INTERPERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

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Abstract

Though contemporary epistemology acknowledges the existence of nonpropositional knowledge, such as interpersonal knowledge (IPK) (i.e., knowledge of a person), knowledge of this form has been largely ignored. However, it is also clear that our knowledge of other people is uniquely valuable to us as social human beings and, therefore, should be included within epistemological study. In this thesis, I defend a non-reductionist position regarding IPK, arguing that it cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge and, therefore, requires a separate treatment, which I then provide. Using two paradigmatic cases of IPK as a base, I compare and contrast IPK with other common claims to knowledge in order to illuminate the differences. I then analyze IPK in regard to belief, truth, and justification and defend the view that IPK is experiential knowledge and can only be acquired through interpersonal interactions that are personal and mutually directed. I also discuss other unique qualities of IPK, such as its nontransferability and the fact that it admits of levels. Finally, I provide a glimpse into the ways this study can be applied as an aid to further research.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated with love, respect,
admiration, and appreciation to my husband,
Dr. Aaron M. Thomas, who made this a possibility.

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Chapter One: Introducing Interpersonal Knowledge

I. Interpersonal Knowledge

A. IPK and Contemporary Epistemology

The primary focus of epistemological work to date has been propositional knowledge and beliefs.[1] A proposition is what is asserted by a statement or what is believed by a believer and is the sort of thing that has a truth value; it is either true or false.[2] Propositional knowledge is "knowledge that," typically expressed in the form 'S knows that p' or 'S knows p', where *S* is the agent and *p* is a proposition. For example, "Aaron knows that it is raining." Current epistemology centers around the idea that propositional knowledge is best understood as *justified true belief plus*. That is to say that the first three elements (i.e., justification, truth, and belief) are generally agreed to be necessary for knowledge in some form, but they are not regarded as sufficient, at least in some cases, thanks to Gettier.[3] A fourth condition is required to fully account for propositional knowledge claims and much work has been done to identify what this "plus" element entails.[4]

Much of epistemology centers on these issues, but it is also generally agreed that nonpropositional forms of knowledge exist. As Linda Zagzebski explains:

> Even though most philosophers agree that knowledge is directed at true propositions, they almost always also agree that this is not exactly true, since there is nonpropositional knowledge. One can have nonpropositional knowledge of other persons, of oneself and one's own mental states, and other objects in one's environment which one knows by direct experience rather than through testimony or inference from other things one knows.[5]

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[1] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 5
[2] Stanley, 2011, p. vii
[3] 1963, 123
[4] Feldman, 2003, p. 37
[5] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 5

Clearly, nonpropositional knowledge is an area of study populated by many varied and interesting subjects. Zagzebski mentions knowledge of other persons, self-knowledge, and experiential knowledge. Knowledge of other persons is the sort of knowledge one claims when one says, "I know John," where John is another person. Self-knowledge, here described as "knowledge of oneself and one's own mental states," is acquired through perceptual awareness of one's own body and/or introspective awareness of one's own emotions, thoughts, attitudes, memories, etc. Experiential knowledge is, to put it very simply, the sort of knowledge claimed when one says something like, "I know what it is like to get caught in the rain." It is usually knowledge associated with a qualitative experience of some kind. However, these are only a few examples. It is widely recognized within modern epistemology that knowledge comes in many forms, varieties, or types.[6] This fact of human cognition undoubtedly has something to do with how knowledge is acquired, i.e., our knowledge sources, which are as rich and diverse as the knowledge itself. Philosophers Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry Silverstein explain that, by asking the question of how we come to have knowledge, we are able to identify

> a lengthy and quite heterogeneous list of types of knowledge—propositional, procedural, introspective, perceptual, memorial, testimonial, experiential, rational, inductive, deductive, intuitive, self-ethical, religious, scientific, mathematical, logical, probabilistic, apodictic, a priori, a posteriori, conceptual, empirical, and the list goes on.[7]

The above types or varieties are not all on the same logical level, as some may be species of others listed and other kinds of overlap may be possible. However the taxonomy plays out, recognizing that knowledge admits of various kinds and methods of acquisition opens the

[6] Campbell et al., 2010, p. 9
[7] Ibid, p. 10

field of epistemology to new understandings not accessible by epistemology devoted to propositional knowledge alone.

The focus of this thesis is on the first kind of nonpropositional knowledge mentioned by Zagzebski above, "knowledge of other persons," which I call *interpersonal knowledge* (IPK). In this thesis I limit my study to the paradigmatic case of the sort of knowledge we claim when we say, "I know X," where both "I" and "X" are persons.[8] Until now IPK is an area of epistemology that has been largely ignored, at least within traditional epistemology. In fact, even the term *interpersonal knowledge* is somewhat novel. When IPK is discussed, it is variously referred to as "knowledge of other persons" [9]or "knowing an individual"[10], "knowing someone personally"[11], or even more vaguely as "friendship."[12] In this thesis and in regard to my paradigm case: "I know X" where both "I" and "X" are individual persons, the label *interpersonal knowledge* is intended to mark two key factors: (1) the prefix 'inter-' implies a certain sort of betweenness, requiring at least two people, and (2) the root word 'personal' is used to refer exclusively to individual, human persons.

For example, I can legitimately claim to know my husband, Aaron. Aaron and I met as adults through mutual friends. We spoke for a while, hit it off, and began gravitating toward one another at subsequent social events. We were engaged within a year and another four months saw us married. Fifteen years and three children later we are still best friends. No one would claim that I *do not know* my husband or that he does not know me. No one

[8] As opposed to animals, cities, social groups, artificially intelligent beings, etc.
[9] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 5
[10] Feldman, 2003, p. 8
[11] Boër and Lycan, 1986, p. 14
[12] Although friendship is discussed at length in many publications, epistemological discussion regarding the actual kind of knowledge involved is quite limited. Mostly, I have found this kind of reference is used in feminist literature.

would claim to know him *in the same way* as I do, and very few people would claim to know him *as well* as I do or vice versa.

Consider another example: I also claim to know my friend, Angela. We have grown quite close over the years, hanging out together, talking on the phone for hours, and getting into trouble together. No one would claim that I do not know Angela, although Angela does have other close friends. But though others may claim a *similar* relationship (friendship) with Angela, no one has *my* relationship with Angela. My relationship with Angela is unique from Angela's relationship with Sonia, and both of those relationships are unique from my relationship with Sonia. Furthermore, there are others who know her *better* than I do, such as her husband, kids, and sisters. Still, I have ample reason to claim to know her. These cases, although they admit of certain differences, are unproblematic, paradigmatic cases of IPK.

B. The Irreducibility of IPK

In this thesis I argue for a non-reductionist position regarding IPK. That is to say, although certain kinds of knowledge claims ("I know when the bus will come.") may be reduced to a claim of knowing-that ("I know that the bus will come at 3:10 pm."), not all knowledge claims can be thus reduced. I will defend the position that IPK, in particular, cannot. Epistemologist Richard Feldman takes a similar stance and explains it this way:

> …it is unlikely that all the things we say using the word *knows* can be expressed in terms of propositional knowledge. Consider the first item on our list: 'S knows X.' You might think that to know someone or something is to have propositional knowledge of some facts about that person or thing. Thus, we might propose: S knows x = df. S has propositional knowledge of some facts about x (i.e., for some proposition p, p is about x, and S knows p). It is likely that anyone you know is someone is someone you know some facts about. But knowing some facts about a person is not sufficient for knowing the person. J. D. Salinger is a reclusive, be well-known, author. Many people do know some facts about him: they know he wrote *The Catcher in the Rye*. They may know that he does not interact with a great many people. So they know facts about him but they do not know him. Thus, knowing a

> person is not the same as knowing some facts about a person. This shows that [the above formulation] is incorrect.[13]

Taking Feldman's line of thought, in this thesis I will defend it further and conduct a critical analysis of IPK in order to establish its character. I also introduce some possible applications of this work to other areas of study.

It seems intuitively true that the kind of knowledge[14] we claim when we say, "I know that it is raining" is a different sort of thing than when we say, "I know my mom." Perhaps this is, in part, because to equate these two kinds of knowing entails a need to equate the "things" known. Immediately, this becomes problematic in most, if not all, societal structures, because we typically do not consider people to be the same sorts of things as inanimate objects or mere facts found in the world. Certainly, a human being is an object in the sense that he or she has a physical body, providing him or her with a physical presence that can be perceived in the same way as one perceives a rock or a tree; however, most of us would also like to assert that a person also enjoys a mental presence, which impacts the world in significant and unique ways. So, by equating a human with a mere object, we are failing to recognize an essential aspect of the person. Similarly, if we equate a person with, not an object, but with an abstract concept, such as knowing that 2+2=4 or that it is raining, we are denying a person's autonomous nature and, perhaps, in extreme cases, his or her existence outside of our own minds.

The problem caused by these two very different senses of the word 'know', while present in English, is often avoided altogether in other languages. In Spanish, for example, the word *conocer* denotes the knowing of a person, while *saber* denotes the knowing of a

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[13] Feldman, 2003, p. 11

[14] In this thesis I argue that IPK cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge about the other person. However, though I reference "knowledge" particularly, let it be understood that my arguments for IPK being irreducible to propositional *knowledge* are also intended to serve as arguments that it is irreducible to propositional *beliefs*.

fact. To say, "*Yo se mi madre*"[15] is ungrammatical.[16] It makes no sense. A native Spanish speaker, upon hearing this, would assume you are speaking to your mother and assuring her that you know some fact, as in "I know [that it is raining], my mother." Many other cultures also recognize the intrinsic differences between these two kinds of knowing by assigning them different words. In Polish, the word *anać* denotes knowing a person, whereas *wiedzieć* denotes knowing a fact. In French, the words are *connaître* and *savoir*, respectively. In Persian/Farsi, the words are *sheńakhatæn* and *dāńeśtæn*. Despite the possible confusion caused in English by our use of "know" for both kinds of knowing, I, personally, have never had any trouble convincing friends and colleagues that a difference *exists*. However, *how* these two concepts are different is, perhaps, less obvious. In addition to our social and moral distaste for objectifying a person, we have other reasons for thinking of these two ways of knowing as true differences of kind. This thesis is intended to help tease apart these differences.

II. Does the Study of IPK Have Epistemological Merit?

A. Merit of IPK: Avoiding Equivocations

Virtue epistemologist, Linda Zagzebski addresses the lack of attention nonpropositional knowledge, including interpersonal knowledge, has received within contemporary epistemology:

> …most epistemologists choose to ignore nonpropositional knowledge for at least two reasons: (1) It is very difficult to analyze it and it is hard to say anything about it that

[15] This statement, translated into English, means "I ____ my mother," where the wrong word for "know," *saber* rather than *concocer*, is used, although it is conjugated appropriately. The correct translation would be, "*Yo conosco mi madre*." *Conocer* is also used when one speaks of knowing a place, in certain constructions, but this distinction is not important for my purposes here, since I am merely trying to show that other languages often use a different word for knowing a person than for knowing a fact. Knowing a place is unique to both of them in interesting ways, which I discuss in chapter three.

[16] Kripke, 1977, p. 268

> adds to our understanding of it, and (2) It is so different from propositional knowledge that it needs a separate treatment.[17]

Although Zagzebski is correct in her estimation of the difficulties nonpropositional knowledge engenders for epistemology, a better understanding of it is nevertheless desirable. In the case of IPK in particular, a better distinction between it and other kinds of knowledge would help us avoid equivocations and confusions, not only within academia, but within everyday language.

An equivocation is a misunderstanding that arises from ambiguity associated with a word or term, such as when one word has two (or more) different meanings. As described above, in English, "know" is just such a word. "Know" might refer to knowledge of a fact, of a person, of an experience, etc. If these are different kinds of knowledge, as most epistemologists seem to think, then our discussions and studies regarding how these claims are justified, applied, etc. should accurately reflect these differences. If they do not, we risk coming to a conclusion that is based on an equivocation and that perhaps does not even follow logically from the premises. I have noticed a good bit of confusion in conversations I have had in which the acquisition and maintenance of IPK are spoken of as if they are analogous to the acquisition and maintenance of propositional knowledge.

For example, a fellow student and I were discussing the differences between belief and faith as they pertain to religious matters, and he said, "but there is no empirical justification for the belief that Jesus Christ can save me and that I will go to heaven one day." He may be right that there is no empirical justification for that proposition if it is the case that the proposition reflects propositional knowledge alone. In other words, if Jesus Christ is an idea rather than an actual person (or a personal God), then my friend's statement is true.

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[17] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 5

However, if Jesus Christ is in fact a person (or a personal God), then perhaps the justification for the proposition, "Jesus Christ can save me and I will go to heaven one day," is dependent on the justification for knowing Jesus Christ.[18] If this is true, then in this case we are not speaking of propositional knowledge but of interpersonal knowledge—the kind of knowledge reflected in the statement "I know my mom." It would then be reasonable to assume that the same necessary and sufficient conditions which pertain to propositional knowledge (such as, perhaps, some sort of empirical justification) may not pertain to interpersonal knowledge.

Therefore, the study of nonpropositional knowledge and, in particular, IPK, bears with it the promise of helping us avoid equivocations, confusions, and unintentional misunderstandings. Finally, Zagzebski's final point is well taken. Nonpropositional knowledge, and in this case IPK, does require a separate treatment, which I provide here.

B. Merit of IPK Epistemology: Understanding Our Epistemic Foundations

IPK is perhaps one of the earliest forms of knowledge we develop as social human beings. Among an infant's very first experiences outside the womb are her interactions with her mother and father. These early interactions, such as making eye contact, the feel of being held, the sound of the parents' voices and heartbeats, etc., are all intimate, interpersonal *experiences* which create interpersonal knowledge (IPK)[19] between parent and child as well as form the epistemic environment through which she will come to learn other sorts of things.[20] Since we are social beings, the same environment that provides us with the capacity

[18] I am not arguing for either the truth or falsity of any statements regarding Jesus Christ. I am merely pointing out that many of the subjects that divide us (e.g. religious/spiritual beliefs, politics, culture, gender issues, etc.) may, *in some cases*, be logically connected to misunderstandings regarding how we talk about the things we know and how we justify those claims. We very often talk past one another. Recognizing this will not solve our actual *disagreements*; however, perhaps we can at least avert some of our *misunderstandings*.

