies he promoted. As Higham (*ibid.*, 1227) writes, one of Adams's legacies was his "zeal to link and consolidate … much of Adams's energy went to forging a broad alliance between the teachers of history, whom he was training, and the much larger number of local historians, whose support he eagerly solicited and whose status as pillars of the community he yearned to share." Adams saw local historians as untamed resources, writing to Freeman on 14 February 1882 (EAF 1/7/1–13) that a particular historian was "a good illustration of the partisan spirit and local pride which pervade history-writing in America."

This consolidation initially took the form of what would, ironically, become the pre-eminent organization of professional historians: the American Historical Association. Another of Adams's outreach projects was his leadership in the University Extension movement, which sought to engage individuals who were not professional scholars or students with lectures designed to disseminate scholarly work in an accessible way and to spark interest in scholarship and local history (Frederick Jackson Turner described his own success of the University Extension movement and described Adams as its primary leader in the United States in a letter from Turner to Adams, 27 September 1890, HBA 1/16).

Adams's correspondence contains examples of his efforts to include local historians in his project to document the histories of small-scale institutions. In a 3 July 1882 letter to D.C. Gilman, the president of Johns Hopkins University at the time, Adams wrote that "it will be a good thing for the University if we can ally with us the Historical Societies and quasi historians in all the seaboard States" (HBA 1/16). Earlier in the year (on 6 April 1882, EAF 1/7/1–13), Adams explained to Freeman his vision for the Series of University Studies in Historical and Political Science: the Series would encourage the participation of historians in various local historical societies and would feature monographs written by Adams's graduate students about the peculiarities of socio-political institutions in their hometowns. Freeman, for his part, indicated support for the University Extension movement by name in a letter to Adams in January of 1888 (HBA 3/32/16). His 1881–1882 lecture

tour in the United States, while not explicitly labeled University Extension, certainly followed the same principles of making academic work and ideas accessible to the public.

Adams was recognized at the time as being an effective mentor and lecturer, but the body of literature that he produced was relatively small (Cunningham 1976, 245). Several of Adams's most prominent students strayed from their mentor's theory of local institutions as the germ of national identity. For example, Woodrow Wilson focused more on the differences—not continuity—between the British and the American constitutional systems (Higham 1984, 1234–6), and Frederick Jackson Turner formulated his Frontier Thesis, arguing it was the unique experience of westward expansion that shaped the American national character, not racial or institutional heritage (Turner 1963 [1893]; Bassin 2003, 18–21). Two lesser-known proteges of Adams's, John Franklin Jameson and Charles McLean Andrews, went even further, directly refuting the idea that institutions of town governance were definitively not the seeds of national character in the United States (Higham 1984, 1235–6).

In this light, outreach to local amateur historians appears to be one of Adams's most important legacies: even those students who did not carry on the Teutonic Origins Theory maintained an interest in local outreach. Woodrow Wilson (then teaching at Princeton University) gave a University Extension lecture when he visited Baltimore in 1896.[4] Frederick Jackson Turner bragged to his mentor in a letter dated 18 January 1892 that he was "fairly well satisfied with the success of my Extension work [in towns around Madison, WI]. … In one little community of six hundred inhabitants—farmers, etc.—I have an audience of over two hundred people" (HBA 1/16). That is an impressive turnout, and it speaks to the legacy of Adams as encouraging outreach to local history enthusiasts as both a strategy of disseminating one's work and of engaging with the people who understand the history of a place best.

4.5 A Love of Old, Familiar Places: Topophilia in Anglo-Saxonism

One of Adams's few published works was an essay on *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns*, read before the Harvard Historical Society on 9 May 1881 and published by Johns Hopkins in 1882. The typically Teutonist and Anglo-Saxonist thrust of his argument is that "the tree of English liberty certainly roots in German soil" and he cites William Stubbs (1878) along with Green (1874), Freeman, and a handful of German scholars to support his argument (Adams 1882a, 11). This is an American iteration of the Teutonic Origins Theory at its purest: Adams looks to

---

[4] In a letter to Adams (dated 13 January 1896, HBA 1/17), however, Wilson expressed his reservations, mostly regarding his own style of lecturing. "The idea of outsiders as well as students attending startles me a little," he wrote, contending that his lectures are class lectures, "not popular in theme or in style. I can imagine some outsiders being wofully [sic] disappointed!"

Anglo-Saxon institutions as a sort of middleman, a subsection of the greater Teutonic family of socio-political institutions.

The essay is an ode to a vaguely-defined system of small agricultural settlements that govern themselves democratically. The main institutions in question are those that relate to a town's relationship with its land: in particular, the town's fenced or entrenched boundary, known as the "tun," and the town's communal plots of land (*ibid.*, 9). The township, in Adams's words, "embodies the great principle of local self-government" (*ibid.*, 6). Beyond the symbolism of the self-governed town, it was traditions and offices at this scale that transmitted Teutonic institutions across the Atlantic: "these little communes were the germs of our state and national life. … In New England especially, towns were the primordial cells of the body politic" (*ibid.*, 5).

To prove the point of similarity between New England towns and their alleged Teutonic ancestors in Germany, Adams turns to deep description of the visual characteristics of this type of town. He supposes that Tacitus, the 1st–2nd century Roman historian who visited what is now southern Germany, would have seen "compact settlements, but with separate buildings and home lots, exactly like those of a New England farming town" (*ibid.*, 12). In an unacknowledged contradiction, Adams describes the typical towns of southern Germany after having written three pages earlier that the system of town governance inherited by New England originated in "Sleswick" (Schleswig), in northern Germany/southern Denmark. Furthermore, New England towns might be "compact" but with "separate buildings and home lots," as might German towns, but it is hard to imagine towns of any number of regions that would not meet those vague criteria. In contradictions like these, Adams's faults as a scholar are on display (see Higham 1984), as is his desire to show the similarities between ancient German and modern New England towns at all costs.

To this end, Adams begins to use a more informal style of writing. The essay starts to read as a traveler's guide to an idyllic rural German village, and Adams assumes the role of tour guide. He writes of a hypothetical student in the south of Germany, even using the second person to write as if addressing this hypothetical student, referring directly to the reader as "you." This gives the essay an informal tone that parallels the shift from historical narrative to deep visual description of an unnamed German town. This description is worth quoting at length (all sections from Adams 1882a, 13–14):

> *"There is still much left to amuse and instruct the students who tramp through the Forest every Whitsuntide vacation (Pfingsten) from Heidelberg, Freiberg, and other German universities. … The student may explore the numerous*

valleys and forest villages, which are to this day skirted with evergreen forests, dimly suggesting to his fancy the ambuscades into which the Roman legions fell when they penetrated the Teutoberger Wald. In such forests liberty was nurtured. Here dwelt the people Rome could never conquer. ... Here lay the germs of religious reformations and of popular revolutions, the ideas which have formed Germany and Holland, England and New England..."

"What now are the external characteristics of one of these primitive forest-villages? Emerging from the wood or rocky defile, the traveller comes suddenly upon a snug little settlement perched upon the sunny hillside or nestling in some broadening meadow. Surrounded by forest, this settlement is indeed a Mark, or, as Americans would say, a 'clearing.' Baedeke here is better than Tacitus, and you will discover that the place is perhaps called Schoenwald, or Beautiful Forest, or possibly Schoenau, or Beautiful Meadow. Such villages are usually planted near a brook or some constant stream, and frequently bear a name like Rohrbach or Lauterbach, either of which terms would signify the same as Roaring Brook, so familiar in New England. [The houses] altogether remind the modern traveller of Swiss chalets. ... If a stranger enters one of these forest villages on a day in June, he will hear nothing but the humming of the bees; for men, women and children are all in the hay-fields."

After this passage, the essay segues into a detailed description of the communal farming system that Adams claims characterized these German villages. Of course, the hypothetical student is anything but hypothetical: Adams himself studied at Heidelberg in the early 1870s. One cannot help but imagine a young Adams in his Heidelberg days wandering through rural villages in the south of Germany, marveling at their beauty and the similarities he observed between them and the New England towns of his own childhood.

Adams's narrative description certainly evokes beauty: he translates the toponyms of "Schoenwald" and "Schoenau" as "Beautiful Forest" and "Beautiful Meadow," respectively. The village in question is "snug," on a "sunny hillside" or nestled in a meadow. Geographers tend to present the notion of place with these kinds of positive connotations. For Taylor (1999, 10–11), following Tuan (1977), place is "security," "pause," "intimate," and "familiar." Staeheli (2003, 158) describes the emotions commonly evoked (or thought to be evoked) by place as "home, rootedness, order, setting, context." Of course, Adams makes a choice, conscious or not, to use such positive descriptors: the weather in this village is likely not always sunny, but it is remembered and

memorialized as such in Adams's text. The hypothetical student visits during the Whitsuntide vacation (seven weeks after Easter, in early Summer), "on a day in June," but certainly the village endures less agreeable weather in other seasons.

With this usage of positive descriptors, and with the deeply visual description in general, Adams conveys a particular relationship between himself and a place. Tuan might call this kind of emotional connection to a place "topophilia," a human's "affective [tie] with the material environment" (1974, 93). Buttimer (1982, 90) writes that humans organize their views of the world rationally to an extent, but that they also "feel, believe, hope, love and hate certain symbols of the world." In this case, Adams's description of the German town and his comments about attachment to place make his loving emotional connection to this place clear. Moreover, the place itself is a symbol for the continuity of institutions and the race that produced and sustained them.

This dichotomy between a personal relationship with a place and its symbolism for a wider cause (in this case, Anglo-Saxonism), is important. When describing topophilia, Tuan (1974, 93) is sure to note that "topophilia is not the strongest of human emotions. When it is compelling we can be sure that the place or environment has become the carrier of emotionally charged events or perceived as a symbol." The construction of place in the human imagination has an important temporal component to it (Pred 1984), but it also relies heavily on how humans perceive the place's evolution throughout history. "Awareness of the past is an important element in the love of place," writes Tuan (1974, 99), so it stands to reason that love of place could also feed into a constructed awareness of the past, as in its leveraging here in the service of Anglo-Saxonist institutional history.

The human construct of a place is "a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the people who have given it meaning" (Tuan 1979, 387). In the case of Adams's relationship with the small villages of southern Germany, we have more than just his published works. In his notes for a lecture entitled "Instinct for Settlement and Home-Life" (HBA 2/21/12), Adams gives his own account of why humans can have strong emotional connections to places. This lecture can serve as a meta-narrative when read alongside the topophilic description of place in *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns.* In the lecture notes, Adams writes that "The tendency of men as well as animals is to seek occasionally their old homes and ancient habitats. Seen in individual fondness for his birth-place, the school and college where he was educated… This instinct so common and so deeply-rooted in our Anglo-Saxon human nature is one of the greatest of historical forces: it binds men and nations together" (*ibid.*). Furthermore, "all men have a kind of domestic instinct, a natural love of home and of old familiar places." Generalizing the argument even further, he goes on to write that the "domestic instinct" is "one and the same with that which lies at the root of

our Anglo-Saxon idea of home or and of [sic] all which the world calls patriotism or love of country" (*ibid.*).