[19] I argue for this role of interpersonal interactions in chapter three.

[20] Simultaneously, of course, the infant is also learning to process new perceptual stimuli—lights, sounds, colors, smells, etc. How much of this process begins prior to birth is not fully known; however, we now know that unborn people do have the capacity to experience pain (Lee et al., 2005, §32) and react to other perceptual

to acquire IPK also provides us with a foundation for our social/psychological development and cognitive development. Lorraine Code writes,

> …knowing of other people is at least as worthy a contender for paradigmatic status as knowledge of medium-sized, everyday objects. Developmentally, recognizing other people, learning what can be expected of them, is both one of the first and one of the most essential kinds of knowledge a child acquires. An infant learns to respond cognitively to its caregivers long before it can recognize the simplest of physical objects. Evidence about the effects of sensory deprivation on the development of cognitive agency shows that a child's capacity to make sense of its physical environment is intricately linked with its caregivers' construction of that environment.[21]

Interpersonal relationships are important to early cognitive development and when they are inadequate, cognitive development is stunted.[22] Considering our paradigmatic case, if IPK is, as I believe it to be, one of the earliest kinds of knowledge we acquire and it has the additional capacity to form an early framework through which we can develop into psychologically and cognitively healthy human beings over time (e.g., through knowing my Mom, I am aided in coming to know myself, other people, and the world around me), then studying IPK and learning more about when and how we acquire this knowledge may provide us with a better understanding of the way in which our epistemic capacities are environmentally situated, how they develop, and how to best protect them from an early stage.

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stimuli, such as auditory stimuli (Govindan et al., 2008, §1). It is not my intent here to establish precisely at what time an infant becomes capable of IPK or of acquiring other kinds of knowledge, but merely to point out that IPK acquired quite early in a normal human's life and that coming to know other people, in the paradigmatic way which I am studying, is an integral part of early cognitive development.

[21] Code, 1991, p. 37

[22] Olsen et al., 2007, p. 418. Clinically diagnosed cases of failure to thrive (FTT), or poor weight gain during infancy, is associated with cognitive deficiency exhibited later in life. One of the risk factors associated with FTT is an inadequate mother-infant relationship; however, other risk factors (such as early feeding issues, economic status, physical makeup, etc.) play a role (Olsen et al., 2007, pp. 419 & 428). Although order of causation is uncertain, psychosocial deprivation (generally caused by a lack within early interpersonal relationships and/or infant-parent bonding) is still commonly associated with FTT, included within the significant factors contributing to the condition, and associated with reduced cognitive competence later in life. (See Olsen et al., 2007, & Ayoub et al., 2011, for examples of such studies.)

C. The Value of IPK

The reasons IPK has been largely ignored by traditional and current epistemology are well captured by Linda Zagzebski in a comment regarding nonpropositional knowledge in general:

> …most epistemologists choose to ignore nonpropositional knowledge for at least two reasons: (1) It is very difficult to analyze it and it is hard to say anything about it that adds to our understanding of it, and (2) It is so different from propositional knowledge that it needs a separate treatment.[23]

Of course, critical analysis of propositional knowledge has certainly seen its share of difficulties. Twenty-five hundred years (and counting) of study has been poured into its analysis and we have yet to find a single definition that is universally accepted. Furthermore, while it may be *hard* to say "anything about it [nonpropositional knowledge] that adds to our understanding of it," no epistemologist would suggest that it is not possible or worthy of merit.

Since Plato's *Meno*, epistemologists often pay attention to the value of having knowledge versus merely having a true belief in their theories regarding propositional knowledge. However, IPK is such a different kind of knowledge that it makes little sense to say that knowing a person is more valuable than having a mere true belief of or in or about that person. As we will see in chapter four, the concept of belief as it pertains to IPK is quite different than the way in which it pertains to propositional knowledge. However, IPK is one of the things we value most highly. Poets, philosophers, and kings have been extolling the virtues of our deepest human relationships since our earliest recorded histories. In *Romeo and Juliet*, William Shakespeare wrote regarding romantic love, saying, "Come what sorrow can,

[23] Ibid

It cannot countervail the exchange of joy, That one short minute gives me in her sight."[24] King Solomon is credited with exclaiming, "How much more pleasing is your love than wine, and the fragrance of your perfume more than any spice!."[25] Aristotle believed we value our relationships and friendships highly because knowing others and being known is essential to our nature as human beings, saying, "Surely it is strange… to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and on *whose nature is to live with others*."[26]

While we all likely agree that IPK—knowing others and being known—is to be highly valued, it is important to establish whether or not a study of this sort of knowledge can contribute to our understanding of ourselves. Indeed, for the reasons given in the above sections, I believe it can and to a very significant degree. Therefore, this thesis is dedicated to establishing the character of IPK.

III. Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced IPK, briefly discussed its relationship with contemporary epistemology, and argued for its merit as a unique area of epistemological study. In chapter two, I explore the epistemological landscape to demarcate the boundaries within which IPK resides and identify its relationship with other forms of knowledge. In chapter three, I defend a non-reductionist position regarding IPK, wherein propositions alone and analysis based solely on them cannot account for our claims to IPK. IPK cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge alone. To say, "I know X" is not the same as saying, "I know that p." Nor can one claim to know a person simply by knowing a list—even an extensive list—of facts about that person. However, propositional knowledge and/or belief does play a crucial role within IPK

[24] Shakespeare, 2012, Act II, Scene 6
[25] Solomon, 2011, 4:10
[26] Aristotle, 1994, Book IV, §9

and other forms of experiential knowledge, since it could not be claimed that one could have experiential knowledge without any pertinent propositional beliefs at all. I also examine a recently popular area of social epistemology, testimonial knowledge, and defend the claim that IPK also can neither be reduced to testimonial knowledge, despite that testimonial knowledge invariably occurs within the social sphere.

The complexity of IPK cannot be captured by any traditional or contemporary critical analysis of propositional knowledge. Therefore, IPK requires a separate analysis in order to establish its necessary and sufficient conditions, which I attempt to do in chapter four. I analyze IPK in regard to belief, truth, and justification and I answer the question of how IPK is formed and maintained. I compare and contrast these findings with our understanding of propositional knowledge and show that IPK is worthy of further epistemological attention as a form of experiential knowledge with unique characteristics and far-reaching influence within the cognitive landscape of the human experience. I address the question: How do we acquire IPK? and argue that the formation and maintenance of IPK requires interactions that are personal and directed between two people.

Chapter Two: IPK within Contemporary Epistemology

Although I have yet to find any extensive epistemological work in the area of IPK (and none that refer to it as *interpersonal knowledge*), certain helpful references have been made. In this chapter I explore the current literature that deals directly with IPK and differentiate IPK from certain other kinds of knowledge that might easily be confused with it.

I. Direct Philosophical Discussion of IPK

A. Jean-Paul Sartre's Concrete Relations with Others

The subjects of love and friendship have been the focus of centuries worth of work. However, as the subject of pointed and extensive *epistemological* discussion, the amount of work regarding IPK is startlingly low, by comparison. The best examples are found in relatively recent philosophical work, most notably within feminist epistemology. However, one can find an earlier reference, viz., Sartre.

Before one begins to speak of knowing other persons, one needs to establish the metaphysical claim that other persons—or *minds*—exist. Though a person is an objective thing (i.e., he/she exists in bodily form), when we speak of knowing a person, we do not mean that we know their bodies apart from the personality inherent to it. To say, "I know Michael" is akin to saying, "I know the *being* associated[27] with the Michael-body." It is *not* to say, "I know an object that appears to be a human body." We could know a corpse in this way, but perceiving a corpse is not the same thing as knowing a person. Nor is it to say, "I know an *animate* human body." Although, this is closer, it is conceivably possible that this kind of knowing is no more than knowing a corpse that is being mechanically manipulated.

[27] "Associated" may not be the best term to use here, but in an attempt to avoid a complicated and expansive discussion regarding the metaphysics of the mind/body problem, I feel it is best suited to the task of representing people as a wholes—including both a mind and a body—regardless of the metaphysics of how those two (one?) things are related.

Neither is this knowing a person. When I claim, "I know Aaron" I am specifically referring to the *being* Aaron (whether I have ever perceived his physical appearance or not). I am recognizing the *person* (variously understood as the personality, mind, soul, consciousness, or life-force).

In 1956, Jean-Paul Sartre published his book, *Being and Nothingness*. Drawing on earlier philosophical work (such as that by René Descartes and Bertrand Russell), Sartre recognizes the skeptical problem of inferring the existence of other minds (i.e., another's subjective subconscious) from our perception of the existence of other human bodies. Sartre uses phenomenology[28] to establish the existence of other minds by analyzing how the experience of shame affects our relationships with others. When we experience shame, we are reacting to a known reality regarding the existence of and character of the other person's mind. It is through our own unsolicited but natural reactions that we can more firmly establish the existence of other minds.

> Consider for example shame. …Yet although certain complex forms derived from shame can appear on the reflective plane, shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection. In fact no matter what results one can obtain in solitude by the religious practice of shame, it is in its primary structure shame *before somebody*. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I *appear* to the Other.[29]

[28] Phenomenology is a philosophical method that attempts to explain our experiences from the point of view of the experience itself, removed from whatever causal histories or ontological forces might be involved. In particular, phenomenologists tend to focus on what our lived experiences (e.g., our perceptions, internal motivations, emotions, psychologies) and how we naturally react or respond to stimuli has to show us about the kinds of beings we are (Smith, 2008, §1).

[29] Sartre, 1956, pp. 221-222

Sartre writes and attempts to analyze "being" from the perspective of the being (the conscious entity) itself—in this case, a human being. Sartre posits what he terms "concrete relations with others."[30] He begins by identifying three modes of being: the "in-itself," the "for-itself," and the bilateral relation: the "for-itself-for-others."[31] The term "itself" simply refers to the human subject. It is the human perspective out of which its own being, the world, and other beings in the world are recognized.[32] The "in-itself" is pure being—the fact of our existence which is not accessible to our conscious experience. The "for-itself" is experiential. It is our conscious state which is constantly seeking to affirm its own being.[33] The "for-itself-for-others" is the state of being which stands in relation to what Sartre calls "the Other," or other minds/consciousnesses/beings. This is the state by which we are made capable of recognizing the world around us, as well as other people. Sartre characterizes this state as something of a revolving door through which we are constantly alternating between standing apart from our own Being as an object for others and making others into objects.[34] For Sartre, it is through conflict that we are forced to recognize what is beyond us. Of this he says,

> Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations. The following descriptions of concrete behavior must therefore be envisaged within the perspective of conflict. Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.[35]

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[30] Ibid, p. 361
[31] Ibid
[32] This is not unlike the perspective Descartes adopted, once he consciously and figuratively stripped away everything else in existence in his attempt to provide a firm foundation for believing in the reality of what the mind perceives (Descartes, 2009, 12).
[33] Ibid, 629
[34] Ibid
[35] Ibid, p. 364

The "for-itself-for-others" or, here, the "being-for-others"[36] is the relation that most interests me for my project of trying to identify what this kind of knowledge is like, in that this is one metaphysical view that posits an experiential relationship between two people. By basing his philosophy on lived experience, he first posits what most of us already believe (thanks to Descartes), that we exist and that our thoughts and experiences are veridical. Next, he attempts to bridge the gap between our belief in the existence of our own minds and the belief in the existence of other minds, not by using perceptually based inference, as might be expected, but by, again, identifying certain *lived experiences*—the experience of shame, in particular—which simply wouldn't make sense if we were the only minds present. The experience of shame is a reflexive reaction to the presence of another mind, given certain circumstances. It is a subconsciously motivated response to the presence of a consciousness (an "Other") outside ourselves—a mere reflex. Therefore, we know there is something (in this case, *someone*) that exists beyond us, or the presence of this reflex would make no sense. In this way, Sartre addresses a key metaphysical problem that must be addressed *before* one can begin speaking about other people as the sort of thing that can be *known*—particularly when we want to posit that we not only interact with their physical bodies, but with their subjective consciousness, as is necessary for my study of IPK.[37]

[36] The distinction between the "for-itself-for-others" and the "being-for-others" is subtle and is not important to this discussion.

[37] Sartre's consideration of our relations with others is for the purpose of revealing something about the individual's experience, rather than to reveal something about the relationship itself or for some epistemological purpose regarding the knowledge we gain when we engage in relationships with others. Sartre's philosophy centers on the essence of the "being" or the state of conscious existence of the *individual* and how that conscious existence functions within the real world and within our perceptions of ourselves, the world, and others. His is a work of metaphysics, not epistemology. Also, Sartre makes some deeply metaphysical claims regarding the nature of both our experience and our existence, taking an existential stance which is not in itself necessary to the epistemological study of IPK. Still, as with all areas of philosophy, there will be some overlap and certain applications can be drawn.

Sartre's work serves as a metaphysical stepping stone for the epistemological work of IPK by providing a philosophical foundation for possible skeptical concerns regarding the existence of other minds and the possibility of consciousnesses interacting in knowledge producing ways. First, Sartre establishes that, in order to form a relationship with "the Other," we must first recognize their body as an object.[38] Second, recognizes "the Other" as a separate consciousness.[39] And, third, he recognizes that there are (at least) two separate, conscious entities involved.[40] For my purposes, I only nominally adopt Sartre's first claim. I do not hold that one could gain IPK of another person *only* by actually perceiving their physical bodies. One could, rather, get to know another person via email or written correspondence, for example, and merely *infer* that they have a physical body of some sort. Therefore, if Sartre's first claim could be understood as some level of recognition that the other person is metaphysically *real* in some physically applicable way,[41] it will not conflict with my understanding of the requirements for IPK. Sartre's second and third claims support the following condition for IPK, as seen in our paradigm case: recognition of a person as a *person* (i.e., a separate consciousness).

B. Feminist Epistemology

Feminist epistemologists address IPK more extensively than most epistemologists; however, they aim less at analyzing IPK than using it to keep androcentrism from undermining epistemology, a field they strongly believe should accurately represent both

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[38] Ibid, p. 361
[39] Ibid, pp. 221-222
[40] Ibid, p. 364
[41] By "physically applicable" I mean physically existent in a way that allows one person to interact with another person who is also physically existent. I leave this purposefully vague to allow for the possibility that we could gain IPK of a person or personal being who is physically quite different from ourselves (e.g., a person with mechanical implants, an intelligent alien, a brain in a vat, God, etc.). But, conditions I later develop in this thesis should eliminate the possibility that we can get to know someone who is not metaphysically real (e.g., an imaginary friend, a false god, a dead person, a psychotic hallucination, etc.).

men and women's ways of acquiring and sharing knowledge and promote equal valuation of both groups. Regardless, feminist epistemologists touch on two important points that pertain to my study of IPK. One, their discussion of IPK implicitly lends support to my base requirement that IPK be between *persons* by their demand that women be recognized as possessors of full *personhood*. That is to say, that in as much as a man is a person—the possessor of a separate body and consciousness—a woman is as well. They make this point implicitly by demanding equal recognition. That is to say, one must be, at the very least, recognized as a *person* in order for claims of equality with other persons to make sense. Further, two, feminist epistemologists lend to my study the concept that IPK admits of *levels* or variations in *quality*. One can know another person more or less well, and relationships can be deep or shallow and either positive or negative in nature.[42] Their work does this by adding the further requirement that both genders be respected and valued equally (in all areas, but particularly in epistemic ones) and by showing that it is through this deeper recognition that we acquire relationships that admit of deeper levels or higher quality.

One should keep in mind that feminist epistemology is a much narrower field of interest than either feminism or epistemology. Its goal is to promote equal consideration for women within epistemic sciences. According to feminist epistemologist, Elizabeth Anderson,

> Feminist epistemology is about the ways gender influences what we take to be knowledge… Feminist epistemologists claim that the ways gender categories have been used to understand the character and status of theoretical knowledge, whether men or women have produced and applied this knowledge, and whose interests it has served have often had a detrimental impact on its content. For instance, feminist epistemologists suggest that various kinds of practical know-how and personal knowledge (knowledge that bears the marks of the knower's biography and identity), such as the kinds of untheoretical knowledge that mothers have of children, are undervalued when they are labeled 'feminine'.[43]

[42] I develop this view in chapter three.
[43] Anderson, 1995, p. 50

Interestingly, Anderson here specifically references what I take to be an instance of our paradigm case of IPK ("I know X"), citing the "knowledge that mothers have of children" as an example of the sorts of knowledge both men and women claim to have, but which is undervalued within contemporary epistemology due to its association with femininity.

Another form of IPK, that of friendship, has also historically been the subject of gender-based prejudice. Lorraine Code, in her book What Can She Know?, discusses some possible implications of Aristotle's view of friendship in *Nichomachean Ethics* for feminism:

> First, Aristotle makes friendship central to good character development, and second, the dependence of friendship on mutual acknowledgment of good character invokes important cognitive issues. Third, however, it is not possible, within the strict confines of the Aristotelian text, to claim that friendship of the best sort is possible for women—neither for women of his own class and time nor for women of the late twentieth century.[44]

Given how our cumulative social history has such androcentric roots and how women have been traditionally viewed as incapable of true friendship (not with one another, and especially not with men), it is easy to see why feminism is concerned with debunking this stereotype. Androcentrism effectively denies women full *personhood*. By casting women as something less than man, she is less than a full person. Something in her makeup is lacking. Her femininity reduces her in society's eyes. In 1949, well-known feminist Simone de Beauvoir wrote, "Renouncing her femininity means renouncing part of her humanity."[45] Femininity is a basic female trait and females are indeed fully human. Here a great paradox arises, if human women are not human, what else could they be?

[44] Code, 1991, p. 98
[45] De Beauvoir, 2011, p. 723

When prejudice prohibits women[46] from equal participation within relationships they are also denied full participation within the epistemological structuring of society and the benefits such social knowledge provides. In this way, androcentrism undermines, devalues, or ignores essential human ways of cognizing and knowing (both propositionally and nonpropositionally). Code goes on to link gender-based prejudices, such as androcentrism, to issues of trust:

> Clearly, such a relationship is possible only if a man can know, respect, admire, and trust his friend. Indeed, on Aristotle's account, trust is central to friendship: without it, friendship can neither persist nor thrive. Trust enables a friend to learn from his friend's conduct, from a critical vantage point that is at once engaged and detached. Friendship thrives on possibilities of reliance on one another; hence it requires knowing each other's character and competence well.[47]

Granted, the kind of relationship Code describes here—friendship—is a robust kind of knowing, like my paradigmatic case of my friendship with Angela. I can certainly claim to know my friends, but I can also claim to know people who are mere acquaintances or enemies. A severely sexist man can claim IPK of his wife. But how *well* could he possibly know her if he does not recognize her as fully human? Though he may recognize her as a *person* on some level (as opposed to an animal or a potted plant), his failure to acknowledge her *personhood* will limit his IPK to a much lower level than the kind of open intimacy that would be possible otherwise. In this way, feminist literature suggests the implicit claim that, as Sartre explains above, one must recognize another person as a person in order to gain IPK of them. Moreover, through their further development of the idea of personhood, feminist epistemologists contribute support to the idea that IPK admits of levels and quality,[48] some of which are more desirable and epistemically beneficial than others.

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[46] The same argument could be made for any minority group.
[47] Code, 1991, pp. 98-99
[48] This is a point I develop in chapter three.

C. Richard Feldman

Epistemologist Richard Feldman, in his book *Epistemology*, makes it clear that the focus of his work is propositional knowledge;[49] however, he begins by differentiating between propositional knowledge and other kinds of knowledge. He specifically mentions IPK, referring to it as "knowing an individual" as in "S knows X."[50] He mentions various sorts of knowledge we might claim, such as "knowing whether," "knowing when," "knowing that," etc., and explains how many of these other claims reduce to mere propositional claims.[51] For example, if I know whether Sarah will come to the party, this knowledge could be reduced to either the proposition, "Sarah will not come to the party" or "Sarah will come to the party." The same reduction is possible for knowing when. If I know when Sarah will arrive at the party, the proposition, "Sarah will arrive at the party at 7 p.m." suffices to accommodate this knowledge. However, Feldman does not believe this kind of reduction is possible for every kind of knowledge we claim. In particular, he argues for a non-reductionist stance with regard to IPK, as I showed in chapter one. His example regarding J. D. Salinger is a counterexample and he insists that we are unable to simply fix the example to make it work. Adding that we know a great many facts about the author does not fix the problem, nor does adding that we know important facts about him.[52] No matter what kinds of propositions we have available to us regarding Mr. Salinger, this does not entail that we know him.

> Knowing x isn't a matter of knowing facts about x. Instead, it is a matter of being acquainted with x—having met x and perhaps remembering that meeting. No matter how many facts you know about a person, it does not follow that you know that person. Knowing a person or a thing is being acquainted with that person or thing, not having propositional knowledge about the person or thing.[53]

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[49] Feldman, 2003, p. 12
[50] Ibid, p. 8
[51] Ibid, pp. 9-10
[52] Feldman, 2003, p. 11
[53] Ibid

In this thesis I, like Feldman, take a non-reductionist stance regarding IPK. I also argue that the mode of acquisition is particularly important for this kind of knowing. Feldman claims that we must have met the person and remember that meeting. I also believe this is the case, if by "met" he would also accept interactions that are not necessarily face-to-face. I would like to include meetings that occur in other ways, such as by phone, email, or written correspondence. For example, today it is common for someone to claim, "I got to know Miriam through an internet dating website before we met in person." Naturally, these kinds of interactive experiences will limit the relationship in certain ways, if not because of the lack of face-to-face interactions, then because of the inability of experiencing one another's company in various other environmental or social settings. However, we still would like to claim that we can develop IPK even in the absence of one another's bodily presence.

The point Feldman makes about remembering having met, as a condition for IPK, is an interesting one. If he means remembering, perhaps not the meeting itself, but experiencing certain interpersonal interactions with the person, then I would agree. However, I do not think one necessarily needs to remember one's first meeting with another person in order to claim to know that person. I have long forgotten the precise circumstances of having met my sister Laurel, but I do nevertheless claim to know her. Furthermore, I might know my sister very well and then sustain a brain injury that robs me of my memory of our relationship. In this case, it might be truly said that I no longer know her, having forgotten all that transpired between us through which I acquired that knowledge in the first place.[54] Therefore, memories of shared interpersonal experience seem to be a requirement of IPK. So, if I do not remember

[54] Cases of amnesia, of course, admit of more complexity than what I suggest here. For example, it may be the case that the memories are not, for all intents and purposes, *lost* but merely made temporarily unavailable. Still, one might yet say, at least for the stretch of time that I am unable to recall my sister, that I no longer know her.

ever knowing Laurel, then I could not claim to know Laurel. However, this is not the sort of condition one needs to explicitly include in an analysis of this sort. It seems clear enough that one can only claim to know what one is capable of remembering, for any type of knowledge, IPK notwithstanding. IPK, then, does not differ from other kinds of knowledge in this regard. However, Feldman's epistemological segue into nonpropositional knowledge, though brief, provides some key, preliminary insights for my deeper look at IPK.

II. Distinguishing Between IPK and Related Epistemological Categories

A. Nonpropositional Knowledge

Nonpropositional knowledge comes in various forms and is acquired in many different ways. Epistemologists are far from agreeing on the placement of nonpropositional knowledge within the epistemological landscape, let alone on its particular character. For example, traditionally, procedural knowledge (i.e., know how) is often considered a type of nonpropositional knowledge—a kind of knowledge that contains an essential element that cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge alone.[55] However, there are philosophers who claim procedural knowledge is reducible to knowing facts (i.e., propositional knowledge), as, for example, Jason Stanley does.[56] Despite the disagreements about the reducibility of particular kinds of knowledge, many philosophers admit nonpropositional knowledge exists,[57] though its nature is far from being defined. This is in part because there are also many kinds of nonpropositional knowledge, perhaps only analogous to one another in the fact that they are nonpropositional. Although a piece of propositional knowledge will have certain key characteristics in common with other pieces of propositional knowledge (e.g., it is true, it is believed, and it is warranted), pieces of nonpropositional knowledge may or may

[55] Stanley, 2011, p. vii
[56] Ibid
[57] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 5

not have similar characteristics. Except for the fact that they are not propositional, little else may unite them.

Generally, the sorts of things that fall within the category "nonpropositional knowledge" are things like procedural knowledge, bodily knowledge, knowledge of qualia, and, perhaps, things like intuition, *á priori* knowledge, and self-knowledge, although the debate still continues as to how to classify most of these. Given the lack of epistemological attention in this area, it is easy to see why nonpropositional knowledge is far from fully understood. However, it is within this motley category that I believe IPK falls. I will defend my reasons for identifying IPK as a form of nonpropositional knowledge in chapters three and four; however, the primary reason is that IPK is not reducible to propositional knowledge alone. Other reasons concern how IPK is acquired, the qualitative character of IPK, and several other key differences between IPK and propositional knowledge types. Therefore, it should be understood that, although IPK is a form of nonpropositional knowledge, there are many forms of nonpropositional knowledge that vary widely in character and should be distinguished from it.

B. Knowing-Who

Stephen Boër and William Lycan, in their book Knowing Who, seek to answer the following questions:

1. Can we provide an interesting and useful taxonomy for the different sorts of answers that might, under various circumstances, be given to queries of the form "Who is N"?[58]

2. Given the (much-conceded) multiplicity of tests for "knowing who" appropriate to different sorts of situations, is there any single canonical paraphrase appropriate to all instances of "S knows who N is"?[59]

[58] Boër & Lycan, 1986, p. 3
[59] Ibid

3. …can we give a general theory of 'knowing who' that illuminates the traditional issues that have been supposed to hang on the notion?[60]

Although Boër and Lycan's work relies on propositions that describe people, IPK, as I have conceptualized it, is not the aim here, at least, not in any developed sense. A series of propositions seems to suffice to answer Boër and Lycan's first question, whereas in my evaluation of IPK, propositions alone *cannot* provide a full account. [61] They state, "…if S knows *enough* facts about someone, then S cannot fail to know who that person is."[62] And, conversely, it is not the case that answers arising from a personal acquaintance are the only or even a necessary sort that would adequately answer their first question. "S's knowing or being acquainted with N should not in every situation suffice for S's knowing who N is, nor should it be required…."[63] This is because knowing-who is relative to a certain "project" or "purpose." They provide the following example:

> But S may know, and at the same time not know, who did the murder depending on purposes. For the purpose of writing history books, S may know, in that he knows that the murderer is the man named Boris Flammenwerfer, a chicken-sexer who hails from Berlin; yet S may still not know who the latter individual is for the purpose of laying hands on his person, throwing him into a cell, bringing him to a trial, and executing a sentence.[64]

Therefore, one may claim to know who S is based on a certain purpose or project in which the knowledge arises from what may be a very limited dealing with S (which may or may not include interpersonal interaction). This knowledge may even leave out certain (sometimes significant) facts about S's character, lifestyle, etc., but still qualify as knowing-who. I find this insight regarding the practical aspect of this kind of "partial knowledge" enlightening, and although I maintain that knowing-who and IPK are different kinds of knowledge (the

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[60] Ibid
[61] I defend this claim at length in chapter three.
[62] Ibid, p. 4
[63] Ibid, p. 17
[64] Ibid, p. 19

former propositional and the latter nonpropositional), the human component[65] which adheres in cases of knowing-who seems to affect IPK in a similar way as it affects knowing-who above. For example, I may know the cashier at Wal-Mart for the purpose of chatting with her about the weather. But, I may not know her for the purpose of asking her to lend me money or confiding in her my personal problems. Still, I could rightly claim to know her, but admittedly, my IPK in this instance is quite limited. It would obtain for particular purposes and not for others. I will discuss this characteristic of IPK at length in chapter four where I discuss how IPK admits of levels.