Adams included the idea that humans tend to feel a fondness for "the school and college where he was educated." As mentioned above, this applies perfectly to Adams's description of the southern German village in *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns*: Adams himself had played the role of the hypothetical student in the narrative, visiting the countryside surrounding Heidelberg in his college days. Adams, then, displays a self-awareness when it comes to his love of the villages of southern Germany.

This awareness of the power of place could serve another role, however. Tuan (1974, 101) distinguishes between two scales of patriotism, local and imperial. Local patriotism relies on topophilic emotions and "rests on the intimate experience of place." Imperial patriotism, on the other hand, "feeds on collective egotism and pride." In the service of imperial patriotism, "topophilia rings false when it is claimed for a large territory" (*ibid.*). We can classify Anglo-Saxonism (as a subset of Teutonism) as a kind of patriotic movement, and its broad scale would earn it the classification of "imperial" patriotism, in Tuan's system. In *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns*, Adams does not claim topophilia for a large territory, a rhetorical strategy that would "ring false," according to Tuan. Instead, he focuses on what he knows is an effective rhetorical strategy and focuses on an emotional connection to a locale as a symbol for a grand historical narrative stretching across both centuries and oceans.

As is typical in Adams's writing, he leaves room for the alternative in such a broad way that it muddles his argument. While attached to places, he writes, men also have "a kind of vagabond instinct … to change our environment and to seek fresh fields and pastures new," a "nomadic spirit of travel and adventure" (HBA 2/21/12). This argument is important because, as Freeman's Three Homes Thesis suggests (see Chapter 2), a defining characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon branch of the Teutonic race is that it is not bound to any homeland, but instead is destined to expand and spread its way of life worldwide.

Freeman, for his part, did not express this love of place in the text of his writings so much as he did using texts of a different kind—sketches and hand-drawn maps. Freeman's papers at the University of Manchester currently contain more than 6,200 of his pen and ink sketches, almost all of them depicting parish churches in England (as in Figure 6, shown below). Freeman's love of local architecture extended beyond England: in a letter to John Richard Green dated 25 October 1871, he babbled effusively about the ecclesiastical architecture he was encountering in Sicily (EAF 1/8/1–30).

He also took pains to draft extremely large-scale maps of military campaigns in medieval England and France. In these efforts he earned Adams's praise of his "exact local studies of English topography" (Adams 1895, 238). Great care went into Freeman's maps, and he critiqued the style of the maps of his colleagues (as in a 28 September 1879 letter to Green, EAF 1/8/1–30). Appendix B shows the process of creating such maps.

Figure 6: Freeman's sketch of a parish church and local castle (Freeman 1883)

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has detailed how the concern of Anglo-Saxonist institutional historians with place and the local was multi-faceted and had an important effect on both the content of Anglo-Saxonism (its focus on local institutions) and on the strategies of outreach, research, and rhetoric used to produce and disseminate it. Institutions were important because they could show the continuity of national character over time while also allowing for the assimilation of individuals of (certain) other

races; local institutions in particular were studied because Freeman and Adams held that it was in "locales" that large-scale institutions were made real and constituted in the daily lives of individuals, to use an idea of Agnew's (2015 [1987], 28).

The way a focus on the local influenced the strategies employed by Anglo-Saxonists is also important. It is especially interesting because it helped to determine strategies of different kinds, from those of outreach and research to rhetorical strategies in the texts themselves. In particular, the link between Adams's belief in the power of appealing to humans' "natural love of home and of old familiar places" (HBA 2/21/12) and the presence of deep topophilic description in one of his articles (Adams 1882a) merits reemphasis because of how it ties into the broader argument of this thesis. By conceiving of Adams as an intentional and conscious agent in producing the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism, I can show the link between his ideas of sense of place and his usage of them in a text. Chapter 3 showed that Adams consciously sought to spread his ideas with a sure understanding of the discursive structures he would have to navigate. When he describes an emotion and then plays on it in published texts, I can then infer that he is using that strategy intentionally in an effort to win people to his cause.

CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and Epilogue

5.1 Conclusions

This thesis has critically examined the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism as a geopolitical discourse produced by intentional, conscious agents. As such, it has provided a case study in how a way of looking at the world is spread by individuals who choose specific strategies to create and disseminate that worldview. My examination of the intentions and consciousness of these individuals provides the crucial link between the forms of the discourse, on the one hand, and the agency of the individuals who produce the texts that comprise it, on the other. I argue that the way to study this link is to study meta-narratives: what the producers of texts say about their texts.

As I noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, I was inspired to pay closer attention to agency in critical geopolitics discourse analysis by Müller's (2008, 325) description of what he calls the Agency Concept of discourse. According to Müller, this concept is the most popular in critical geopolitics, but it gives too much credit to individuals as agents who can intentionally draw on discourses to achieve political aims. To Müller, a truly poststructuralist approach would focus on texts of a discourse to reconstruct the rules that govern it. Following Foucault, individuals should be thought of as subjects, given identity only by the discourses in which they inevitably must participate (see Bevir 1999).

I disagree and argue that the Agency Concept does not pay enough attention to the agency of the individuals it studies. Works of critical geopolitics seldom look at the narratives that actors produce about their own texts at all. Instead, they compare the supposed objectivity of geopolitical discourses with the parallel interests of the individuals producing the texts of those discourses and infer ulterior motives. A concept truly engaging with agency will assess these meta-narratives about the intents of the authors of geopolitical texts.

Studying the agency of actors is important for two primary reasons. First, as Bevir (1999, 71) notes, a solid understanding of the agency involved in the production of a discourse is necessary to critique it: responsibility for acceptable or unacceptable uses of power can only be assigned to actors understood to be intentional and conscious. Accusations of crimes you were forced to commit by some other person or structure do not typically hold up well in court. Anglo-Saxonism reinforced a racial hierarchy degrading peoples deemed outsiders to the Anglo-Saxon race and encouraging the often violent expansion of the British and American Empires. By understanding the proponents of Anglo-Saxonism as intentional agents conscious of the potential implications of their ideology, we can assign some responsibility for racial injustices to them.

The second reason why taking agency into account is important is that it can paint a more detailed picture of the micro-dynamics of the production and spread of a discourse. As Gee (2005, 27) describes it, discourses converse with and change each other through the individuals that "carry" them. From a standpoint emphasizing agency, however, that is not the entire picture. Individuals make choices about how they engage with their environment, including the discursive structures that define it. Individuals are not autonomous, in that they do not have unlimited choices, but to an extent they can ignore, perpetuate, use, or actively change and spread the texts and social structures around them. An approach centering the agency, intent, and consciousness of individuals can begin to understand why these choices are made and how they are carried out.

In searching for and using methods of examining agency in discourse, however, I encountered a significant challenge. The most obvious is that I was trying to fill a gap in the literature, and as such, I found no clear precedents for this kind of project. This meant that I had to cobble together an approach from several different sources (primarily Giddens 1984, van Leeuwen 2000, Scollon 2001). My engagement with these approaches led me to recognize that they operate in very different epistemological frameworks. While they are internally coherent, the way they approach knowledge is inconsistent with one another. It is these inconsistencies and their ramifications for research methods that I would like to address now. Simply put, investigating intentions and consciousness in the social sciences proved to be tricky and contentious. With some selective choosing of different parts of several approaches, however, I believe I arrived at a workable mixture.

Lees (2004, 104) argues that all analyses of discourses must lie along a spectrum of constructionism, from claiming that no absolute truth exists outside of a discourse (relativism) to the more conventional stance that discourses are misrepresentations of an objective reality. At the former end of the spectrum sits van Leeuwen's (2000) work on the discursive construction of purpose. Van Leeuwen makes it clear that he does not write about discourse as a window into the actual intentions or purposes behind an action; instead, he writes about how statements can construct a discourse about why actions were taken (*ibid.*, 66). In this way, van Leeuwen focuses on how texts reflect the characteristics of a discourse, not a reality external to it.

Giddens, on the other hand, takes a much less relativistic stance when writing about discursive consciousness and agency in structuration (Giddens 1984). As critics have noted (*e.g.*, Mathieu 2009, 179), Giddens does not distinguish between the account an individual gives for his actions, on the one hand, and why he actually acted as he did, on the other. Giddens's epistemological stance must therefore include two positions: first, that individuals can know why they acted in a certain way; and second, that researchers can know why individuals acted a certain way by collecting

the individuals' statements about their intentions. Giddens is sure to note that individuals' actions might have unconscious motives and unintended consequences, such as those consequences that unintentionally feed back into reproducing structures (1984, 6–12). Ultimately, however, "actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities … they also routinely monitor … the contexts in which they move" (*ibid.*, 6). To Giddens, an actor's statements can prove to a researcher that the actor has this discursive consciousness, an awareness of the structures around him that he must navigate in order to achieve his goals. This is an entirely different position from van Leeuwen's, as Giddens takes an individual's statements at face value, so to speak: the statements reflect a reality about what the individual knows.

Scollon's (2001) stance lies somewhere in the middle. Her theory of Anticipatory Discourse posits that an individual's actions are products of three factors: their habitus (internalized cultural norms and expectations), the practices of the social groups in which they operate, and their anticipation of the future (*ibid.*, 105). Scollon goes on to set up an entire framework to describe an individual's anticipation of the future, his expectation of the efficacy of his own actions (see Figure 2). This is a very similar idea to Giddens's discursive consciousness, but one that allows for the possibility of an individual's erroneous anticipation of the future and his actions' consequences. Like Giddens, Scollon describes an individual's stance as something that is knowable by a researcher, obtainable through the individual's statements.

As I stated at the end of the literature review of this thesis, my own stance toward epistemology occupies a middle ground on Lees's spectrum. Gee (2005, 97) describes a balanced position as one showing how discourses simultaneously reflect and construct reality. The position that this research has led me to adopt is that some kinds of statements can be taken as constructing reality, whereas others can reflect it. Scollon's own balanced position towards epistemology informs my position: despite setting out to study the intentions of an individual alongside how the individual anticipates the future, Scollon states that she avoids intentionality altogether: she writes that "My own approach is to focus on the interaction among action and construal of action, describing strategies while saying as little as possible about intention" (Scollon 2001, 110).

My position is that analyzing an individual's knowledge is different from knowing what his motives are, intentional or unconscious. Showing how an individual's knowledge compares to another set of knowledge is a much easier task than attempting to reconstruct their thought process and unconscious motives alike. I recognize, like van Leeuwen, that understanding all the motives and intentions that go into producing an action is difficult if not impossible: individuals' statements of

their intentions should be taken as producing a discourse about their agency, not as proving what their intentions and motives really are.