The goal of question 1 is to discover what sort of propositions qualify as appropriate responses to "Who is N?" not to develop a *definition* of the sort of knowledge active in such a case. However, they discover that this is not so easy as it may seem. Boër and Lycan then identify three sorts of facts: (1) name, address, and occupation, (2) fingerprints, and (3) location, which are often considered either separately or conjunctively (by police, for example) as sufficient for knowing-who.[66] However, Boër and Lycan disagree that these three sorts of information are always sufficient for knowing-who based on the fact that, even if the above data are known, it is still reasonable that someone might ask, "But *who is* this person whose data sheet we have here"?[67] Instead, we need some "individuating fact" or "important name," which, when stated in answer to "Who is N?" satisfies that question for

[65] I cite the "human component" here as the base reason why IPK, like "knowing who," can be legitimately claimed despite only having partial information regarding the subject—and, perhaps, not even otherwise significant information at that. Since humans are such complicated, multi-faceted, and variable subjects to the point that we are incapable of full knowledge of ourselves, let alone others, this seems to make the most sense to me. Any claim to know another person is, by default, a claim of partial knowledge. However, there may be additional reasons why this phenomenon occurs with "knowing who" and with IPK and it may be the case that other types of knowledge can also be claimed based on partial knowledge of their subjects. My purpose here is to merely point out an interesting epistemological phenomenon that Boër and Lycan discuss which applies to IPK as well as to "knowing who" and give credit where credit is due.
[66] Ibid, p. 5
[67] Ibid

the purpose at hand.[68] They say, "If these questions make sense, as they surely do, then possession of identifying facts of any of the three sorts we have mentioned is insufficient to guarantee knowing who someone is."[69] However, if one knows the important name (or, the significant individuating information relative to the purpose at hand), one can claim to know who N is and this need not be an obviously important fact. They explain, "…[H]aving an important name of N may amount to knowing just one key fact about N—possibly an obscure fact at that."[70] Therefore, this kind of partial knowing still qualifies for certain claims relative to the question "Who is N"[71] as long as the purpose for asking is fulfilled by the response given.[72]

Boër and Lycan's second question involves a search for "any single canonical paraphrase appropriate to all instances of 'S knows who N is'."[73] This "canonical paraphrase" becomes what they later call an "important name," as described above, and amounts to merely propositional knowledge. No IPK need be involved. Boër and Lycan's theory presents two conditions under which one could come to know who someone is. They are: (1) when you have interacted with the person, and (2) when you have not interacted with the person.[74] If you have interacted with the person and through this interaction obtained enough knowledge of or about the person in order to answer, "Who is N?" adequately when asked, then you can be credited with knowing who that person is. However, if you have never interacted with the person but you have learned enough pertinent information about him or her through other reliable means (e.g. testimony, historical records, newspapers, court

[68] Ibid, pp. 4-5
[69] Ibid, p. 5
[70] Ibid, pp. 16-17
[71] Ibid, pp. 127-133
[72] All of these descriptive responses (e.g., fingerprints, occupation, important name, etc.) to the question "Who is N?" are examples of the same sort of knowledge as Russell's "knowledge by description" (Russell, 2008, 34).
[73] Ibid, p. 3
[74] Ibid, p. 17

documents), then you can also be credited with knowing-who, assuming this information enables you to answer the question, "Who is N?" satisfactorily.[75] Therefore, according to Boër and Lycan, you do not need to have interacted with someone personally in order to know who someone is. One need only report second-hand propositional statements about N in order to be said to know who N is.[76] Therefore, we can see that, unlike for the formation of IPK, where we gain the ability to claim to know a person, knowing-who does not require any interpersonal interactions or shared experiences of any kind to acquire the knowledge.

Boër and Lycan's third question is mostly satisfied through the examination of questions 1 and 2. They later spend a good deal of time defending their condition for knowing-who:

> To know who N is for purpose P is to know-true a sentence of one's language of thought which is *appropriately equivalent (i.e. computationally or—in a restricted way—semantically, as the case may be)* to a true answer to the query 'Who is N?' in which N is uniquely classified in P-admissible vocabulary.[77]

Given the length and complexity of Boër and Lycan's defense and explanation of this final definition, it is unlikely that I could explain in short order precisely all that is entailed here in a way that would satisfy the authors. Thankfully, for my purposes, an exhaustive account is not necessary. So, very simply put, any claim of knowing-who is going to be based on a purpose. That is to say, there is a purpose for asking—a purpose or need or project that the questioner has in mind. For example, a student might ask, "Who was George Washington?" hoping to discover enough pertinent information to be able to differentiate between this arbitrary sounding name and a variety of others on a worksheet. The teacher answers, "George Washington was the first president of the United States." The teacher, recognizing

[75] Ibid, p. 135
[76] Ibid
[77] Ibid, p. 135

the purpose at hand, can rightly claim to know who George Washington was and, now, so can the student. The teacher's answer is, in this case, "appropriately equivalent" to the student's purpose for wanting to know. To "know-true" means, basically, that the mental notion or idea is veridical for the purpose at hand and does not suffer from any importantly false information. This is not to say that all beliefs about George Washington must be true, merely the ones that pertain the project at hand:

> Piddling little errors about the Father of Our Country intuitively do not count; knowing who Washington was does not require one to be an infallible source of information about him. What does seem to be required for "knowing who" in this case is that S should, so to speak, have no importantly false beliefs about Washington.[78]

An "importantly false" belief would be some belief that interferes with the purpose at hand. For example, if our teacher said, "George Washington was the fifth president of the United States," we could not say she knew who George Washington was in that situation.

With regard to this phenomenon of knowing-who obtaining in cases of partial knowledge relative to certain purposes, IPK functions in much the same way. Knowing someone personally may be claimed based on certain known facts but not others. For example, I know my friend Sonia as a female friend, but I may not know her relative to what kind of wife she is, since that is not the sort of relationship we share. Interestingly, while Boër and Lycan admit that IPK may be necessary for *certain purposes* relative to knowing-who,[79] they do not believe that having IPK *necessarily* answers the question "Who is N." "Knowing someone personally does not guarantee knowing who that person is (for all practical purposes)… although, depending on the actual workings of an important name, it

[78] Ibid, p. 38
[79] Ibid, p. 17

may guarantee knowing who the person is for some easily specifiable purposes."[80] For example, you could know Bruce Wayne personally, but not know him as Batman. In this case, you would only have partial knowledge, but still be able to answer the question, "Who is Bruce Wayne?" or "Who is he?" if your answer aligns with the purposes behind the question. So, if they wanted to know who Bruce Wayne was so that they would know which businessman had invited them to the party, you could answer this question adequately without knowing Bruce Wayne's masked alter ego.[81]

It is clear that, although Boër and Lycan discuss IPK (which they refer to as "knowing someone personally") as it may or may not relate to knowing-who, they do not claim that the two forms of knowledge are identical, nor do they claim that IPK is reducible to knowing-who or to propositional knowledge. Still, the fact that they discuss it at all is of interest to my project, and I find their insights regarding partial knowledge (in that it still suffices for knowing in certain cases) and knowing relative to certain projects or purposes insightful and applicable to the study of IPK in particular (and, likely, to social epistemology more generally).

C. Bertrand Russell's "Knowledge by Acquaintance" and "Knowledge by Description"

Bertrand Russell's epistemological work regarding "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" is sometimes mentioned in connection with IPK.[82] However, while Russell's insights are valuable to the discussion, they do not identify IPK within the

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[80] Ibid

[81] See Boër and Lycan (1986) pages 127-133 for more examples and discussion regarding partial knowledge and instances of mistaken identity.

[82] For an example, see Stephen Hetherington's entry "Knowledge" in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Hetherington, 2012, §5). Note also that Boër and Lycan use the phrase "being acquainted with" in reference to having experienced a personal interaction with another person (Boër and Lycan, 1986, 17).

body of things we claim to know nor clarify how IPK should be conceptually understood within epistemology or in relation to other forms of knowledge.

In *The Problems of Philosophy*, Bertrand Russell separates our knowledge of things into two categories: "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description."[83] Knowledge by acquaintance covers those things of which we are directly aware, such as sense data (e.g., "I see red."),[84] abstract concepts (e.g., "I know the color red."),[85] memories, (e.g., "I recall playing chess."),[86] introspective insights, (e.g., "I am hungry."),[87] and universal concepts (e.g., brotherhood, whiteness, diversity, etc.).[88] Objects that can be known by description are described through either an indefinite expression (e.g., a man) or a definite expression (e.g., the man).[89] Russell concentrates on those expressions that would qualify as definite descriptions, such as "the man with the iron mask."[90]

It is difficult to deduce precisely how Russell would characterize IPK, given the way he describes knowledge by acquaintance. For example, of "knowing what goes on in the minds of others" he says,

> This kind of acquaintance[91], which may be called self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things. It is obvious that it is only what goes on in our own minds that can be thus known immediately. What goes on in the minds of others is known to us through our perception of their bodies, that is, through the sense-data in us that is associated with their bodies.[92]

However, there is no reason to believe that "knowing what goes on in the minds of others" is the same as knowing the person. I could know that a person on TV is feeling fear or

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[83] Russell, 1997, p. 46
[84] Ibid
[85] Ibid, p. 47
[86] Ibid
[87] Ibid, p. 48
[88] Ibid, p. 52
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Acquaintance through introspection.
[92] Ibid, p. 48

deliberating between options simply by observing their bodies, as Russell describes; however, I would not claim to know that person. Furthermore, knowing a person is more than simply seeing the body of another person and acquiring some perceptual understanding of their physical makeup. We do not claim to know everyone we see. He goes on to say,

> It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted *are not included* physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), *nor other people's minds*. These things," he claims, "are known to us to us by what I call 'knowledge of by description'…."[93] (Emphasis added.)

Taking both quotes together, Russell believes that a person's mind can be known through inference from our own self-knowledge combined with sense-data, but cannot be *directly* known through knowledge by acquaintance. Additionally, I can know a person for whom I have *no* knowledge by acquaintance. For example, suppose I become pen pals with a girl in China. We exchange lots of letters; however, she does not have access to either a camera, nor a phone, nor a computer, so I never see a picture of her nor do I get to hear the sound of her voice. Still, I might certainly claim to know her, although, admittedly, my knowledge would be limited. Therefore, knowledge by acquaintance is neither necessary nor sufficient for IPK.[94]

Above Russell suggests that "knowing a person's mind" is one of the sorts of things we know by description.[95] However, he does not elaborate as to what he means when he says "a person's mind." So, it is unclear as to whether he means knowing a person's thoughts or

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[93] Ibid, p. 52

[94] The way we colloquially use the word "acquaintance" is different than how Russell is using it here. If we were posed the question, "Do you know Micah?" I might respond, "Oh, yes. I'm acquainted with him." In this instance, we would be speaking of a low-level IPK. We often refer to certain people we know as an "acquaintance" if that person is someone whom we do not know very well. However, even this kind of acquaintance requires more than merely experiencing perceptual awareness of the person in question. I would not say, "I am acquainted with John" if I had only seen him around the office, for example. I would only claim this if we had actually spoken at some point or acknowledged one another in some personally interactive way, such as by email or phone, etc.

[95] Ibid

feelings, or simply knowing that other minds exist. It does seem clear, though, that knowing a person's mind is *not* IPK—the knowing of the *person*, given his description of how it is acquired—through inference from one's own self-knowledge combined with knowledge by acquaintance, for I can have this knowledge and still not know the person, as seen above. Of knowledge by description, Russell says,

> We shall say that an object is 'known by description' when we know that it is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance.[96]

Clearly, I can have knowledge by description of another person without actually knowing that person. I can know that George Washington was the first president of the United States and he is the one and only person to whom this description applies, but I do not know George Washington. Therefore, knowledge by description is not sufficient for IPK. However, although knowledge by description is not *sufficient* for IPK, it does seem to be *necessary*, at least as a *pre-condition*. If I can claim to know someone to any degree, surely there is some true description to which I have access that can instantiate for that individual, even if it is something relatively insignificant, such as "that person right there" or "the blonde girl who works at Starbucks." As long as the description, according to Russell, refers to someone who exists and to the one and only person to whom you are referring, this is accurate knowledge by description.[97]

If knowledge by acquaintance is neither necessary nor sufficient and knowledge by description is insufficient but necessary as a pre-condition for the development of IPK, as I have argued above, one might consider whether a combination of the two would necessarily create IPK when applied to a person. However, it would not. Suppose I had knowledge by

[96] Ibid, p. 53
[97] Ibid, p. 54

acquaintance of a person's physical appearance and I knew the person by description. For example, I have seen Micah (experienced visual sense-data of him), I know Micah's name and, perhaps, I also know some other true descriptions of him, such as that he is "the boy who broke both his wrists falling from the monkey bars." Do I then know Micah? Not necessarily. Another example might be of having seen a new woman around the office, having heard her name as well as some gossip about her regarding her ex-husband. In this case, could I claim to know her in a way that matches our paradigm case for IPK, "I know X"? We would still have to answer "no." However, if we were to have met (or socially interacted with) either Micah or the new office co-worker, this would then provide us with both the necessary condition for claiming IPK *as well as* both kinds of knowledge Russell describes. Russell describes the way in which our knowledge claims can move away from the knowledge by acquaintance toward mere knowledge by description:

> It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from acquaintance with particulars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him; Bismarck to those who only know of him through history; the man with the iron mask; the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further removed from acquaintance with particulars; the first comes as near to acquaintance as is possible in regard to another person; in the second, we shall still be said to know 'who Bismarck was'; in the third, we do not know who was the man with the iron mask, though we can know many propositions about him which are not logically deducible from the fact that he wore and iron mask; in the fourth, finally, we know nothing beyond what is logically deducible from the definition of the man.[98]

Interestingly, his first example would seem to be an example of IPK, according to our paradigm case. So, although his descriptions of both kinds of knowledge do not suffice on their own nor *necessarily* in combination, one or both could to apply *after* some personal interaction has occurred. Russell makes no comment regarding this additional, required, experiential knowledge, which appears at this stage to be the *only* method through which IPK

[98] Ibid, pp. 57-58

is actually formed—a condition I defend in chapter three. Therefore, although Russell's epistemology is useful in describing both the pre-IPK condition for the development of IPK (recognizing a person as a person) and the post-IPK state of adding descriptive knowledge to what one knows about a person, it does not account for the state at which IPK is *acquired* or made *possible*.

Chapter Three: Is Interpersonal Knowledge Reducible?

I will be defending a *non-reductionists* stance regarding IPK. In other words, when I say, "I know my mom," this type of knowledge—even though it is stated in propositional form—cannot be reduced to a mere list of propositions I can claim to know "about" my mom. It seems clear that I might know a great many propositions/factual statements about someone (such as knowing some fact about a movie star) and yet not "know" them, as we would say, *personally*. Additionally, I would like to defend the position that propositional knowledge, although it is not *sufficient* for IPK, it is nonetheless *necessary* for IPK. That is to say that, in order to come to know someone, even in the barest sense, you must know at least *one* true proposition about that person. While I have gestured at these positions in previous chapters, in this chapter I will clarify and defend these claims. First, I conduct an examination of how the word 'know' is used in the English language within contexts that might be easily confused with the way I use 'know' in my paradigm case of IPK. This is intended to help us differentiate between cases of *propositional knowledge only* versus cases where IPK is involved. Next, I reintroduce Feldman's non-reductionist argument and explain why it succeeds. Third, I defend the position that propositional knowledge is a necessary precondition for the production of IPK. Fourth, I explain why the irreducibility of IPK entails that it is also nontransferable. Fifth, I address the question of how testimonial knowledge applies to IPK. Sixth, I discuss the related issue of whether or not our conception of propositional knowledge is robust enough by considering whether embedded questions within knowledge claims could entail IPK reduction. Finally, I wrap up this chapter by examining the nature of the qualia as an irreducible element within IPK.

I. Our Many Claims to Know and How They Correspond to IPK

As discussed in chapter one, our paradigm case of IPK is that which satisfies the claim, "I know X," where both "I" and "X" are persons. Recall my example of my claim to know my husband, Aaron, and my claim to know my friend, Angela. However, the word 'know' is used in English to denote a vast array of meanings. As we have seen, to say, "I know how to ride a bike" means something different than to say, "I know you have a bike" or "I know about bike riding." In turn, these are different from saying, "I know my own thoughts" or "I know how you feel." Epistemologists attempt to differentiate between these kinds of knowledge claims and identify precisely what it takes to make veridical claims of these sorts and many others. For my present epistemological task of characterizing IPK, I first differentiate between IPK and other kinds of knowledge—precisely, between IPK and the knowing of a fact, or propositional knowledge. In order to do this, I have identified certain ways in which the word 'know' is used that could most be easily confused with my paradigm case, "I know X," where both "I" and "X" are human individuals. Consider the differences that exist between the following statements:

(a) "I know my mom."

(b) "I know about Bill Gates."

(c) "I know of George W. Bush."

(d) "I know who Joan Cusack is."

(e) "I know what the head cheerleader is like."

(f) "I know Joan Cusack, but she doesn't know me."

(g) "I knew my grandfather."

(h) “I know Jane Austen.”

(i) “I know Paris.”

(j) “I know my dog.”

(k) “My dog knows me.”

(l) “I know Yosemite Sam.”

(m) “I know myself.”

(n) “I know God.”

(a) & (b): “I know my mom.” and “I know about Bill Gates.”

Note that (a) is a case very much like my paradigmatic cases. It can be said that, if one can claim the form of sentence (a) about one’s mother, many of the other forms of sentences could also be claimed about her. Naturally, I will also know about her, know of her, know who she is, and know what she is like. However, the converse is not true. One can claim (b) and still not be able to claim (a) about Mr. Gates. In other words, I might know a great many facts about him, but still not be able to truthfully claim to know Bill Gates. If someone asks me, “Do you know Bill Gates?” and I respond, “I know *about* him,” my interlocutor would take me to be saying, “No” to her question. It makes sense for speakers to claim the strongest form of knowledge first. If I was asked, “Do you know Bill Gates?” and Bill happened to be my best friend, I wouldn’t say, “I know about him,” I would say, “Yes, he’s my best friend. Of course I know him.”

(c): “I know of George W. Bush.”

Furthermore, while it is logically true that, if one can claim (a) about George W. Bush, one can also claim (c) about him, it is generally the case that if one claims (c) about another person, they are not in a position to claim the (a) form of statement about that person,

given common usage. In this case, if I were asked, "Do you know George W. Bush?" and I responded, "I know of him," I would be taken not to know George W. Bush. However, I do know a few basic propositions about him, such as the facts that he was the 43rd president of the United States, a Republican, and a Texan. But, though that might be *all* I know about him (or I may know even less), I could still claim (c).

(d): "I know who Joan Cusack is."

The (d) form of sentence is particularly interesting because, depending on the context, it could refer to only the barest recognition of a person one has never even met or it could refer to the deepest interpersonal knowledge of another person's core qualities, character, aspirations, etc.—a deep form of (a).[99] Often, though, if the latter is the case, we express that deeper relationship to the person in question by saying something like, "I know who Joan Cusack *really* is," or we alter verbal emphasis on certain words to indicate our deeper knowledge (e.g. "*I* know who Joan Cusack is."), or we may ensure that our meaning is expressed in the context of the conversation. Aside from these applications, though, to claim (d) is often not a claim of (a).

(e): "I know what the head cheerleader is like."

The (e) form is used in a way similar to the (d) form. However, in this case, the knowledge seems centered more on external behavior patterns rather than on intimate, personal details about the person's character and motivations. Often, when we claim to know what someone is like, we are referring to how they behave in social situations or we may be referring to the way they perform certain tasks. However, this need not always be the case. This statement, of all those following (a), is the most likely to refer to interpersonal

[99] Boër & Lycan, 1986, p. 17

knowledge of a person, because to claim to know what someone is like usually requires interaction with that person.

Additionally, one might simply observe a person from afar or watch a reality show in which they appear and claim (e) about them either as an individual or in reference to their role, either real or perceived, legitimate or stereotypical. For example, "I know what the head cheerleader is like, because I have known head cheerleaders and they are all the same." So, the (e) construction may refer to another kind of knowledge, likely a form of social knowledge; however, in these latter two examples the claims being made are usually recognized as lacking interpersonal knowledge or first-hand experiences or interactions and, because of this, are opinions that are less trustworthy.

(f): "I know Joan Cusack, but she doesn't know me."

The (f) form provides us with an interesting case. Suppose the police caught a stalker outside the unfortunate actress's home who claimed vehemently that he knew Ms. Cusack. Ms. Cusack, when questioned, denies ever having seen, let alone meeting, the deranged man. The man, straining against handcuffs, continues to insist that he knows her. He reports that he has seen all her movies, read every article and internet source that mentions her name, and has been secretly watching her from afar for years. He knows personal details as well,[100] such as the color of her favorite lipstick, the date of her last dental checkup, and he names of her distant cousins. Given this scenario, does the stalker indeed *know* Ms. Cusack? It seems clear that Ms. Cusack, up until the moment of the arrest, did not know the stalker. Further, if interpersonal knowledge requires that the knowledge be interpersonal—that is, between two

[100] The idea of "personal" information might cause concern for some, given the different ways something might be considered to be "personal" (e.g. personal information such as a social security number, personal details of one's sex life or medical history, etc.). However, for this example these distinctions are irrelevant. Neither the nature of the information nor the depth of how personal the information is matters. So, in this case, let it be as personal as we think it could be.

persons—then it must require that those two people both share in the knowledge. In this case, only one person is claiming to know the other and there is no evidence that Ms. Cusack ever knew the stalker in the past; therefore, it cannot be a case of IPK.

But sentence (f) could be read another way. If Joan Cusack had the misfortune of suffering from some traumatic brain injury which left her with amnesia, it might be plausible that such a sentence could be said by a close friend or family member and still involve IPK. In fact, this friend might rightly claim, at least for a time, that they know Ms. Cusack better than she knows herself, unless the injury caused a massive shift in personality. What we see from this is that, although the knowledge is (at least, outwardly) now only held by one person, it at one time adhered between both of them[101]. It was formed interpersonally in the correct way, despite the unfortunate events that, temporarily let us hope, created a rift between one of the people and her access to her memories of that relationship. However, if the friend is patient enough to do the work of maintaining the knowledge until such time as new ground can be forged by Ms. Cusack, it will likely continue to develop.

(g): "I knew my grandfather."

A couple of years ago, my grandfather passed away. Before that time I knew him well. So, at the time, if I claimed, "I know my grandfather," I would have been truthfully claiming IPK of him. However, although the IPK is now only held by me and can no longer be developed in this life, my claim to have known him is still veridical. Interestingly, I make the claim only using a past tense of 'know'—as if the knowledge is no more; however, it

[101] This is an example of the distinction some philosophers draw between *competence* and *performance*. The word 'competence' here involves not only actual ability, but also potential or capacity (sometimes described as "unconscious knowledge") for attaining fluency in, for example, language. A child, therefore, has competence in language well before she is able to speak (or perform the act of speaking) the language fluently. (See Chomsky, N. (1959). In my example above, the person with amnesia may yet be competent in IPK (depending on the extent of the brain damage), even though she is unable to, at that moment, perform in accordance with it.

seems to me, I did not lose any of my actual knowledge of him at the moment of his death. When I claim to know my mother, who is alive, my claim is not based merely on the fact that she lives at this moment, but on all the past interpersonal experiences we have shared which allowed me to come to know her. When she dies, none of these past experiences will be altered; the history remains. So, what does the past tense usage suggest in this construction, if not a complete end of the knowledge itself?

I suggest that the past tense signifies an end to the "knowing"—the progressive, developmental, *inter*personal element of IPK. Of course, we do not use the present progressive tense of 'know' when we speak of knowing a person, as in "I am knowing my mother." This would be ungrammatical (at least in English). However, there is a key feature of IPK that is lost when one person becomes unavailable to us through death, or through coma, amnesia, or some vegetative state. It is that interpersonal awareness, that open, free exchange between consciousnesses, that present availability of one person's time and attention for the other in that unique way that signals to each person that they, too, are known and being known and being seen for the "who" that they are.[102] To claim (g) maintains the one-sided memories and the "having known" and a veridical claim to a past relationship. The past tense signifies a loss of something important in the present—the "betweenness" of two people. Something—*someone*, more precisely—is lost. This person is more than the mere object of knowledge, he/she is also one of the knowers. Furthermore, IPK's original creation and development does not change once the person dies; it merely ceases. This process is different from the way we acquire propositional knowledge. Therefore, there is no reason to think that one's IPK simply becomes another form of knowledge, such as propositional

[102] I cast my discussion in a positive light, given that my example is my relationship with my grandfather; however, we might rightly claim to have known someone who was an enemy and even claim to have known them very well. Claims of IPK are not dependent on whether the interactions were positive or negative.

knowledge. It merely halts or pauses (such as in the case of a temporary coma) in its development.

(h): "I know Jane Austen."

I included the (h) form because a fan of Ms. Austen's work and/or a reader of her biography might say it, but unless it was stated by someone who lived at the same time as she, no one would credit this person with IPK. This kind of knowledge is no different, at base, than that discussed in the (b) form of sentence. What the overly enthusiastic fan is expressing is an academic understanding of the literature and biographical information about the author. They are not claiming to know Jane Austen *interpersonally*, unless they also insisted that they had spoken with her spirit during a séance or some such mystical experience. Of course, if it could be shown that the spirits of the long dead do indeed hang about and condescend to meet with us during odd little parties in smoke-filled rooms, then I suppose IPK might be the result—that is, if they can still be considered *persons* at all. However, if not, and if there is no actual interaction between the dearly departed and the fan of her work, then it cannot be said that her claim to know Ms. Austen is referring to IPK since, like the (b) form of sentence, there is nothing *interpersonal* about her knowledge.

(i): "I know Paris."

Naturally, sentence form (i) cannot be considered interpersonal knowledge because there is no person involved—at least, not a specific person. There may be, perhaps, a collective personality or social culture which one might claim to know. However, it is not interactive in the same way as a personal relationship between two people. For example, I can claim to know my mom and claim to know Paris, but Paris will not be offended if I insult the food it provides, nor is it likely to say comforting words to me when I get my heart

broken, nor will it visit me when I am sick. Because the social dynamic of a city is a collective one versus an individual one, the interactions I can have with Paris will invariably be altered and limited in a variety of ways.

Nonetheless, we can attain interesting insights by studying this sentence form. For instance, when a person makes a claim of this sort, they may do so relative to a specific purpose. For example, if they are traveling to Paris with people who have never been there before and who are concerned about being able to navigate the city to find their hotel, their guide might say, "Don't worry. I know Paris." The claimant here is claiming knowledge of the layout of the city for the specific purpose of assuring her companions of her ability to successfully navigate from one place to another. She is not, in this instance, claiming to know any specific Parisian, nor is she necessarily claiming knowledge of some other body of knowledge, such as the culture or fluency in French. To say, "I know Paris" is relative to a particular purpose. It is not a claim of *exhaustive* knowledge of all things Paris.