I believe I can adopt a less relativist stance towards the problem of understanding an individual's knowledge (or discursive consciousness or anticipation of the future). Individuals can state or show that they have knowledge of something, and then that knowledge can be compared to another set of knowledge. Giddens would have us compare it to an objective reality of discursive structures that we as researchers understand: if an individual's knowledge matches ours in that case, we can say that he has discursive consciousness. For a less positivist approach, we can compare different statements that show different understandings of the way the world works and contrast them for critique (specific methods can come from the discourse-immanent critique of inconsistencies within a discourse: see Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 88). This is the approach I took in Chapter 3 of this thesis, where I examined passages from two articles written by Freeman (1877 and 1882, respectively). I argued that Freeman showed what Giddens would consider discursive consciousness in his first article in rejecting the hegemonic discourse of applying race to politics. In the second article, however, he adopted an entirely different stance, embracing that same discourse when it aligned with the rest of his life's work. With this contrast, I critiqued Freeman as opportunistic and self-contradictory in his pursuit of political goals. I also did this while avoiding an inconsistent epistemological position relative to the other methods of analyzing discourses of agency.

The rest of this thesis has engaged with the agency of two producers of Anglo-Saxonism in two key ways. In Chapter 3, I assessed how Freeman and Adams (and Hosmer) situated their work in a context that included the text's purpose, its predicted effect, its influences, and its relationship with other texts and similar ideas. I concluded that they all constructed themselves discursively as conscious and intentional agents in the production and spread of Anglo-Saxonism. In Chapters 2 and 4, I examined personal correspondence and notes alongside the published texts of Anglo-Saxonism. These two types of documents can only meaningfully be linked together if the agent is understood to be intentional and conscious in choosing certain strategies over others to accomplish an intended goal. That understanding of consciousness can show how ideas and beliefs present in private documents can inform the presence of strategies related to those ideas and beliefs in published texts.

I hope that this thesis will serve to introduce the methods of the Discourse-Historical Approach and those examining the discursive production of agency to critical geopolitics and that they will enjoy greater use in the sub-discipline. These methods will have tremendous value in understanding and explaining the spread of contemporary disinformation and extremist ideologies, especially those using new media and the phenomenon of "fake news." Crucially, these methods will

be able to detail the mechanism of spread rather than just the form that the discourse takes, and that can give the analysis a truly critical edge. Analyses of geopolitical discourses need to go beyond describing those discourses to explaining why they persist, shift, and take certain rhetorical forms. When individuals produce the texts of geopolitical discourses along with narratives about the production of those texts, we should pay attention to those narratives.

Of course, any study is limited by its data. My project would not have been possible if not for the shelves and shelves of correspondence and notes that Freeman and Adams left behind. Meta-narratives can sometimes be found in published works (*e.g.*, Hosmer 1890, ix), but such self-reference appears to be rarer. Attempting to study the intentions and consciousness of individuals who did not leave behind papers and who are unavailable for interviews[5] might be impossible. However, many historical figures—the "wise men of statecraft"—do leave behind unpublished documents like correspondence, so to focus solely on published works is to ignore a potential wealth of contextualizing perspectives. When paired with the appropriate methods, these meta-narratives can shed light on how actors see and maneuver within their contexts and produce texts that help them achieve their political goals.

5.2 Epilogue: Placing Anglo-Saxonism in History

In addition to the contribution I hope this thesis will make to the methods used in critical geopolitics, I believe that the subject matter itself of my thesis is worth examining in its own right. In this epilogue, I will demonstrate the importance of Anglo-Saxonism to later developments in the geopolitical stances of the British Empire and the United States, particularly to the beginning of the "Special Relationship" between the United Kingdom and the United States and to the turn to internationalist organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations.

In a study of Anglo-Saxonism in late 19th century politics, Kramer (2002) suggests a typology for investigating ideological movements that play on some mixture of racial and national identities to define an "exceptional" group. I have clarified the geography implied in Kramer's framework and present the resulting typology in Table 3 below. The typology is helpful in narrating the development of Anglo-Saxonism and I will use it throughout this epilogue. While Kramer does not make the connection, the distinction between a focus on Race versus one of Civic Virtues as the binding agent between members of the group resembles Smith's (1991, 8) idea of racial versus civic nationalism.

---

[5] Because they are long dead, for instance.

Table 4: Typology of Exceptionalist Ideologies

Typology of Exceptionalist Ideologies Relative to Race and the State (Table by Author)	**Stance Relative to the State**	
Focus on	*Inward-Looking*	*Outward-Looking*
Race	national racial exceptionalism	international racial exceptionalism
Civic Virtues	national exceptionalism	internationalism

Following Kramer (2002), the version of Anglo-Saxonism that Freeman and Adams promoted can be termed an international racial exceptionalist ideology because it defined a group of people living in different states as a singular exceptional race (Horsman 1981). In its time, Anglo-Saxonism conflicted with national exceptionalist ideologies like Frederick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis (Tulloch 1977) which claimed that characteristics of American national identity, such as individualism, were shaped by the experience of expanding the American Frontier further and further west. Higham (1984, 1228) describes how Anglo-Saxonism challenged national exceptionalist ideals of American democracy as a product of an Enlightenment revolution, instead asserting that American democracy was "the distinctive ethnic heritage of a people who had learned self-government by running their own affairs and defending local liberties against centralized power." Anglo-Saxonism would slowly lose its explicitly racialized character, tending towards internationalism: after World War I, Anglo-Saxonism birthed internationalist movements that aimed at a world government (see section 2.7 of this chapter and especially Brundage and Cosgrove 2007).

Anglo-Saxonism itself was explicitly racialized and racist (see section 2.3.3 of this chapter), but its twin focus on the Anglo-Saxon race and its socio-political institutions mean that hybridity was always a key issue: could other races adopt Anglo-Saxon institutions and assimilate? The answer was often yes, provided they were white enough (see, for example, E.A. Freeman's 1877 essay on Race and Language, E.A. Freeman Papers, 2/2/145), but the issues of hybridity and assimilation were perpetually thorny ones for supporters of Anglo-Saxonism (Anderson 1981).

Most of the scholarly debates around Anglo-Saxonism have focused on its effects on geopolitical changes and maneuvers; in particular, how Anglo-Saxonism helped to effect the Great Rapprochement between the United States and the British Empire in the 1890s (e.g., Perkins 1968, Anderson 1981, Kramer 2002, Adams 2005). Historians have given several reasons for the popularity of Anglo-Saxonism, from justifying American colonialism and giving it a model to mimic (Kramer

2002), to supporting and consolidating the American rise to power on the world stage (Parmar 2002), to anxiety over British imperial decline (Adams 2005). Similarly, the debate over why Anglo-Saxonism in its explicitly racialized form disappeared is not resolved. Explanations range from the rise of constitutional history (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007), to the challenges of getting non-Anglo constituents to accept Anglo-Saxonism as a political motive (Perkins 1968, Blake 1945), to the realization of an American colonial empire (Kramer 2002).

5.2.1 The English-Speaking Federation Movements

The intense focus of Anglo-Saxonist institutional history on the local affected the macroscale political systems thought to be most compatible with Anglo-Saxon liberty. Even institutions thought of as operating on national or international scales (or in Cox's terms their "spaces of engagement") could be understood as relying on local "spaces of dependence" (Cox 1998). In *The Germanic Origins of New England Towns* (Adams 1882a, 13)*,* refers to ideals "which have formed Germany and Holland, England and New England, the United States in the broadest sense of that old Germanic institution." Note the use of the phrase "United States" (italicized in the original) to mean something entirely different from the United States of America. This use of a commonly-understood name to refer to something other than its usual referent is a classic type of nomination strategy of discourse, where agents construct actors, objects, or phenomena discursively by naming them in a noticeably different way from the norm (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94). In Adams's quote, "the United States" is an appositive for the four political entities mentioned just before, so it refers to a union of Germany, Holland, England, and New England, much in the way the contemporary phrase "Greater Britain" meant the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (Seeley 1971 [1883], Bell 2007).

The idea of federation as an organizing principle would go on to play an important role in the Anglo-Saxonist movements to unite the United States and the British Empire up to their incarnations during World War II, and the federalism principle was tied to Anglo-Saxonism from the beginning. Adams wrote to Freeman in a letter dated 6 April 1882 (EAF 1/7/1–13) that "there is nothing in Institutional History more wonderful than the gradual expansion of the federal principle from Aryan villages, like the Attic demes [of ancient Greece], through municipal confederations and leagues, through States and Nations, to the 'Federation of the World' by treaties and commercial relations." Federation as an idea was compatible with an emphasis on local self-governance as it could be a sort of league of local places, all on equal footing with one another.

The veneration of the federal principle would have a significant impact on the specific aims of Anglo-Saxonism as a political movement. As Anglo-Saxonism and the Teutonic Origins Theory

were spreading around the United States, Anglo-Saxonism was beginning to gain real political momentum. Freeman's contemporaries Charles Dilke, James Anthony Froude, and John Seeley were busy providing the inspiration for the Imperial Federation Movement, a lobby striving for a free union of the white, self-governing colonies of the British Empire (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) with Britain itself. Inspired by Dilke's 1868 book Greater Britain, Seeley's The Expansion of England (1971 [1883], 14) aimed to promote an interpretation of the name "Britain" to include any "English subjects of European and mainly English blood" living in the British Empire. To maintain these ties of blood, Seeley advocated a political federation of the white colonies with Britain. The Imperial Federation Movement was founded the next year in London.

These calls for Anglo-Saxon unity often looked favorably upon the United States as a potential ally, but many advocates—particularly John Seeley, Charles Dilke, and James Bryce—did not think that the United States should be a full member of a potential imperial federation (Vucetic 2011, 29). Bryce even used the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxonism to discourage colonialism in general (Kramer 2002, 1339). Freeman himself did not go so far as to advocate for a single English-speaking government, only greater cooperation between the English-speaking governments (Boston Advertiser 18 October 1882, EAF 5/1/10). Although Seeley recognized the United States as sharing English "language…chief institutions, [and] habits;" and although he wrote admiringly of its expansion, he never opened up his planned federation to the U.S; to him in the immediate future, the idea of federation was one for Greater Britain only (Seeley 1971[1883], 50).

Other British imperialist figures such as W.T. Stead and Cecil Rhodes appropriated Seeley's work but also declared themselves open to the inclusion of the United States in a federation (Gross 1971, xii; Anderson 1981, 47–51). Americans, led initially by Herbert Baxter Adams's student James K. Hosmer, began to join in as well. Hosmer's A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom (1890) cites Freeman and Adams's work extensively as it narrates the development of the political institutions of the English-speaking peoples in familiar terms. Like the work of John Fiske and Josiah Strong, Hosmer's work appealed to a broader audience partially because it addressed (and reinforced) fears of immigration and threats from other races. To combat these threats, Hosmer argues that the Anglo-Saxons must unite. Such a union would not only protect the Anglo-Saxon race and its virtuous institutions from destruction, but would ultimately benefit the world as a whole, or so the theory went. Since the combined economic and military might of the English-speaking peoples would be too great for any single nation to challenge, a sort of Pax Anglo-Saxon would follow unification, after which the world would simply disarm and join together. Thus, an "Anglo-Saxon fraternity [would be] a step toward the federation of the world" and "subsequent world peace" (Hosmer 1890, xix).

The idea of political union with Britain gained more ground in the decade following the publication of Hosmer's book. Even the influential businessman Andrew Carnegie was entirely swept up: his self-published 1898 pamphlet entitled The Reunion of Britain and America: A Look Ahead called for a federation based on "the strongest sentiment in man," a "pride of race." Later in his career, just before his death in 1901, John Fiske took his work an extra step and wrote a speech advocating the federation of the English-speaking peoples (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 138). The idea that the United States might (and should) expand to cover the globe was not a new one, but its earlier appearances in the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century had two important differences (Horsman 1981, 292–293). First, the United States was portrayed as exceptional because it represented the superior branch of the Anglo-Saxon race; if partnership with the British came up, it held them to be secondary partners instead of the equal partners that Hosmer, Fiske, and Strong envisioned. Second, American leaders in first decades of independence generally held that American democracy could be spread around the world by teaching other peoples to govern themselves, a far cry from the military might required by these later propositions (Horsman 1981, 298–299).

The idea of an international federation was to become an important part of advocating Anglo-Saxon unity and in the transition from racialized Anglo-Saxonism to liberal internationalism. Hosmer's prescient hope that an "Anglo-Saxon fraternity" might prove "a step toward the federation of the world" presages the goals of later movements, including that of Clarence Streit a half-century later, and his wish "for the abrogation of national distinction" was echoed by George Louis Beer a quarter-century later (Hosmer 1890, 369). As Brundage and Cosgrove noted, "it was the principle of federalism as a viable means of organizing the English-speaking world…that was to have a more enduring impact on Anglo-American relations" than the racially-charged principles of Anglo-Saxonism would (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 138). Despite the ultimate importance of the federalism principle, however, the idea of supranational government for the English-speaking peoples had its roots in a faith in race as "the strongest tie" to bind nations together (Seeley 1971 [1883], 14).

5.2.2 The Great Rapprochement

Just how much sway Anglo-Saxonist identity and the new movements for Anglo-American political unity held over elites in Washington and London was tested during the 1895–1896 Venezuela Boundary Dispute (Anderson 1981, 96–105; Vucetic 2011, 32–34). When British diplomats tried to assert their imperial prerogatives by enforcing a questionable border between Venezuela and British Guyana, American President Grover Cleveland delivered a bellicose, Anglophobic speech on 17 December 1895 in which he invoked the Monroe Doctrine of American protection of the Western Hemisphere. In response, several British politicians, including Cabinet

members Balfour and Chamberlain, delivered speeches in early 1897 in which they appealed to Anglo-Saxonist sentiment. Their calling the possibility of an Anglo-American war "fratricidal" and "criminal" appears to have had the desired effect of eliciting an outcry of racialized camaraderie on both sides of the Atlantic, and Washington backed down.

In the immediate aftermath of the Venezuela Boundary Dispute, the two statesmen responsible for its resolution—U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney and British ambassador to Washington Julian Pauncefote—began working on a treaty that would establish a system of international arbitration to ensure that a similar crisis would not happen again. Despite promising public support for the treaty (see Anderson 1981, 107), the Senate failed to ratify it on 5 May 1897. The failure of the treaty demonstrated the limits of Anglo-Saxonism and its character—at least in the 1890s—as an identity shared only by elites in the English-speaking world. Even though many senators were personally moved by Anglo-Saxonism, they could not ignore their non-English (especially Irish) constituents (Blake 1945, 236–241; Perkins 1968, 6). After his 1881–1882 visit Freeman himself wrote that "American dislike towards England" is sometimes "put on simply to catch Irish votes" (Freeman 1882, EAF 2/2/181).

The key limit to Anglo-Saxonism in the late 1890s appears to have been that it was an identity very much restricted to the elite classes of the white, English-speaking worlds (Vucetic 2011, 23; following Bell 2007). While the initial success of Anglo-Saxonism was due in part to the "social, familial, intellectual, and literary networks that tied elite Americans and Britons together," it was ultimately limited by the fact that it was spread primarily by "a small body of academics, jurists and intellectuals whose writings in learned journals, legal textbooks and works of comparative politics lacked extensive appeal" (Kramer 2002, 1326; Tulloch 1977, 825). Even contemporary supporters of Anglo-Saxonism like Alfred Thayer Mahan acknowledged the lack of broad popular support contrasted with acceptance among elites, writing that while friendly feelings between the English-speaking peoples of the world were growing and welcome, they "cannot be forced, … cannot be hurried" (Mahan and Beresford 1894, 560).

Although the Senate failed to ratify the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty, the Great Rapprochement continued along less formal lines. The Spanish-American War, which broke out the next year, has been deemed "critical to the transformation of the Anglo-American bond" because of British policy of "benevolent neutrality" towards the imperialistic aggression of the United States (Adams 2005, 12). To many in Britain, the U.S. was beginning to shoulder its share of the White Man's Burden: as Bradford Perkins believes, "American entry into the elite company of empires, coinciding with renewed imperial interest in Britain, demolished many irritants between the nations" (1968, 66).

Why did the United States and the United Kingdom, two states seemingly destined for rivalry, begin to avoid conflict and pursue friendship? Why did the "almost instinctive American dislike of England" diminish (Perkins 1968, 5)? Historians and scholars of International Relations have struggled over this question and come to various conclusions (Vucetic 2011, 22–25). According to Iestyn Adams (2005, 17), the consolidation of the new Anglo-American friendship was a political maneuver effected by British elites anxious over the slow but inexorable decline of the British Empire. Thus an abandonment of Britain's "splendid isolation" led it towards not only a new friendship with the United States, but also towards the alliance system (the Entente) that would draw it into World War I. Bradford Perkins (1968, 10) credits a convergence of American and British economic and political systems: "when concern for the health of the industrial order helped to create imperialism in the United States…the two nations found a further element of similarity," and the growing franchise and increasing democratization in England meant that it "no longer symbolized monarchical opposition to the ideals of the American republic."

Other explanations are more straightforward and constructivist: "Anglo-Saxonism, as an intellectual construct, provided the primary abstract rationale for the diplomatic rapprochement" between the United States and Britain (Anderson 1981, 11–12). Vucetic (2011, 20) agrees with Anderson, writing that the explanation for the beginning of the Great Rapprochement (the Venezuela Boundary Dispute "can be found in the rise of Anglo-Saxonism, [the] racialized identity that established American and British empires as vanguards of civilization." Kramer (2002, 1319) argues that while Anglo-Saxonism was important, the reason the political elites of the United States adopted it so readily was not rapprochement. Instead, Anglo-Saxonism was attractive because it justified an American imperial future in terms of racial destiny, giving Americans a (British) model to base their own colonial visions. A passage from an article by Freeman supports Kramer's imperial mimicry thesis. Freeman wrote that it was natural that "every American should in his heart deem British opinion more important than any other, and should in his heart value British good opinion more fondly than any other. A young nation … is naturally keenly density to the opinion of other nations, above all of the nation which in its heart it feels to be its own parent" (Freeman 1882, EAF 2/2/181).

5.2.3 The Decline of Anglo-Saxonism

Despite the continued political rapprochement after 1898, the Spanish-American War has been called "the apex of Anglo-Saxonism" in American politics (Anderson 1981, 112). In the words of Bradford Perkins, "Anglo-Saxonism, so much emphasized in 1898, shaded into a less strident advocacy of friendship between the English-speaking peoples" (Perkins 1968, 312). In the short term, unfavorable American public opinion of Britain's Second Boer War (1899–1902) and another crisis

over Venezuela (1902–1903) dampened Anglo-American spirits slightly, even though the United States government exhibited "unabashed sympathy" towards the British and loans floated by American bankers paid for 20% of the British war cost (Vucetic 2011, 24; Anderson 1981, 131). With the acquisition of formerly Spanish possessions, the United States also now had an empire of its own. Before the Spanish-American War, "the glories of the British imperial past and present had to stand in for a hypothetical American colonial future to which it was connected by Anglo-Saxon racial destiny" (Kramer 2002, 1349). After the war, America's colonial future was no longer hypothetical: thus, international racial exceptionalism and imperial mimicry could be replaced by national exceptionalism.

A realist view of geopolitics might also look to several geopolitical shifts that left Britain less worried about its vulnerability and less needful of an American ally. The 1904 Entente Cordiale led to an effective Franco-British alliance, giving Britain a friend on mainland Europe. Perhaps more importantly, Russia was defeated handily by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). As Hosmer's fear of Russia evidences, a central concern of Anglo-Saxonists was protecting that racial heritage against Slavic military might (Hosmer 1890, 351–364). With Russia's prestige weakened after the humiliating loss to Japan, it no longer seemed to be a substantial threat to Britain (Anderson 1981, 172–176).

What replaced this fear was anxiety over Germany's power. Anna Marie Martellone posits that it was this new enmity towards Germany that led to a decline in the invocation of Anglo-Saxonism: after all, Anglo-Saxonism was originally rooted in Teutonism through the Teutonic Origins Theory, in which the German people were held to be similar or even equal to the English-speaking peoples in terms of racial makeup and appreciation for democratic institutions (1994, 90). The more racially-charged Pan-Germanism would evolve into Nazism, emphasizing purity of blood, while the British and Americans focused on their "superior moral mission of building empires by virtue of their common Anglo-Saxon inheritance of democracy and their special Anglo-Saxon gift for self-governance" in the face of the German threat (Martellone 1994, 86).

The inconsistency between claiming kinship with Germans and hating them helped highly racialized Anglo-Saxonism die out among intellectuals, in whose subsequent work "race no longer supplied the paramount historical interpretation for the continuity of English and American history" (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 38). Instead, historians began to focus on the continuity of socio-political institutions, studying what continues to be known as constitutional history. The comparative study of institutionalized constitutions both written (i.e., those of the United States and France) and unwritten (i.e., that of the United Kingdom) was not new (Kramer 2002). Constitutional history in the

years after the apex of Anglo-Saxonism, however, still served the project of Anglo-American unity by naturalizing the "belief in the institutional superiority of Anglo-American law and government." Constitutional historians such as George Burton Adams and George Louis Beer acted as "ardent advocate[s] of closer Anglo-American ties" by "extolling the virtues of the British Empire, vilifying the Germans, and stressing the shared values of the American and English peoples" in the years leading up to World War I (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, xi, 142, 148).

When President Woodrow Wilson made his case before Congress that the U.S. should declare war on Germany, he appealed to democracy in general, rather than referring to the democratic Anglo-Saxon institutions by name. The U.S. was not setting out on a unilateral crusade for liberty—the implication of selflessly "making the world safe for democracy" was that the entire Entente the U.S. would be supporting was a bastion of democratic ideals. It might not behoove an ally of France, fighting in France, to claim to do so on the basis of helping the English because of racial ties. While Wilson himself was an Anglophilic student of constitutional history, and a student of Herbert Baxter Adams's, the potential backlash from isolationists, Anglophobes, and the French could have prevented him from alluding to the Anglo-American bond (Perkins 1968, 291). Instead, not mentioning racial or linguistic ties allowed the general appreciation of "democracy' to encompass non-English-speaking nations, like France in this case. These internationalist aspirations, as opposed to a narrow focus on the English-speaking peoples, were to play an important role in the movements for federation with Britain in the decades to come.