Interestingly, (a) claims would seem to be similar in this respect. When we claim to know a person, we are not claiming exhaustive knowledge of that person physically, emotionally, intellectually, or in any other way. I know my husband, but I may not know how many hairs he has on his head, or what he is feeling at this exact moment, or how he managed to derive the answer to a certain engineering problem. Still, I know him in accordance with certain purposes, such as for the purpose of sharing my feelings with him, responding to his frustration over a speeding ticket, for deciding questions regarding parenting decisions about our children, etc.[103] In fact, any of the above claims of knowledge could be understood in this way—as claims to knowledge in accordance with certain

[103] Boër & Lycan, 1986, pp. 17 &19

purposes, [104] for it is unlikely any of our knowledge claims of subjects so varied and complicated as persons or cities could ever truly be exhaustive in nature.

A further insight regarding (i) is that this claim, like IPK, may *not* be reducible to propositional knowledge. Consider that both involve a phenomenology—that is, a subjective "feel"—that could prove resistant to reduction. Further, it is conceivable that I might be able to navigate the city under the influence of something like *recognitional knowledge*.[105] This sort of knowing might function as my guide without being articulable or accessible to prior recall. If so, this might be another kind of nonpropositional knowing. I might say, while driving, "Hmm…. I think I'll turn right. It just feels right," or, "This seems familiar."

Given the above, one might wonder if statements (b) through (e) contain subjective elements that are irreducible to propositions alone since they are also social in nature. The answer would be, I think, dependent on the purposes involved in the original knowledge claim and to what extent experiential knowledge is involved. To claim (b) for the purpose of revealing his character as opposed to revealing, say, his financial practices might necessitate first hand interactions with him. But, in that case, we would be speaking of IPK. As I stated earlier, if one has IPK of an individual, one will be able to claim some (b) through (e) statements (at least, relative to certain purposes or contexts) as well. However, the converse is not always true. Just because we can claim knowledge that pertains to a person does not entail that we have any first-hand experiential knowledge about that person. Moreover, for IPK, unlike for knowledge of a city, second-hand acquisition does not suffice. I cannot, for

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[104] I do *not* wish to claim that the purposes attainable within my relationship with my husband or with anyone else I claim to know are *all* that constitutes my IPK or the relationship itself. I merely want to show that IPK admits of levels of intimacy and different purposes attain at different levels. Other kinds of knowing may also exhibit this kind of partial knowing and the attainability of certain purposes at varying degrees of depth of knowing, such as is the case when one claims to know something complicated, like a city.

[105] Evans, 1982, p. 267-301 (See especially, p. 286.)

example, claim to know Bill Gates, merely by being well acquainted with his secretary. So, it may or may not be the case that statements (b) through (e) reflect certain subjective, irreducible elements, but this understanding need not interfere with what we understand to be true regarding the nature of IPK.

(j) & (k): "I know my dog." and "My dog knows me."

If, as I believe, animals are not persons, then neither of the claims in (l) and (k) are claims of IPK, particularly since, in this thesis, I am focusing my study to the paradigm case of the knowing that exists between two human individuals. However, the claims we make about "animal knowing" do resemble IPK in certain respects. While certain animals like slugs and cockroaches are, apparently, deprived of the capacity to know anything or anyone in the same way we cognitively manage our life experiences, other animals, like dogs, dolphins and chimpanzees, do exhibit a certain cognitive awareness of their surroundings, other animals, and people. And certainly the claims (l) and (k) are ones that any rational person might make. A dog, for example, certainly has the capacity to distinguish between his owner, with whom he is acquainted, and an intruder, with whom he is not. Furthermore, the relationship one has with his dog is something that grows and develops over time, much like a relationship one has with a friend. My hesitance to allow that animals acquire IPK in a manner analogous to human IPK acquisition is based on certain differences that pose significant epistemological dissimilarities, as well as social and psychological ones that should be taken into consideration regarding any claim to knowledge.[106] Therefore, at this

[106] Animals, for example, may not have the cognitive abilities or potential that people have, such as language, empathy, logical inference, intelligent self-expression, etc., which allow us to relate to one another in a personal, bi-directional way. Indeed, the claim that they know us is a claim made *by us* on their behalf. The claims we make about them and about their subjective cognitive experiences are necessarily human generated and based on observation without recourse to first-person substantiation. And since we are the ones making all of the claims, there exists a danger of *personifying* animals beyond metaphysical reality. However, I do *not* want to suggest that there is no such thing as animal knowing—either of things or of people—nor do I want to

time, it is merely the fact that they are not *persons* which denies them the ability for interpersonal knowledge.[107] For my purposes, then, I limit the scope of this study to account for human knowledge of another human person..

(l): "I know Yosemite Sam."

The (l) statement is similar to the (i), (j), and (k) sentence formulations because, as in those statements, either the subject or the object is not a person. Yosemite Sam is a fictional character, and like all fictional characters, you cannot know them interpersonally because they are not persons to be known, but inanimate creations that came from the mind of their author(s). Yosemite Sam is not, in fact, a person any more than your dog is a person or Paris is a person or a work of art is a person. You might claim to know any or all of these, but the knowledge you are claiming cannot *ipso facto* be a claim of IPK. What you may be claiming to know are certain facts about his character or how to draw him or his history with Warner Brothers, but you are not really claiming to know "him" because Yosemite Sam is not a "him"; "he" is really a thing.

Interestingly, the claim to know an animated cartoon character would generally be based on a person's having had a series of experiences involving this character, which are qualitatively unlike simply reading about it. Watching a cartoon movie, seeing the actions and interactions displayed on the screen, hearing the writer's dialogues and reactions displayed by the image, and experiencing the emotions elicited within you as you engage in the process are all ways in which the experience manifests a qualitative feel. To know what it

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suggest that whenever an animal's behavior exhibits reason or problem-solving skill, that we are merely personifying them. However, more biological data is required to substantiate claims of animal IPK.

[107] It should be clarified that IPK is restricted to persons and that this is the primary qualification for the capacity for IPK in my view, regardless of what abilities certain animals may possess (even advanced abilities some animals may have over a severely mentally handicapped or underdeveloped person). However, it might be the case that certain people have lost or fail to develop the capacity for IPK such as coma patients, those who die before birth, etc.

is like to watch a Yosemite Sam cartoon is not something that can be fully shared with another person by words alone. To know it, one must experience it. This is an important point because, although I do not claim that knowing Yosemite Sam is the same as knowing a real person, I do want to allow that certain aspects of claim (l) are irreducible to propositional knowledge. Experiential knowledge exists in many ways that do not involve IPK, but this does not change the fact that IPK is also experiential. It is simply the case that another form of nonpropositional knowledge might be at work here.

Statement (l) might also be understood in another way. Suppose it is instead a reference to knowing the person who is the voice of Yosemite Sam, Mel Blanc, rather than the character itself. Then it would be an instance of IPK, assuming you knew Mr. Blanc while he was still alive. However, knowledge of anyone or anything that is not a person would not be IPK because it would not be *interpersonal*, or *between persons*.

(m): "I know myself."

What disqualifies the last four statements as IPK is the fact that they are missing the "personal" element in the term "interpersonal." Statement (m), however, is missing the "inter" element. There can be nothing "between" me and myself in the same way as there can be something between me and someone else. IPK entails knowledge one individual shares with another consciousness, whereas knowledge of myself only refers to my reflection on my own consciousness. There is nothing "between" me and myself in the same way as there is something (i.e. a relationship) between one person and another.

However, let us consider the implications of change over time. If I look back upon the person I used to be, I might claim, "I know her." But, though it may sound like I am speaking of a different person, I am not. That person is still me. Even if we allow for metaphysical

skepticism regarding personal identity and suggest that I *was*, in the strong sense, a different person, I would also be forced to admit that, like my dead grandfather, I no longer have access to that person. I cannot interact with her. Nothing interpersonal exists between us. All knowledge I have of her is static—in the past, unchanging. Claim (m) could then only be understood as a reference to memory, not relationship. So, whether I think of myself as uniquely one person over the course of time or different people at different times, I still cannot interact in the relevant sense with myself. IPK requires interpersonal interaction. One cannot interact with oneself; therefore, one cannot have IPK of oneself.

(n): "I know God."

As might be expected, many find statement (n) difficult to understand, let alone explain. Part of the reason for this is our many ideas about the nature of God or gods and the mass disagreement about whether such a being or being(s) or forces actually exist. I suppose it could be agreed, however, that if such a being/force doesn't in fact exist, one cannot have IPK of that entity. One cannot in any way know someone or something that doesn't exist, let alone know the non-thing interpersonally.

However, it is likely that whoever states (n) undoubtedly believes there is *someone* in existence to which the word 'God' refers. Our next task must surely be to discover what sort of god it is, whether or not this god exists, and whether or not he/she/it is the sort of entity with and of whom one might gain IPK. If I abide by my earlier insistence that, for IPK to obtain, both knowers be distinct persons, then we must eliminate any description of god as an impersonal force or being. Secondly, if 'god' in (n) refers to a concept rather than *an actual, living, personal being* (whether this is understood by the claimant or not), the speaker cannot be credited with IPK. You cannot have IPK of a concept (which is not a person any more

than Yosemite Sam), even if you sincerely *believe* that concept represents an actual being. If there is no god, there is no knowledge of god. In other words, knowing God means knowing a Being, not having a belief, regardless of how sincere that belief is. Still, if God *does in fact exist* and if He is a personal being who could qualify as a *person* in a robust enough way to be able to participate in an interpersonal relationship with another person, IPK might very well be possible. That is to say, he/she/it must have at least comparable ability to communicate intelligently and interact with us as we generally do with one another.

Conclusion

In conclusion, statements (b) through (f) might be reducible to propositional knowledge, but statement (a) is not. Statement (g) is unique in that it refers to IPK that is locked in the past. Statements (h) through (m) do not reference IPK because the claim is missing a second person, which is necessary for there to exist anything interpersonal. The final claim (n) may indeed be a claim of IPK, but only under certain conditions regarding the identity of God. Notice that when a preposition or modifier (e.g., 'about', 'of') is added to (a), something important is lost, as in sentences (b) through (e). That "something" is what I hope to uncover. That "something" is interpersonal knowledge.

II. Feldman's Counterexample

I introduced Richard Feldman and his contributions to the study of IPK in chapter two and I would like to reintroduce and emphasize Feldman's argument for the irreducibility of IPK to propositional knowledge alone. He provides a counterexample to the claim, "S knows x = df. S has propositional knowledge of some facts about x (i.e., for some proposition p, p is about x, and S knows p)."[108] This is a candidate definition for "S knows x." Feldman shows that this definition is inadequate by providing the following counterexample: a person can

[108] Feldman, 2003, p. 11

know a great many facts (or have a great deal of propositional knowledge) about J. D. Salinger but still not know J. D. Salinger.[109] The counterexample shows that the above definition is not sufficient. Therefore, it *cannot be the case* that IPK is the same as knowing propositions about the person. IPK is irreducible to propositional knowledge. He concludes by saying, "So not all knowing is propositional knowing."[110] Any knowledge type that cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge is called *nonpropositional*. So, IPK is nonpropositional in nature.

While Feldman's argument is compelling, there might be those who remain unconvinced. So, let us consider the primary concern a critic would have regarding Feldman's argument: that Feldman's "definition" does not represent *every* way in which IPK could be propositional. Perhaps only low levels of IPK are reducible to propositional knowledge, while higher levels are not. If this is the case, Feldman's counterexample only disproves the reducibility of higher levels of IPK, but not all of them. But if *any* amount of IPK is reducible to propositional knowledge, *all* IPK is reducible. Higher levels of IPK subsume lower levels of IPK, and lower levels of IPK are no more reducible than higher levels. So, it cannot be the case that Feldman's counterexample only partially succeeds. Due to the nature of IPK and how it is formed, Feldman's argument either succeeds in disproving the reducibility of *all* cases of IPK or his argument fails completely. But, Feldman's argument does not fail, and I explain why this is true through two examples.

Consider (f) above, the "stalker" example. The stalker manages to obtain a great deal of information about Joan Cusack, much of which is personal in nature. However, Ms. Cusack has never seen nor heard of the stalker. She claims *not* to know the stalker. I argued

[109] Ibid
[110] Ibid

that if interpersonal knowledge requires that the knowledge be *interpersonal*—that is, between at least two persons—then it must require that those two people both share in the knowledge. In the stalker case, only one person has any knowledge of the other and, regardless of how this information was obtained—whether through direct observation or from reading a book or some combination thereof—unless at least *some* interpersonal interactions had occurred, the knowledge cannot be interpersonal in nature. It is not IPK. Seeing a person or watching a person or reading about a person does not entitle us to claim that we know that person.

Let us consider a second example, which I will henceforth refer to as the "observer" example: Two men, Adrian and Ron, ride a crowded elevator together every day. Adrian, unlike, Ron, pays attention to everything Ron does—he observes Ron's mannerisms, notices who Ron hangs out with, overhears his conversations, and notes how Ron dresses. In this way, Adrian comes to know a great deal about Ron, including certain information that is personal in nature. On occasion Adrian has asked Ron to push the button for him, which Ron does; however, he is only dimly aware of Adrian's presence. Prone to preoccupation with his own affairs, Ron fails to actively observe anything about his elevator-mate. Later, when asked whether he knows Adrian, Ron truthfully asks, "Who?" But, if Adrian were asked the same question about Ron, how should he answer? Does Adrian know Ron, or is this like the stalker case? Does proximity matter? Does the fact that Ron has seen and minimally interacted with Adrian matter, despite that he is unable to pick Adrian out of a crowd?

Admittedly, the two cases are different. In the stalker example, there is absolutely no interaction between the two individuals. However, in the observer example, there is interaction but of a very limited variety. Additionally, the two have a sort of shared history of

riding the elevator together, although Ron is barely aware of it. Ron does not claim to know Adrian. Like most of us, he sees a lot of people in his busy life, sometimes repeatedly, who he does not claim to know. But Adrian might conceivably say something like, "I know him," and mean by that IPK. If so, what would this entail? To address this issue, let us take the story a bit further. Suppose Adrian walks down to Ron's office and knocks on the door. Would he still have to introduce himself? I think he would, but he might say something like, "Hello. My name is Adrian. I know you, but you may not know me." How might Ron respond? Being quite unaware that Adrian had been observing him over the course of time, he would probably be interested to find out *how* this person knows him, assuming Ron doesn't recognize Adrian right away. But, when Ron comes to realize the method and extent of Adrian's "knowledge" of him, he would likely admit that Adrian does know him, at least minimally.

So, these examples provide us with several considerations: One, does proximity matter? Two, what sorts of interactions qualify as interpersonal interactions—or, the sort that can produce IPK? And three, if Adrian indeed knows Ron through close observation, why could he not claim the stronger, unqualified, "I know you" and still be behaving in a socially acceptable manner?

I will address each concern in order. One, proximity alone does not matter. If Joan Cusack's stalker, for example, conducted all of his observations of her from within the same room but only feet away, hidden behind a curtain, she still would not know him. Unless she, at the very least, recognizes him as another human individual and interacts with him in some way, she would not claim to know him. Regardless of how close he gets to her, if she doesn't notice his presence, she doesn't notice *him*.

Second, it is important to specify what makes an *interaction* an *interpersonal interaction*. However, it must be admitted that different people might have different ideas about this. Adrian, for example, might want to assert that the elevator rides together were a sort of interpersonal interaction, despite little active involvement between the two men. However, in this case, unlike in the stalker case, both individuals involved have at least recognized one another as persons and some interpersonal interaction did take place. I doubt that Ron would have been able to calmly ignore his companion had Adrian been replaced with a live bear, for example. And, riding up and down in an elevator with a person would also seem to be a different sort of experience than riding up and down with a potted plant. If Ron had not seen another living person for a decade, say, the fact that Adrian was in the elevator rather than a potted plant would be a significant difference. So, it cannot be said that Ron was completely unaware of Adrian's existence as a person nor that he never interacted with Adrian. Therefore, whether or not Ron would assert IPK of Adrian, Adrian's IPK of Ron (though minimal) was created in the appropriate way.

Third, if Adrian indeed knows Ron through close observation, why could he not claim the stronger, unqualified, "I know you?" When we tag sentences with qualifiers it often serves a social purpose. In this case, Adrian realizes that Ron has virtually ignored him, despite that Adrian wants to claim to know Ron. So, Adrian qualifies his assertion to alleviate any confusion and avoid coming on too strong. In this way, he recognizes that the relationship between them is severely underdeveloped—despite the wealth of propositional knowledge he has about Ron. Furthermore, within closer relationships, the claim "I know you" is implicit. We do not have to state this fact upon approaching and speaking with people we know. We just start talking. But, when Adrian knocks on Ron's door and they look in one

another's eyes and speak to one another for the first time, for all intents and purposes, they are beginning a significantly new phase in the relationship.

In the stalker example, all of the observations were made *from the outside*, so to speak. Though some of them were *personal* in nature, they were not *interpersonal*—they resulted from observation rather than from interpersonal interaction. The difference between these two words is important. Knowledge that is personal is knowledge of facts particular to a certain individual. Knowledge that is interpersonal is knowledge obtained directly through interactions *between* two consciousnesses where there is an exchange—each person revealing[111] elements about themselves to another individual and simultaneously accessing elements about the other person, including both propositional knowledge and nonpropositional knowledge[112]. In the observer example, knowledge *from the inside* became possible via the interpersonal interactions, although only to a small degree at first. This kind of knowledge consists of more than mere second-hand testimony or observation.

What the stalker and observer examples show us is that, to whatever extent two people are involved in interpersonal interactions[113], it is to that extent that IPK can exist. *Without* interpersonal interactions, *no* IPK can exist. Furthermore, low levels of interpersonal interaction may or may not produce recognizable IPK and, if it does, it may yet not be claimed by either party. But, certainly, the complete lack of interpersonal interactions entails a complete lack of IPK.

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[111] This can be accomplished both intentionally and unintentionally.

[112] Recall that nonpropositional knowledge pertains to things you know that cannot be reduced to a proposition. I discuss the precise nature of this irreducible portion of IPK later in the chapter.

[113] In these examples the interpersonal interactions were largely conducted in person; however, phone calls or written correspondence can also serve as forms of interpersonal interaction. These other kinds of interactions also admit of time delays within IPK formation, which I examine in chapter four.

But, let us return to the concern raised by our imaginary critic of Feldman, where the concern was that Feldman's argument only succeeds in disproving the claim that S knows x means knowing some facts about s. But suppose that in reality higher levels of IPK aren't reducible to knowing a list of facts, while lower levels of IPK are attainable simply by knowing certain facts. That is to say, maybe by knowing a great many facts, S can have *just a little bit* of IPK of x. Then his counterexample (i.e., I have a great deal of propositional knowledge about J. D. Salinger, but I still don't know J. D. Salinger) would only serve to show that the higher levels of IPK aren't reducible to propositional knowledge alone—that by knowing lists of facts, S wouldn't know x *well*. Our examples, though, show that this cannot be the case. They do this by providing us with a necessary pre-condition for the formation of IPK: *interpersonal interactions in which each person recognizes the other as a person and by showing us that even a brief interaction may yet provide a small amount of IPK*. Since only a bare amount of interpersonal interaction is *necessary* for the formation of IPK and if, as our critic admits, there must be something in the higher levels of IPK that is irreducible, there must also be something in that bare amount that goes beyond propositional knowledge alone. This "something extra" satisfies a nonpropositional condition—the experiential condition—on IPK. So, as I stated earlier, if *any* amount of IPK is reducible to propositional knowledge, *all* IPK is reducible to propositional knowledge. But, as Feldman's argument proves even to our skeptic, there is *some* IPK that cannot be reduced to propositions alone; therefore, *no* IPK can be reduced to propositions alone.

If the above is a correct account of IPK, one might then wonder about my earlier suggestion that, although IPK cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge, propositional knowledge is still required for IPK to exist. To understand this, one must understand the

nature of propositional knowledge and how it fits into IPK, which I discuss in the next section.

III. Propositional Knowledge as Necessary for IPK

In order to come to know a person, as stated above, we must at least recognize the person as a *person*.[114] The propositional truth: *here is another person*, must be accessible to us; although it is not a necessary a feature of active thought at the time. However, we cannot come to know a person, all the while believing they are a potted plant or a cat or a figment of our imaginations. We must recognize that they have a consciousness that is unique from our own. The recognition and acceptance of this proposition then, *is* propositional knowledge, but this knowledge itself is *not* IPK. As stated above, I can recognize a great many people as people without acquiring any IPK of them and without even interacting with them. For example, I have seen many people on TV. I know they are people. I know they are unique from me, are owners of their own consciousness with their own point of view and are entitled to claim whatever condition necessary for me to recognize them as true *persons*, but I do not know them. Our stalker example also showed this to be true. Unless Ms. Cusack recognizes her stalker as a person, she will not be able to interact with him in an IPK forming way. Therefore, this bit of propositional knowledge does not amount to IPK, nor does it produce IPK; however, it is *a necessary precondition* for the formation of IPK.

Let us now consider more in-depth propositional knowledge—personal knowledge, for example—that one may acquire via interpersonal interactions with another person, whom they recognize to be a person. If propositional knowledge is acquired in this way, is this

[114] In *Varieties of Reference* (1982), Gareth Evans discusses recognition-based identification. Though his focus is on the recognition of specific objects one has seen before, he claims that a similar account can also be made to recognize types or kinds of things (p. 289). It is in this sense that I claim that we have the ability to distinguish persons from other sorts of objects in the world in ordinary cases.

propositional knowledge a part of IPK? In other words, is knowing that my husband is a chemical engineer part of knowing my husband? Given what we have learned above, it would seem that rather than being a *part* of IPK, propositional knowledge such as this is a product of it. Suppose, though, the propositional knowledge is even more personal, such as the fact that my sister tends to get more defensive in front of women than men. My sister doesn't even know this about herself, but I know it. If true, it qualifies as a fact. But, again, whoever is reading this now knows it, too, but my readers do not necessarily know my sister. Therefore, IPK may produce propositional knowledge or it may create the correct conditions for propositional knowledge to arise, but IPK is not propositional knowledge and propositional knowledge is not IPK.

As Feldman has shown us, no number of known facts can instantiate IPK. However, it would be false to presume that propositional knowledge (aside from us needing to know that the person is a person) is completely left out once IPK is formed and begins to develop. Certainly, we are capable of acquiring a great many true beliefs about a person once we begin to interact with them and, in this way, propositional knowledge is produced and shared. Although propositional knowledge may not be a logical *part* of IPK, nevertheless, the acquisition of propositional knowledge may come along for the ride—perhaps *always*—in any relationship we develop with another person.[115] However, it is not the case that my knowing that my husband is a chemical engineer is an ineliminable part of my knowing my husband. Certainly, it would seem to be a significant oversight in our relationship were I *not* to know his occupation; however, I could still claim to know him without knowing this particular fact, because no one particular fact about a person seems critical to IPK of that

[115] Evans, 1982, pp. 268-269

person, aside from the fact that they are a person.[116] But the point remains that propositional knowledge does continue to play an integral role within IPK—even though factual knowledge cannot replace interpersonal interaction. In fact, I can use propositional knowledge about my husband in order to encourage him to become more intimate with me. For example, if I know he likes to go fishing and I, therefore, decide to fish with him (which is an interpersonal interaction) or I could talk to my sister about my insights into her personal characteristics and encourage her to discuss them with me (also an interpersonal interaction). In this way, I am using my propositional knowledge about my husband or sister in a way that produces an experience through which more IPK is produced and through which I can continue to learn even more propositional knowledge about them. It works cyclically: propositional knowledge can be used to trigger development of IPK, which produces more propositional knowledge,[117] which can be used to trigger further development of IPK, etc.

But, if IPK is not propositional knowledge and if propositional knowledge isn't, strictly speaking, a part of IPK, but rather a product of it, what is IPK? The answer to this question lies in our understanding of how IPK is produced—through interpersonal interactions which are unique, interpersonal *experiences*. In considering this, several concerns may arise. The first has to do with how IPK is or is not like other forms of nonpropositional knowledge, such as knowing-how. This is the topic of the next section.

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[116] Knowing a person as a person—the possessor of a consciousness—is necessary for IPK, even if this knowledge is not an explicit feature of their conscious thought processes at the time. It would function like an obvious truth. The important thing to note is that if they possessed some belief that the person in question was not, in fact, a person, this belief would undermine their IPK. That is to say, they could not claim they were getting to know a hat and still be able to claim IPK as a case of knowledge. Rather, they would have something like a false belief, a hallucination, or, perhaps, an imaginary friend, but not knowledge, since knowledge must be veridical.

[117] It is conceivable that propositional knowledge may not a product of IPK, but rather is directly produced by the same experiences that give rise to IPK. Therefore, it would simply be produced simultaneously alongside IPK; however, here I continue with the former understanding for the following reasons: this alternative understanding does not significantly change my analysis and it is difficult to prove. It would require separating the experiential knowledge gained in the experience from the experience itself; however, unlike facts of reality that can exist apart from a knower, experience requires an experiencer.

Then, I discuss how experiential knowledge differs from propositional knowledge and argue that IPK is a variety of experiential knowledge.

IV. IPK and Knowing-How

What if the way we understand propositional knowledge is just too simplistic to capture true propositional knowledge and a more robust understanding of it could account for certain experientially gained knowings, such as knowing-how and IPK?

In his book Know How, Jason Stanley argues that procedural knowledge (knowing-how) is reducible to propositional knowledge. In his words,

> …knowing how to do something is the same as knowing a fact. It follows that learning how to do something is learning a fact. For example, when you learned how to swim, what happened is that you learned some facts about swimming. Knowledge of these facts is what gave you knowledge of how to swim. Something similar occurred with every other activity that you now know how to do, such as riding a bicycle or cooking a meal. You know how to perform activities solely in virtue of your knowledge of facts about those activities.[118]

In order to prove his point, Stanley develops a broader understanding of the nature of propositional knowledge, claiming that our traditional conception of it is too weak. "…[T]he standard theories of knowledge-wh (i.e. propositional knowledge) … are conceptually impoverished. They are not even sufficient to explain the kinds of facts one learns when one learns who someone is, much less the kinds of facts one learns when we learn how to do something.[119] These special kinds of facts[120] are more robust than traditional knowing-that. His account incorporates the full range of propositional knowledge claims: know why, know whether, know where, know what, know who, and know how. He calls this "knowledge-wh."[121] Additionally, they are the sorts of facts that answer a question, such as "How could I

[118] Stanley, 2011, p. vii
[119] Ibid, p. viii
[120] Ibid, p. vii
[121] Ibid, p. 36

swim?" According to Stanley, certain propositional claims using the verb 'know' or 'knows' contain embedded questions.[122] For example, Stanley's construction, "Hannah knows what Obama will do in office"[123] contains the embedded question, "What will Obama do in office?" Hannah can only claim that she knows what Obama will do in office if she knows the answer to the embedded question. Stanley seeks to show that procedural knowledge (knowing-how) is merely a species of propositional knowledge (knowing-wh) by showing that it, too, can be accounted for by answering certain embedded questions within the claim. For example, if John knows how to hit a ball, he also knows the answer to the embedded questions regarding to whom to hit the ball, when to hit the ball, where to hit the ball, why to hit the ball, how hard to hit the ball, etc.

Stanley's work raises a possible concern for my thesis. If procedural knowledge (knowing-how), which is traditionally considered nonpropositional, is indeed reducible to propositional knowledge,[124] despite that it seems to be an intuitively incorrect postulation (which Stanley himself calls "puzzling")[125], then might it be the case that IPK (which I consider to be nonpropositional) is also be reducible to propositional knowledge in the same basic way as procedural knowledge? Perhaps, it is possible to show that "I know X" contains an embedded question or a series of embedded questions that can be answered using propositions where the answers of these questions provide the totality of what it means to know X. If this is the case, IPK is tantamount to knowing a truth or a series of facts.