Neil Smith (2003, 177–178) submits that Wilson's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference at the War's end made "a subtle and largely uncontested claim to global superiority" by deploying the language of ethnicity instead of race. Ethnicity was an American invention, Smith explains, that elided grand classifications of race by reducing European nationalities to ethnicities, establishing a hierarchy of peoples from which the English-speaking peoples were exempt and therefore atop. Smith traces how Wilson and his delegation sought "a new and higher stage of international society—a beneficent brotherhood of capitalist nations competing economically but peacefully while advancing the global good"—a system in which the economic hegemony of the United States and the British Empire could be maintained (2003, 16).

Of course, the decline in explicitly racialized Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric did not mean that faithful idealists did not still exist. Published in 1914, Sinclair Kennedy's The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations is the quintessence of Anglo-Saxonism. While the previous influential figures in Anglo-Saxonism were all elite and independently influential academics, Kennedy was a Bostonian lawyer, and his taking up of the Anglo-Saxonist

cause indicates that Anglo-Saxonism survived in the popular imagination of an Anglophilic segment of the American population (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 157).

Like Hosmer and Carnegie before him, Kennedy advocated the union through federation of the English-speaking nations of the world (Kennedy 1914, viii). Unlike the earlier plans, however, there is no mention of the Pan-Anglic federation becoming a world government: Kennedy meant the federation to be for the benefit of "English-speaking whites" only, with no assimilation of other races possible (Kennedy 1914, 27). Federation, as a political structure, could serve "its dual purpose of protecting the group and leaving the individual unharmed," important features given Kennedy revered individualism as the root of all Anglo-Saxon virtues (Kennedy 1914, viii). A contemporary review of The Pan-Angles noted that the book's ideas—including complete political federation between the "Pan-Angles," had "taken hold of too many minds to be pronounced mere fancy or delusion" (Schuyler 1915). The Pan-Angles is Anglo-Saxonism at its most racist and discriminatory, and its readership proves that the movement, while diminished, still existed in the minds of many Americans going into World War I.

5.2.4 Internationalism during the Interwar Years

The War brought immediacy to the cause of Anglo-American cooperation and led to the limited realization of the Anglo-Saxonist dream: the experience of fighting side by side in World War I galvanized the Anglo-American alliance. A 1919 article in the English-Speaking Union's journal The Landmark marveled at the "complete harmony" between the American and British delegations at Versailles, noting it proved how the wartime experience had brought the diplomats of the two countries close together (The Landmark 1 (4): 196). After World War I, the Anglo-American friendship had solidified to the point that the future growth of that relationship seemed inevitable (Balfour 1919). The challenge to advocates of English-speaking federation as the basis of world government became the involvement of the rest of the world.

The First World War shocked and horrified those that participated in it. As Paul Fussell wrote, "every war is ironic because every war is worse than expected…but the Great War was more ironic than any before or since" (1975, 7–8). The "enormous popular enthusiasm" evident in the streets of Europe in August 1914 gave way to "the manufacture of mass death" on a scale never seen before (Keegan 2000, 71, 4). The problem of how to prevent such a war from happening again prevailed in the minds of academics and politicians alike, and some began to dream up new world orders (see Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). In 1917, while the war still raged alongside the American decision whether or not to enter the war, the American constitutional historian George Louis Beer published The English-speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations.

In it, Beer aimed to advance the idea of "the advisability and necessity of a co-operative democratic alliance of all the English-speaking peoples, from which may possibly in time be developed such a new type of permanent political association" (Beer 1917, x).

What emerges from the pages of The English-Speaking Peoples is a strong disdain for nationalism and for the entire system of sovereign states that led to the "international anarchy" the world experienced during World War I. To Beer, the "failure to create any supernational authority" was the direct cause of the catastrophe (Beer 1917, 63, 24). Like James K. Hosmer calling for an "Anglo-Saxon federation" as a "step towards the federation of the world" in 1890, Beer saw the English-speaking alliance as the "corner-stone" of a new league of nations (Hosmer 1890, xix; Beer 1917, 270). Where Beer's rhetoric differed from his ideological forbearers from the pre-war era was in its attention to the importance of drawing in the rest of the world into an "unprecedented form of political association" (Beer 1917, 271). Since the common language, "common civilization," and "same political ideals and institutions" shared by the English-speaking democracies of the world would naturally draw them together, the challenge would be to abolish the nation-state system under a new world federation while maintaining as its cornerstone the already extant Anglo-American alliance (Beer 1917, 189–190, 252–253).

Immediately following the end of the War, popular efforts and movements to promote Anglo-American friendship and cooperation abounded, (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 162). A February 1920 article in the magazine English Speaking World claimed that "never in the history of the United States has there been such a desire…to come into closer and warmer friendship with other English-speaking countries" (Bennett 1920). By the mid-1920s, these organizations could count among their number the English-Speaking Union Sulgrave Institute, the Pilgrim Society, the American English-Speaking Union, the Society of British and American Friendship, and a whole host of smaller organizations and leagues. Of these, the English-Speaking Union was arguably the most influential. It still exists today (see http://www.esu.org/), and has counted among its leaders such luminaries as Winston Churchill (chairman of the E-SU from 1921-1926), Franklin D. Roosevelt, William H. Taft (first president of U.S. branch in 1921), Arthur Balfour (president of British branch in 1921), James Bryce, and, of course, Sinclair Kennedy.

In addition to these movements and leagues, Anglo-American elites continued to effect greater cooperation between the United States and the British Empire through the novel institutions of think tanks (Parmar 2002). The twin think tanks of Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) and the Council on Foreign Relations were born from informal meetings at Paris Peace Conference between American and British advisers (ibid., 54; Smith 2003, 118). Their

leaders consistently mixed idealism with power: on the one hand, they championed liberal internationalism in the hope of a new and peaceful world order. On the other hand, they made sure that any plans for a new world order would serve either America's projected rise to global preeminence or the maintenance, in one form or another, of Britain's global position. As Parmar (ibid., 54) puts it: "the universal state, to which many paid homage or lip-service, was anything but universal, institutionalizing 'Anglo-Saxony' at the expense of the world's non-white peoples."

Isaiah Bowman, Wilson's geographer at the Paris Peace Conference and a life-long Anglophile, became the founding president of the CFR. That think tank exhibited a clear pro-British prejudice with references to the "common language and political institutions" that made the United States and Britain "spontaneous" allies (Smith 2003, 199). In a classic case of establishing Gramscian hegemony, the CFR lauded the moral good of pursuing economic interests, making American internationalism as thoroughly an economic strategy as a political one (Smith 2003, 118, 413).

The attention paid to movements of such international outlook dropped sharply during the 1920s and 1930s, however. The hopes of Anglophilic constitutional historians, members of the English-Speaking Union, and internationalists in general were dashed when the United States refused to join the new League of Nations after the end of World War I. As American voters and Congress embraced isolation once again, culture wars began to rage over the contents of American history textbooks. The "patriotic impulses of ordinary Americans" reacted against the "evident agenda on the part of the elite academics," acting collectively through the American Historical Association, to promote an "Anglophile version of history" (Brundage and Cosgrove 2007, 164–167).

5.2.5 Echoes of Anglo-Saxonism during World War II and Beyond

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent another World War from breaking out only strengthened the resolve of some who saw an institution of international cooperation as the key to world peace and prosperity. While explicitly racialized Anglo-Saxonism dropped out of this rhetoric, the role of the English-speaking democracies in serving as the basis of a new world order remained. Clarence Streit's popular Federal Union, Inc., laid out a plan for the federation of the world's democracies, starting with the English-speaking ones (Streit 1939, 1941). In order to combat the fascist Axis, an immediate union should be joined, one that would be "capable of growing into universal world government peacefully and…rapidly" (Streit 1939, 2). In many ways, Streit's Union Now series fit into the larger national debates over aiding Britain against Germany, combining it with a revived internationalism. While this plan bore striking resemblance to the recommendations of James Hosmer, Andrew Carnegie, and Sinclair Kennedy, it carried no reference to race, only to democratic institutions. Interestingly, Kennedy—author of the 1914 The Pan-Angles—lived long

enough to debate Streit vehemently over whether or not other races could successfully adopt Anglo-Saxon liberties and democratic institutions (their correspondence is housed at the Harvard University Library Depository in Cambridge, MA).

Of course, the English-speaking nations of the world never federated, and advocacy of a Pan-Anglic federation is unheard-of today. Still, the formation of the United Nations was a triumph of the internationalist movement (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). Its birth, and that of the parallel structuring of the world economy along Anglo-American lines, cannot be understood in isolation from its beginnings in the racialized and racist terms of Anglo-Saxonism. Further, the closest and most enduring military and intelligence-sharing alliances in the world are those between the "whitest" of the English-speaking states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Vucetic 2011, 52–53). Even if explicitly racialized terminology is (mostly) left out, Anglo-Saxonism resonates in today's geopolitical discourses. The refrain that some (non-English-speaking) peoples are not "ready" for democracy carries with it the implication that those who enjoy free, democratic institutions are those most suited to and deserving of them (Said 1979). More recently, the ongoing debates in favor of Britain's imminent departure from the European Union often hinge around an understanding that the UK is pivoting towards its natural partners of the English-speaking world (Bell and Vucetic, forthcoming).

In addition to illuminating the genealogy of the geopolitical visions involved in modern-day geopolitics, the subject matter of this thesis also provides an interesting contrast to later (including current) identity politics. The nativism of the 1920s, the America First movement of the early 1940s, and contemporary alt-right movements all equated their racial chauvinism and xenophobia with advocating isolation from the rest of the world (Anderson-Nathe and Gharabaghi 2017, Rehman 2017). Anglo-Saxonism looked outward. The definition of a hegemonic racial "in-group" within several discrete states self-identified as parts of an international whole. This was not an isolationist movement, but nor was it a revanchist one, looking to recover lost territory in which racial kin lived; instead, it was internationalist. Mountz (2009, p. 277) writes that political ideologies based on identity can act as centripetal or centrifugal forces, either acting to hold a state together or to pull the state apart. Anglo-Saxonism instead looked to draw several states together in the pursuit of geopolitical hegemony at the global scale.

REFERENCES

"The numerous footnotes will show, he trusts, that he has not been negligent in his reading."
(Hosmer 1890, ix)

Ackleson, J. 2005. Constructing Security on the US-Mexico Border. *Political Geography* 24: 165–184.

Adams, G.B. 1899. *The Origin and Results of the Imperial Federation Movement in England.* Madison, WI: State Historical Society of Madison.

Adams, H.B. 1877. *Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Commonwealth: Or the History of the Accession of Public Lands by the Old Confederation. A Paper read before the Maryland Historical Society, April 9, 1877*. Baltimore, MD: The Maryland Historical Society.

———. 1882a. *The Germanic Origin of New England Towns*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University.

———. 1882b. Tithingmen. *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.* 1: 398–420.

———. 1883. *VIII Norman Constables in America: Read Before the New England Historic, Genealogical Society, February 1, 1882*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University.

———. 1895. Freeman the Scholar and Professor. *Yale Review* November 1895.

Adams, P.C. Media. 2016. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, ed. K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp. New York, NY: Routledge.

Agnew, J.A. 1998. *Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics*. New York: Routledge.

———. 1999. Mapping political power beyond state boundaries. *Millennium* 28: 499–521.

———. 2015 [1987]. *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*. New York: Routledge.

Agnew, J.A., and S. Corbridge. 1995. *Mastering Space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy*. New York: Routledge.

Anderson, S. 1981. *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904*. Toronto: Associated University Presses, Inc.

Anderson-Nathe, B., and K. Gharabaghi. 2017. Trending rightward: Nationalism, xenophobia, and the 2016 politics of fear. *Child and Youth Services* 38 (1): 1–3.

Balfour, A. 1919. The Future of the World. *The Landmark* 1.

Barry, D., B. Carroll, and H. Hansen. 2006. To Text or Context? Endotextual, Exotextual, and Multi-textual Approaches to Narrative and Discursive Organizational Studies. *Organization Studies* 27 (8): 1091–1110.

Bassin, M. 2003. Politics from Nature: Environment, Ideology, and the Determinist Tradition. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Beer, G.L. 1917. *The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Bell, D. 2007. *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bell, D., and S. Vucetic. Forthcoming. Brexit, CANZUK, and the Legacy of Empire. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*.

Belich, J. 2009. *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Bennett, E.H. 1920. Bear and Forbear. *English Speaking World* 3 (2).

Bevir, M. 1999. Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy. *Political Theory* 27 (1): 65–84.

Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Blake, N.M. 1945. The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897. *The American Historical Review* 50 (2): 228–243.

Bourdieu, P. 1983. *Ce que parler veut dire*. Paris: Fayard.

Bourne, K. 1967. *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Browning, C., and Joenniemi, P. 2004. Contending discourses of marginality: the case of Kaliningrad. *Geopolitics* 9: 699–730.

Brundage, A., and R.A. Cosgrove. 2007. *The Great Tradition: Constitutional History and National Identity in Britain and the United States, 1870-1960*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bryce, J. 1892. Edward Augustus Freeman. *The English Historical Review* 7 (27): 497–509.

Buttimer, A. 1982. "Musing on Helicon: Root Metaphors and Geography." *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 64 (2): 89–96.

Carnegie, A. 1898. *The Reunion of Britain and America: A Look Ahead*. New York: Self Published.

Churchill, W. 2002 [1956-1958]. *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*. London: Cassell.

Coleman, M. Intellectuals of Statecraft. 2016. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, ed. K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp. New York: Routledge.

Cox, K.R. 1998. Spaces of dependence, spaces of engagement and the politics of scale, or: looking for local politics. *Political Geography* 17 (1): 1–23.

Cresswell, T. 2013. *Geographic Thought: A critical introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Cronne, H.A. 1943. Historical Revision No. CIII: Edward Augustus Freeman, 1823–1892. *History New Series* 28 (107): 78–92.

Cunningham, R.J. 1976. Is History Past Politics? Herbert Baxter Adams as Precursor of the 'New History.' *The History Teacher* 9 (2): 244–257.

———. 1981. The German Historical World of Herbert Baxter Adams: 1874–1876. *The Journal of American History* 68 (2): 261–275.

Dahlman, C.T. 2009. Geopolitics. In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, ed. C. Gallaher, C. Dahlman, M. Gilmartin, A. Mountz, and P. Shirlow. Los Angeles: Sage.

———. 2009. Scale. In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, ed. C. Gallaher, C. Dahlman, M. Gilmartin, A. Mountz, and P. Shirlow. Los Angeles: Sage.

———. 2009. Superpower. In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, ed. C. Gallaher, C. Dahlman, M. Gilmartin, A. Mountz, and P. Shirlow. Los Angeles: Sage.

Devine-Wright, P. 2012. Explaining "NIMBY" Objections to a Power Line: The Role of Personal, Place Attachment, and Project-Related Factors. *Environment and Behavior* 45 (6): 761–781.

Dijkink, G. 1996. *National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain*. London: Routledge.

Dittmer, J. 2005. Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (3): 626–643.

———. 2010. Textual and Discourse Analysis. *In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography*, ed. D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. Crang, and L. McDowell, 274–286. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Dodds, K. 2001. Political geography III: critical geopolitics after ten years. *Progress in Human Geography* 25 (3): 469–484.

———. 2003. Cold War Geopolitics. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Dowler, L., and J.P. Sharp. 2001. A feminist geopolitics? *Space & Polity* 5: 165–176.

Driver, F. 2010. In Search of the Imperial Map: Walter Crane and the Image of Empire. *History Workshop Journal* 69 (1): 146–157.

Edward Augustus Freeman Papers. University of Manchester Library Special Collections, Manchester, UK.

Fiske, J. 1885. Manifest Destiny. *Harper's Magazine*, March 1885.

Flint, C. 2010. Geographic Perspectives on World-Systems Theory. In *The International Studies Encyclopedia, Vol. 5*, ed. R.A. Denemark. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Freeman, E.A. 1867–1879. *The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its Causes and Its Results*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1877. Race and Language. *The Contemporary Review* 29: 711–739. E.A. Freeman Papers, 2/2/145.

———. 1881. *The Historical Geography of Europe*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

———. 1882. Some Impressions of the United States. *The Fortnightly Review* 32 (188).

———. 1883. *English Towns & Districts: A Series of Addresses and Sketches by Edward A. Freeman*. London: Macmillan & Co.

———. 1922 [1880]. *A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, M. 1990 [English translation 1978, Random House]. *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage Books.

———. 2002 [1969/1972]. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Oxon, UK: Routledge Classics.

Fussell, P. 1975. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gallaher, C. 2009. Hegemony. In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, ed. C. Gallaher, C. Dahlman, M. Gilmartin, A. Mountz, and P. Shirlow. Los Angeles: Sage.

Gee, J.P. 2005. *An introduction to discourse analysis: theory and method (2nd edition)*. New York: Routledge.

Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Glacken, C. 1956. Changing Ideas of the Habitable World. In *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, ed. W.L. Thomas, C.O. Sauer, M. Bates, and L. Mumford, 70–92. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gramsci, A. 1957. *The Modern Prince and other writings*. New York: International Publishers.

Green, J.R. 1921 [1874]. *A Short History of the English People*. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.

Gross, J. 1971. Editor's Introduction. In *The Expansion of England*, J. Seeley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harvey, D. 1969. *Explanation in Geography*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

———. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Hathaway, O.N., and S.J. Shapiro. 2017. *The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Haverluk, T., et. al. 2014. The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics. *Geopolitics* 19 (1).

Heracleous, L., and Hendry, J. 2000. Discourse and the Study of Organization: Toward a Structurational Perspective. *Human Relations* 53 (10): 1251-1286.

Herbert Baxter Adams Papers. Johns Hopkins University Libraries, Baltimore, MD.

Higham, J. 1984. Herbert Baxter Adams and the Study of Local History. *The American Historical Review* 89 (5): 1225–1239.

Hooson, D. 1994. Introduction. In *Geography and National Identity*, ed. D. Hooson. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Horsman, R. 1981. *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hosmer, J.K. 1890. *A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom: the Polity of the English-Speaking Race*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

———. 1886. *Samuel Adams*. New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company.

Hyndman, J. 2004. Mind the Gap: Bridging Feminist and Political Geography through Geopolitics. *Political Geography* 23: 307–322.

Johnston, R.J., and J.D. Sidaway. 2004 [1979 1st edition]. *Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography since 1945 (6th edition*). London: Arnold.

Kearns, G. 2003. Imperial Geopolitics: Geopolitical Visions at the Dawn of the American Century. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Kebede, A. 2011. Structuration. In *Encyclopedia of Power*, ed. K. Dowding. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Keegan, J. 2000. *The First World War*. New York: Vintage Books.

Kelly, P. 2006. A Critique of Critical Geopolitics. *Geopolitics* 11 (1): 24–53.

Kennedy, S. 1914. *The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Kramer, P. 2002. Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910. *The Journal of American History* 88 (4): 1315–1353.

Kwon, W., I. Clarke, and R. Wodak. 2013. Micro-Level Discursive Strategies for Constructing Shared Views around Strategic Issues in Team Meetings. *Journal of Management Studies* 51 (2): 265–290.

Laclau, E., and C. Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics*. London: Verso.

Langworth, R. 2008. *Churchill By Himself*. New York: Public Affairs.

Lees, L. 2004. Urban geography: discourse analysis and urban research. *Progress in Human Geography* 28 (1): 101–107.

Lerner, R.E. 1963. Turner and the Revolt Against E.A. Freeman. *Arizona and the West* 5 (2): 101–108.

Livingstone, D.N. 1992. *The Geographical Tradition*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Lowenthal, D. 1994. European and English Landscapes as National Symbols. In *Geography and National Identity*, ed. D. Hooson. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Luke, T.W. 2003. Postmodern Geopolitics: The Case of the 9.11 Terrorist Attacks. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Mahan, A.T., and C. Beresford. 1894. Possibilities of an Anglo-American Union. *The North American Review* 159 (456): 551-573.

Marston, S.A., J.P. Jones III, and K. Woodward. 2005. Human geography without scale. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30: 416–432.

Martellone, A.M. 1994. In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom, For Empire and For Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920. In *Reflections on American Exceptionalism*, ed. D.K. Adams and C.A. an Minnen, 83–96. Staffordshire, UK: Keele University Press.

Martin, D-C. 1995. The choices of identity. *Social Identities* 1 (1): 5–20.

Mathieu, C. 2009. Practising Gender in Organizations: The Critical Gap Between Practical and Discursive Consciousness. *Management Learning* 40 (2): 177–193.

Mattissek, A., and Reuber, P. 2004. Die Diskursanalyse in der Geographie: Ansätze und Potentiale [Discourse analysis in geography: approaches and potential]. *Geographische Zeitschrift* 92: 227–242.

Mattisek, A., and G. Glasze. 2016. Discourse analysis in German-language human geography: integrating theory and method. *Social and Cultural Geography* 17 (1): 39–51.

McKee, A. 2003. *Textual Analysis: a beginner's guide*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

McNiven, P. 1990. Handlist of the Papers of Edward Augustus Freeman in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Reprinted from *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 72 (2).

Megoran, N. 2005. The Critical Geopolitics of Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 23 (4): 555–580.

Momma, H., and M. Matto. 2008. *A Companion to the History of the English Language*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Mountz, A. 2009. Nationalism. In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, ed. C. Gallaher, C. Dahlman, M. Gilmartin, A. Mountz, and P. Shirlow. Los Angeles: Sage.

Müller, M. 2008. Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice. *Political Geography* 27: 322–338.

———. 2010. Doing Discourse Analysis in Critical Geopolitics. *L'Espace Politique* 12 (3).

———. 2016. Text, Discourse, Affect and Things. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, ed. K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp. New York: Routledge.

Näsänen, J., and O. Vanharanta. 2016. Program group's discursive construction of context: A means to legitimize buck-passing. *International Journal of Project Management* 34 (8): 1672–1686.

Natter, W. 2003. Geopolitics in Germany, 1919–1945: Karl Haushofer, and the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Ó Tuathail, G. 1996. *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———, ed. 2006. *The Geopolitics Reader (2nd ed.)*. New York: Routledge.

Ó Tuathail, G., and J. Agnew. 1992. Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. *Political Geography* 11 (2): 190–204.

Ó Tuathail, G., J. Hyndman, F. MacDonald, E. Gilbert, V. Mamadouh, L. Jones, and D. Sage. 2010. New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction. *GeoJournal* 75 (4): 315–325.

Parker, C.J.W. 1981. The Failure of Liberal Racialism: The Racial Ideas of E.A. Freeman. *The Historical Journal* 24 (4): 825–846.

Parmar, I. 2002. Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations. *International Relations* 16 (1): 53–75.

Peet, R. 1998. *Modern Geographical Thought*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.

Penrose, J. 2002. Nations, states, and homelands: territory and territoriality in nationalist thought. *Nations and Nationalism* 8 (3): 277–297.

Penrose, J., and R.C.M. Mole. 2008. Nation-States and National Identity. In *The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography,* ed. K.R. Cox, M. Low, and J. Robinson. Los Angeles: Sage.

Perkins, B. 1968. *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States*, 1895–1914. New York: Atheneum.

Pred, A. 1984. Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74 (2):279–297.

Rehman, I. 2017. Rise of the Reactionaries: The American Far Right and U.S. Foreign Policy. *The Washington Quarterly* 40 (4): 29–48.

Reisigl, M., and R. Wodak. 2009. *The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (Second Edition),* eds. R. Wodak and M. Meyer. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Routledge, P. 2003. Anti-Geopolitics. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Said, E.W. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Sayer, A. 1993. Postmodernist Thought in Geography: A Realist View. *Antipode* 25 (4): 320–344.

Schuyler, R.L. 1915. Review of The Pan-Angles, by Sinclair Kennedy. *Political Science Quarterly* 30 (3): 525.

Scollon, S. 2001. Habitus, Consciousness, Agency and the Problem of Intention: How We Carry and are Carried by Political Discourses. *Folia Linguistica* 35 (1–2): 97–130.

Scott, J.W. 1999. *Gender and the Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Seeley, J. 1971 [1883]. *The Expansion of England*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sharp, J.P. 1996. Hegemony, popular culture, and geopolitics: the Reader's Digest and the construction of danger. *Political Geography* 15 (6/7): 557–570.

Sinclair Kennedy Papers. Harvard University Library Depository, Cambridge, MA.

Skey, M. 2009. The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism. *The Sociological Review* 57 (2): 331–346.

Slater, D. 2003. Geopolitical Themes and Postmodern Thought. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Smith, A. 1991. *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, N. 2000. Is a critical geopolitics possible? Foucault, class, and the vision thing. *Political Geography* 19: 365–371.

———. 2003. *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Staeheli, L. 2003. Place. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Stoddart, D.R. 1986. *On Geography and Its History*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Streit, C.K. 1939. *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

———. 1941. *Union Now with Britain*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Strong, J. 1885. *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*. New York: The Baker and Taylor Co.

Stubbs, W. 1878. *The Constitutional History of England: Its Origin and Development*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sundberg, J. 2008. 'Trash-Talk' and the Production of Geopolitical Boundaries in the USA-Mexico Borderlands. *Social & Cultural Geography* 9 (8): 871–890.

Sutherland, C. 2005. Nation-building through discourse theory. *Nations and Nationalism* 11 (2): 285–202.

Taylor, P.J. 1999. Places, spaces, and Macy's: place-space tensions in the political geography of modernities. *Progress in Human Geography* 23 (1): 7–26.

Taylor, P.J., and C. Flint. 2000. *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State, and Locality*. 4th ed. London: Pearson Education, Ltd.

Tuan, Y. 1974. *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

———. 1979. Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective. In *Philosophy in Geography*, ed. S. Gale and G. Olsson, 387–427. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

———. 1991. Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 (4): 684–696.

Tuffnell, S. 2011. "Uncle Sam is to be Sacrificed": Anglophobia in Late Nineteenth-Century Politics and Culture. *American Nineteenth Century History* 12 (1): 77–99.

Tulloch, H.A. 1977. *Changing British Attitudes towards the United States in the 1880s*. The Historical Journal 20 (4): 825–840.

Turner, F.J. 1963 [1893]. *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*. New York: F. Ungar.

van Leeuwen, T. 2000. The construction of purpose in discourse. In *Discourse and Social Life*, ed. S. Sarangi and M. Coulthard, 66–81. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited.

Vucetic, S. 2011. *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Widdowson, H.G. 2008. *Text, Context, Pretext: Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Williams, C.H. 2003. "Nationalism in a Democratic Context." In *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Wilson, W. 1917. Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Germany, 2 April 1917. *Records of the United States Senate*, Record Group 46, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=61.

Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., and K. Liebhart. 1999. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (trans. A. Hirsch and R. Mitten). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Wylie, J.W. 2006. Poststructuralist Theories, Critical Methods and Experimentation. In *Approaches to Human Geography*, ed. S. Aitken and G. Valentine, 298–310. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

APPENDIX A: Archival Documents Reviewed

A.1 Herbert Baxter Adams Papers, Sheridan Libraries of Johns Hopkins University

A.1.1 Items Flagged before Arrival

Series 1 Correspondence:
    Box 3: with James Bryce
    Box 6: with E.A. Freeman
    Box 5: with John Fiske
    Box 8: with James K. Hosmer
    Box 16: with Josiah Strong and F.J. Turner
    Box 17: with Woodrow Wilson
    Box 18: Transcripts 1873–1893

Series 2 Lecture Notes:
    Boxes 19, 21, 22

Series 3 Writings:
    Box 32: "Chapter IX: A General View of Europe in the Nineteenth Century," typescript, and "Freeman, the Scholar and Professor," reprint, and "Is History Past Politics?" typescript
    Box 42: Historical and Political Science Seminary: Freeman, Edward A. "An Introduction to American Institutional History" and "French and English Towns," manuscript
    Box 47: Reprints of Former Students' Work
    Box 61: Misc. notes, incl. on history of education, general US history, notes from Heidelberg

A.1.2 Items Examined

Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 5:
    -Letter from John Fiske to Herbert Baxter Adams (HBA), 22 March 1897
Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 6
    -Letter from E.A. Freeman (EAF) to HBA, 6 January 1889
    -Undated letter from EAF to HBA
    -Letter from EAF to HBA, 17 November 1890
Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 8
    -Handwritten poem "Too Late" by John Hay
    -Extensive correspondence with George B. Hodge of the YMCA / Dept. of Education
    -Letter from James K. Hosmer to HBA 5 April 1883
    -Letter from Hosmer to HBA 17 April 1883
    -2 letters from Hosmer to HBA in 1885
    -Letter from Hosmer to HBA 6 February 1888
Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 16
    -Several letters from Josiah Strong to HBA in 1900 about publications
    -Letter from Strong to HBA, 27 April 1900
    -Letter from Strong to HBA, [no day] May 1900
    -Letter from Strong to HBA, 1 May 1900
    -Letter from Strong to HBA, 31 May 1900
    -Postcard from Strong to HBA, 29 May 1900
    -Letter from Strong to HBA, 6 October 1900
    -Letter from HBA to a Mr. Murray, 11 October 1900

-Attached to above: Letter from Strong to HBA, 9 October 1900
-Attached to above: Strong's handwritten list of clergy and their churches' addresses
-Letter from William H. Tolman to HBA, 28 February 1893
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 12 May 1897
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 19 October 1897
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 6 April 1898
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 27 December 1898
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 17 March 1899
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 12 April 1899
-Letter from Strong and Tolman to HBA, June 1899
-Letter from Tolman to HBA, 27 October 1899
-Letter from F.J. Turner to HBA, 10 December 1889
-Letter from Turner to HBA, 21 December 1889
-Letter from Turner to HBA, 11 January 1890
-Letter from Turner to HBA, 27 September 1890
-Letter from Turner to HBA, 17 May 1891
-Letter from Turner to HBA, 18 January 1892

Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 18

Folder 1: 1873–1879
-Letter from HBA to Trustees of the Hopkins University, 16 April 1876
-Letter from HBA to D.C. Gilman, 21 May 1876
-Letter from a Dr. Means to HBA, 27 June 1878
-Letter from HBA to Von Holst, 6 December 1878
-Letter from Gilman to HBA, 9 July 1879

Folder 2: 1880–1882
-Letter from D.C. Gilman to HBA, 7 September 1881
-Letter from John T. Short, to HBA, 22 October 1881
-Letter from W.E. Foster to HBA, 12 November 1881
-Letter from James Bryce to HBA, 15 November 1881
-Undated letter from Bryce to HBA
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 29 November 1881
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 7 December 1881
-Letter from W.E. Foster, 18 December 1881
-Letter from Foster to HBA, 14 May 1882
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 18 June 1882
-Letter from HBA to Gilman, 3 July 1882
-Letter from Gilman to HBA, 22 July 1882

Folder 3: Transcripts of Correspondence 1883–1886
-Letter from Gilman to HBA, 15 July 1883
-HBA's 29 May 1886 Plea for the Organization of the Department of Historical and Political Science
-Letter from Woodrow Wilson to HBA, 5 December 1886

Folder 4: Transcripts of Correspondence 1887
-Letter from Woodrow Wilson to HBA, 21 January 1887
-Letter from Woodrow Wilson to HBA, 7 February 1887
-Letter from Woodrow Wilson to HBA, 29 March 1887

Series 3 (Writings), Box 32

Folder 5: "Creed"
-Typescript and manuscript of HBA's "Creed"

Folder 5: Biographical Sketches
-Biographical Sketch of Walter Bagehot
    Folder 9: "Constables" by HBA
-"Constables," "[Reprinted from the N.E. Historical and Genealogical Register for July, 1882]"
    Folder 8: "The English Parish in America"
-Villes and Plantations by HBA ("[Notes on a lecture delivered before the Peabody Institute January 30, 1883, and abridged for the Historical and Political Science Association, April 6, 1883]")
-The English Parish in America by HBA ("[Abstract of a communication to the Historical and Political Science Association, January 26, 1883, preliminary to a lecture before the Peabody Institute, February 1, 1883]")
-Typescript also entitled "The English Parish in America"
    Folder 11: Unpublished chapter "Chapter IX: A General View of Europe in the Nineteenth Century"
-Unpublished chapter "Chapter IX: A General View of Europe in the Nineteenth Century"
    Folder 16: "Freeman the Scholar and Professor"
-"Freeman the Scholar and Professor" "A Paper by Herbert B. Adams [From the Yale Review, November 1895]"
    Folder 21: "Is History Past Politics?"
-"Is History Past Politics?"
-"Is History Past Politics?" "A paper read in Baltimore, November 30, 1894, at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools in the Middle States and Maryland"
Series 5 (JHU), Box 42
    Folder 14: Freeman, Edward A. Historical and Political Science Seminary at JHU
-"An Introduction to American Institutional History" (November 1881)
Series 8 (Personal), Box 61
    Folder 3: Notebooks, Heidelberg
-Notes on European History
    Folder 4: Notebooks, Heidelberg
-Notes on American Colonial History
    Folder 6: Notebook from Research in Amherst, 1879
-Notebook from Research in Amherst, 1879
Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 3
    Folder 6: HBA Correspondence with James Bryce
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 2 February 1901
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 25 September 1881
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 13 March [no year given]
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 18 November 1881
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 23 June [no year]
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 29 November 1881
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 27 September 1883
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, [date ripped off]
-Letter from Bryce to HBA, 11 October 1886
Series 1 (Correspondence), Box 17
    Folder 29: HBA Correspondence with Woodrow Wilson
-Letter from Wilson to HBA, 13 January, 1896
Series 5 (Reprints of Former Student's Work), Box 47

-F.J. Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" "Address delivered at the Forty-First Annual Meeting of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, December 14, 1893"

Series 1 and 2, Box 19

Folder 15: Class Lecture Notes on American Colonial History: Causes of the American Revolution (undated)

-Class Lecture Notes on American Colonial History: Causes of the American Revolution (undated)

Folders 16–21: Lecture Notes on American Constitutional History

-Lecture Notes on American Constitutional History

Series 2 (Lectures), Box 21

Folder 10: Lectures on Early Germanic Institutions

-Lectures on Early Germanic Institutions

Folder 11: More Lectures on Early Germanic Institutions

-More Lectures on Early Germanic Institutions

Folder 12: More Lecture Notes

-Notes for a lecture on "Ethnology"

-Notes for a lecture on "Instinct for Settlement and Home-Life"

-Notes for a lecture on "The English People in Their Three Homes"

-Notes for a lecture on "Comparative Philology"

-Notes for a lecture on "The Route of the Great Migrations"

Folder 20: More Lectures on Early Germanic Institutions

-Notes for a lecture on "Inroads of the Norsemen"

Series 2 (Lectures), Box 22

Folder 5: Lectures on English History

-Notes for a lecture "On the Sources of English History, here, Natural Sources: Geology and Physical Geography"

A.2 Edward Augustus Freeman Papers, University of Manchester Libraries Special Collections

A.2.1 Items Flagged before Arrival

3/1/4 Original manuscript of The History of the Norman Conquest of England (1867–79)
3/1/3 Original manuscript of Old English History for Children (1869)
3/1/1 Original manuscript of History of Federal Government (1863)
3/1/5 The Historical Geography of Europe (1881) with maps
3/4/1–24 Maps for Freeman's books
1/7 Letters from Green, Stubbs, and Ward, and Bagehot, and Adams
  1–13 Adams
  134–54 Dicey
  279–81 Green
  724–6 Stubbs
1/8 Letters to Green and from Bryce
  3–108 Green
2/2/1–268 Some of Freeman's articles in periodicals
  2/2/145 'Race and Language'
  2/2/154 'Norman Kings in Saracenic Palaces'
  2/2/173 'On the Study of History' (Transcript of an 1880 address)
  2/2/181 'Some Impressions of the United States' August 1882
  2/2/259 'Books that have Helped me"

5/1/1–10 Scrapbooks containing more of his articles in periodicals (maybe just the below)

        5/1/10 'Freeman in America': Manuscript itinerary of his tour, 1881–1882, and related cuttings

9/2/1–21 Maps, mostly England, France, and Balkans, consulted by EAF

A.2.2 Items Examined

1/4/1–27: Letters relating to Freeman's successful candidature for a Regius Professorship at Oxford

        -Letter from Henry Allen to E.A. Freeman (EAF), 20 March 1884

        -Letter from Ugo Balzani to EAF, 25 March 1884

        -Letter from Charles W. Boase to EAF, 9 March 1884

        -Letter from Boase to EAF, 19 March 1884

1/4/28–59: More letters, as above

        -Letter from A. Doyle to EAF, 19 March 1884

1/4/60–88: More letters, as above

        -Letter from William Stubbs to EAF, 14 February 1884

        -Letter from Stubbs to EAF, 20 February 1884

        -Letter from Henry Fanshawe Tozer to EAF, 17 March 1884

3/3/4: English Essay 1846 No. 5: 'The Effects of the Conquest of England by the Normans'

        -"The Effects of the Conquest of England by the Normans"

3/3/22 Notes on Britain in the 5th century AD n.d. 8pp.

        -"Notes on Britain in the 5th century AD"

1/7 Letters from Green, Stubbs, and Ward, and Bagehot, and Adams

        1–13   Adams (folder contains 1–23)

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 22 January 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 7 February 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 14 February 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 24 February 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 6 April 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 9 June 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 1 July 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 3 September 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 25 December 1882

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 10 July 1883

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 1 May 1884

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 5 September 1884

        -Letter from HBA to EAF, 12 January 1885

        16–17   Walter Bagehot

        -Letter from Bagehot to Freeman, 27 November 1864

        134–54 A.V. Dicey (folder contains 130–156)

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 8 March 1872

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 17 July 1882

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 2 August 1882

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 18 March 1884

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 23 June 1884

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 15 September 1887

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 28 August 1890

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 13 November 1890

        -Letter from Dicey to EAF, 11 April 1891

279–81 Green
724–6 Stubbs

1/8 Letters to Green and from Bryce
Folder 1–30
-Letter from EAF to Green, 16 May 1869
-Letter from EAF to Green, 25 October 1871
-Letter from EAF to Green, 18 December 1871
Folder 31–60
-Letter from EAF to Green, 26 March 1876
Folder 61–108
-Letter from EAF to Green, 18 March 1878
-Letter from EAF to Green, 27 April 1879
-Letter from EAF to Green, 28 September 1879
-Undated letter fragment from EAF to Green
-Letter from EAF to Green, 22 November 1881
-Letter from EAF to Green, 26 December 1881

2/2/1–268 Some of Freeman's articles in periodicals
-EAF2/2/145 Race and Language (March 1877, The Contemporary Review, Vol. XXIX)
-EAF2/2/173 'On the Study of History' (Transcript of an 1880 address)
-EAF2/2/181 'Some Impressions of the United States' August 1, 1882 The Fortnightly
Review Vol. XXXII (32) No. CLXXXVIII (188)
-EAF2/2/259 'Books that have Helped me'

5/1/10 'Freeman in America': Manuscript itinerary of his tour, 1881–1882, and related cuttings
-164 newspaper clippings related to Freeman's lecture tour, some undated and untitled

9/2/1–21 Maps, mostly England, France, and Balkans, consulted by EAF
Folder 1–11
-Map 1: Street map of Dublin (really pretty)
-Map 2: Site of the Battle of Hastings (photographed, mostly a topo map)
-Map 3: Street map Plan D'Angers
-Map 4: Street map Plan de Soissons
-Map 5: Street map Plan de Boulogne-S-Mer
-Map 6: Road/topo map of Nantes (photographed)
-Map 7: Map of other maps of France
-Map 8: Map of Slesvig showing Folkesprogene (photographed)
-Map 9: Same as above but ethnicity I think (photographed)
-Map 10: Same as above two but languages spoken (photographed) (all three 1857)
-Map 11: Map of Southeastern Europe/Balkans (but excluding Greece) "Supplement to the
Guardian, July 2, 1876" (photographed)
Folder 12–21
-Map 12
-Map 13: Slavonic Lands (photographed)
-Map 14: Bosnien und Dalmatien (photographed)
-Map 15: Grecian Colonies in Sicily and Italy at the Time of the Peloponnesian War
(photographed)
-Map 16: Carthage (photographed)
-Map 17: A Plan of Rochester (photographed)
-Map 18: Administrative map of Somerset (photographed)
-Map 19: Plan of Hereford Cathedral (with phases/styles of build marked) (photographed)
-Map 20: Index to Ordnance Survey of Shropshire Shewing Civil Parishes (photographed)

-Map 21: Il Monumento Arabo floor plan

3/4/1–24 Maps for Freeman's books (misc. maps and drafts of maps, mostly of England and France in Norman period, produced by Freeman for his published works

-Map 1: Map illustrating the Shropshire Campaign 1102 (with Freeman's notes on changes to make) (photographed)

-Map 2: Map illustrating the Kent and Sussex Campaign 1088 (photographed)

-Map 3: Map illustrating the Somerset and Gloucestershire Campaign 1088 (photographed)

-Map 4: Map illustrating the Northumbrian Campaign A.D. 1093–95 (photographed)

-Map 5: draft of above (photographed)

-Map 6: draft of a map on tracing paper (photographed)

-Map 7: copy of a medieval manuscript map of Tinmouth (photographed)

-Map 8: another map of Tyne Mouthe (photgraphed)

-Map 9: map of Devonshire from Exon Domesday (photographed)

-Map 10: map of Rochester (photographed)

-Map 11: map of Le Mans (photographed)

-Map 12: map of Rouen (photographed)

-Map 13: map of Evreux (photographed)

-Map 14: Map Illustrating the Campaign of Maine (photographed)

-Map 15: Unnamed map of Normandy (photographed)

-Map 16: Map Illustrating the Norman Campaign A.D. 1091 (photographed)

-Map 17: Draft of above (photographed)

-Map 18: Map to Illustrate the Siege of St. Michael's Mount 1091 (photographed)

-Map 19: Draft of above (photographed)

-Map 20: Map Illustrating the French Campaign A.D. 1098 (photographed)

-Map 21: Map Illustrating the French Campaign A.D. 1098 (photographed)

-Map 22: Map Illustrating the Campaign of Maine (photographed)

-Map 23: Syracuse Megara &c.

-Map 24: Plan of Oxford to Illustrate Eleventh Century (photographed) (on tracing paper)

3/1/5 Manuscript of The Historical Geography of Europe (1881) with maps

-Text of V pp.266–315 (MS, so not the published page #s)

-21 Maps (by Edward Weller, for this book) of "Central Europe"

All told, I reviewed 417 documents in the archives, 97 from the Herbert Baxter Adams Papers in Baltimore, and 320 from the Edward Augustus Freeman Papers in Manchester. These totals do not include several published articles and books by these individuals or historiography written about them or their work.

APPENDIX B: Freeman's Maps in Progress

This appendix shows Freeman's maps in progress, showing attention to large-scale features and topography, and use of topographic surveys as basemaps.


Figure 7: Freeman's hand-drawn map of Rochester at an extremely large scale

Figure 8: An Ordnance Survey of Shropshire, annotated and traced by Freeman to be a basemap for the map shown in Figure 9

Figure 9: A draft of Freeman's map of the Shropshire Campaign of 1102, based on the topography shown in the Ordnance Survey in Figure 8