After some study and reflection I have come to the conclusion that procedural knowledge and IPK are, at base, very different sorts of knowledge—far too different to

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[122] Ibid, p. 39
[123] Ibid, pg. 36
[124] For contrary arguments, see Ryle (1949) and Scholz and Fales (2010).
[125] Ibid, p. vii

assume that what can be said about knowing-how in any way entails a need to recast what should be said about IPK. Stanley recognizes this difference between statements that capture his more robust description of propositional knowledge (knowing-wh) (which he claims can together account for procedural knowledge), and statements expressing IPK (e.g. "John knows Bill" and "John knows the mayor of Boston").[126] He goes on to explain that the word 'knows' in these statements does not even have the same verbal meaning, as evidenced by the use of completely different words, in some languages, to make these claims, such as I discussed in chapter one.

> In many languages, the translations of the sentences in (2) [which refer to IPK] do not involve the verb that translates 'know' in sentences like 'John knows that snow is white'. For example, in French, the verb used in knowledge attributions such as 'John knows that snow is white' is 'savoir', and the verb used to translate 'know' in the sentences in (2) is 'conaitre'. 'Savoir' is also used to translate the sentences (1) [knowing-wh claims]. Similarly, in German, used in knowledge attributions such as 'John knows that snow is white' is 'wissen', which is also used in the translations of the sentences in (1). In contrast, the verb used to translate the sentences in (2) is 'kennen'.[127]

In this way, Stanley himself admits that knowing a person is considerably different from knowing-how or knowing-that. However, the concept of knowledge claims containing embedded questions is an intriguing one and one that should be considered in regard to IPK.

Does the construction "I know my mom" contain an embedded question? If so, would this make it parallel in structure (and, perhaps, in kind) to a propositional claim? Is there such an embedded question that would need to be answered in order for me to claim that I know my mom? Consider the question, "Who is your mom?" If I could answer this question, would that be enough to maintain the IPK asserted in the "I know X" construction *and* prove a necessary reducibility to propositional knowledge? No, it does not. This is because the

[126] Ibid, p. 36
[127] Ibid, p. 36-37

answer to the question, “Who is your mom” may also be answered by describing what one knows when one makes the claim “I know who my mom is”—an expression of knowing who, and, as we have seen in my review of Boër and Lycan in chapter two, knowing-who is not the same as “knowing X,” where “X” is a person. That is to say, to express “I know who George W. Bush is” need not mean, “I know George W. Bush.” So the question “Who is your mom?” cannot be the embedded question, if one exists, within the phrase “I know my mom.” The following questions suffer from the same fate.

(1) a. What do you know about your mom?

b. What is it about your mom that you know?

c. What of your mom do you know?

d. What is your mom like?

They fail because one can answer the question in a way that corresponds to propositional knowledge alone and could be reasonably answered in a way that does not entail any reference to IPK, or, in other words, without the subject in the sentence actually knowing the person mentioned in the predicate of the sentence.

The only questions that may be entailed by (or embedded within) the claim “I know my mom” come in a different form from those mentioned above. These questions appeal to requests for a description of either circumstances of the acquaintance or the level of intimacy within the relationship. Consider the following questions:

(2) a. In what way do you know your mom?

b. How do you know your mom?

c. How well do you know your mom?

Notice that the questions in set (2) appear to include an implicit assumption that the person being questioned has IPK of their mom while the questions in set (1) do not. If the person being questioned knows his or her mother, any answer they provide will only be a *description* of IPK, not the IPK itself. Unlike propositional knowledge, IPK is non-transferrable. One cannot transfer one's knowledge of one's mother (or of anyone else) to a third person via a description. One must experience a person's consciousness themselves to be able to claim to know the person. (This characteristic of nontransferability is the topic of the next section.) Therefore, questions in set (2) are also unsuited to elicit a response that carries with it the actual knowledge of IPK. IPK, then, cannot be akin to propositional knowing in the area of embedded questions. Thus, any concern regarding whether Stanley's ability to reduce procedural knowledge to propositional knowledge entails that IPK might also be reducible to propositional knowledge is misplaced.

V. Nontransferable Interpersonal Experience

As we have seen through our stalker and observer examples, IPK arises *if and only if* people have interpersonal interactions with one another. Therefore, participation within interpersonal interactions is a *necessary* condition on IPK The experience is *of* the *person.* When two consciousnesses interact, they are actually *experiencing one another*. So, to consciously interact with another person is to allow my consciousness and her consciousness to interact and to experience both what it is like to be part of her conscious landscape and what it is like to have her as part of mine—that is to say, to be in one another's gaze.

This intermingling of consciousnesses, so to speak, is experiential in nature and is not the sort of thing of which one can provide a full propositional account. That is to say, it is the experience and what is understood and learned within and of that experience that cannot be

reduced to propositional knowledge. Again, propositional knowledge will undoubtedly be produced by the experience, but it *is not* the experience and nor can propositions *replace* the experience. I would like to support this claim by pointing out a particular quality of propositional knowledge that does not obtain for experiential knowledge: transferability.

Is IPK transferrable from one person to a third person who has never met the person being discussed? For example, suppose I try to transfer to or share the IPK that I claim to have of my mother with my professor, who has never met her. The only way I could attempt to do this, without actually introducing them to one another, would be to tell my professor all I know about her and relate as many stories as I could regarding my experience of being raised by her and loved by her throughout my life. Regardless of how detailed I might be and regardless of my professor's ability to remember details and imagine what it might be like to have her as a mother, unless he actually meets her or has some personal interaction with her, he cannot claim to know her. In fact, even if he were to meet her (let's say I introduce them at a barbeque and they chat for a few minutes), the knowledge he gained from our earlier discussions about my experiences is not interpersonal knowledge. However, it would allow him to decide if he was willing to spend time getting to know her (i.e., personally interacting with her) and, if he chose to do so, it could create a framework for the creation of a relationship. He might know, for example, that she likes her coffee black with sugar, but until they interacted person to person with this bit of information in play, it would remain just a trivial fact. It would do nothing to deepen their relationship.

Consider also that merely sharing in mutual propositional knowledge with someone is not IPK. I share a great many bits of propositional knowledge with a great many people who I cannot claim to know. This could be understood in two ways. The first can be seen in the

following example: I know that Joan Cusack is an actress and a great many other people know that Joan Cusack is an actress, but I do not know everyone who knows Joan Cusack is an actress. Here, A knows C and B knows C, but this relationship does not entail that A knows B. A second way transferability might function can be understood this way: If A knows B and B knows A (factually speaking), do A and B know one another? For example, suppose I know a great deal about Joan Cusack and Joan Cusack knows a great deal about me. However, if we have never met or interacted, we cannot claim to know one another. I might be able to form an opinion such as, "I'd like to meet her," and I might even feel a connection with her if, say, I discover through a third person that she knows about me, but I certainly would not claim to know *her* on those grounds alone. There would be no interpersonal relationship. The sharing of propositional knowledge does not entail the sharing of IPK. Therefore, regardless of whether propositions are involved within an interaction, they will only ever be pieces of propositional knowledge.

Interpersonal knowledge is experiential knowledge of a particular type. There are other kinds of experiential knowledge, such as knowing what it is like to get caught in the rain. However, IPK is knowledge of a person gained by having an interactive experience with the person. The propositional information used or produced within that interaction may serve to deepen one's affection for the other or distance one emotionally from the other, it may encourage further interactions or stave them off, it may be the content of discussions or provide a point on which both consciousnesses mutually focus, but it is not, in and of itself, experiential knowledge of the *person*. My mother's coffee drinking preferences do not constitute IPK for anyone. So, what this shows us is that, while propositional knowledge is the sort of thing that can be transferred from one person to another and propositional

knowledge plays a role—even an important role—within interpersonal relationships, it is not IPK. Furthermore, IPK is not propositional knowledge, it is experiential knowledge. So, although we can transfer via testimony the propositional knowledge we gain through an experience, we cannot transfer the experiential knowledge. I cannot transfer my knowing of my mother to anyone else. It is something my other and I share between the two of us.

VI. Experiential Qualia

We have established that IPK is a type of experiential knowledge which is irreducible to propositional knowledge alone. It is the mutual experience of another's consciousness. However, questions remain about the nature of this experiential knowledge. Do experiences produce actual knowledge beyond that which is propositional? If so, how can we distinguish the nonpropositional from the propositional? I have briefly mentioned qualia. 'Qualia' refers to the qualitative "feel" of an experience—the aspect we would call "what it is like." Here I discuss this aspect of experiential knowledge at greater length.

Philosophers have argued for the idea that there exist irreducible mental phenomena for which neither science nor philosophy can yet provide a full, explanatory account,[128] but others resist this idea. John Searle, in his book *Mind: A Brief Introduction*, describes the resistance this way:

> Why are so many philosophers driven to deny certain common-sense claims, such as, that we really do have conscious thoughts and feelings; that we do have real intentional states such as beliefs, hopes, fears and desires; and that these are caused by processes in the brain and do themselves function causally; and that they are real intrinsic parts of the real world and as much a part of our biological life as digestion, or growth, or the secretion of bile? The answer has to be found historically. The failures of dualism and the success of the physical sciences, together, give us the impression that, somehow or other, we must be able to give an account of all there is to be said about the real world in completely materialistic terms. The existence of

[128] See Nagel (1981) & M. Polanyi (1967)

> some irreducible *mental* phenomena does not fit in and seems intellectually repulsive. It is indigestible.[129]

Thomas Nagel, in his paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" agrees, stating:

> Every reductionist has his favorite analogy from modern science. It is most unlikely that any of these unrelated examples of successful reduction will shed light on the relation of mind to brain. But philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different. This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the mental largely because they would permit familiar kinds of reduction.[130]

Despite the push against what Searle regards as "common-sense claims," there are several provocative arguments for the existence of irreducible qualia. Nagel argues that any organism that has a consciousness must also have a sense of what it is like to be that organism—some "subjective character of experience."[131] His argument is based on the idea that, although bats are another physical life form and experience a sort of consciousness (as most of us believe they do), their life experience is undoubtedly quite different from ours. The mere fact that they perceive their surroundings via echolocation is evidence enough to suppose that what it is like to be a bat must be vastly different from what it is like to be a human. He says, "…bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine."[132] A bat's inner subjective experience will be much different from ours, and regardless of how much we know about how a bat's brain and body work, that objective information in no way gains us access to the

[129] Searle, 2004, p. 72
[130] Nagel, 1981, p. 391
[131] Ibid, p. 392
[132] Ibid, p. 394

qualia associated with a bat's inner life. Therefore, it is a mistake to try to force a reduction of subjective, inner qualia to some objective, outer explanation of it.[133]

Qualia are an important part of the analysis of IPK for two reasons. First, they are needed to explain why interactions are required for IPK, and second, they account for why IPK produced by the intermingling of two unique consciousnesses is unique. The first reason can be seen through an analogy with job training. For example, a doctor or a therapist is expected to spend time, as part of their training, working with real patients. Teachers are expected to complete a semester of student teaching before they can graduate with a degree in education. Pilots must log a certain number of hours of flight time and pass an inflight practical test before they can acquire their license. There are certain qualia associated with dealing with a difficult patient, or feeling 30 pairs of eyes on us, or jetting through the air at 10,000 feet that we must prove capable of handling before we can be considered fully knowledgeable or competent in our field. Modern pedagogy has learned that, for certain fields, it is essential to provide hands-on or first-hand experiences in order to teach the student certain essential aspects of their training that go beyond what can be learned in a classroom—experiential knowledge. These experiences produce knowledge that cannot be reduced to propositions alone—they provide us with a "feel" of the situation. They allow us to assume the point of view of the one who actually performs the task, rather than remaining as a mere observer.

Interpersonal interactions do this as well—they move us from merely observing people into a position of actually *experiencing* people. The resulting qualia—the "what it is like" of the relationship—are nonpropositional elements of IPK that could arise in no other way, explaining both why IPK is not reducible to propositional knowledge and why it is non-

[133] For another classic argument, see Frank Jackson's discussion of Mary in Jackson, 1986, pp. 291-295.

transferable. Other kinds of experiential knowledge also involve qualia, but the qualia associated with IPK will differ in that, for IPK, two consciousnesses are involved rather than just one. For example, getting caught in the rain provides me with nonpropositional qualia—the knowing of what it is like to get caught in the rain. But since only one consciousness is involved, I can only experience it from my point of view without reference through empathy to another's point of view. I am experiencing a thing, an event which is inanimate. Therefore, although IPK is a kind of experiential knowledge, it is not identical to *any* kind of experiential knowledge. The interaction of two consciousnesses produces the qualia particular to IPK.

The second reason rests on the presupposition that no two relationships will be exactly alike. My relationship with Becky is qualitatively different from my relationship with my mom or with her relationship with her mom. Lorraine Code observes, "Friends are not interchangeable—neither are children or parents: it is not possible to substitute one friend for another and establish the same relationship."[134] Some similarities may apply since we are all of us human and share in the human experience, but there is no reason to suppose that what it is like for me to know my mom is identical to what it is like for Becky to know her mom, or that one relationship between two people will be identical to any other combination of personal interactions where at least one of the two people is switched for someone else. If the interacting consciousnesses are different, the experiences will be different. Different experiences entail different qualia.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, I first examined how the word 'know' is used in the English language within contexts that might be easily confused with the way I use 'know' in my paradigm

[134] Code, 1991, p. 96

cases of IPK. By teasing apart the differences between them, we gain a better understanding of the role propositional knowledge plays within the various claims. For example, knowing a great many personal details about the dead author, Jane Austen, is not the same as knowing Jane Austen, and knowing a city may be experiential, but since it is not interpersonal in nature, it is not IPK.

Next, I reintroduced Feldman's non-reductionist argument and explained that knowing a person is not the same as knowing facts—even a great many facts—about a person because in order to know a person, interpersonal interactions are necessary. Third, I defended the position that while IPK is not reducible to propositional knowledge, propositional knowledge is nevertheless a necessary *pre*-condition on IPK. One must, at the very least, know that the person with whom one is interacting is a *person* in order to have IPK of that person. That is to say that, although this fact is not a part of IPK, it must be accessible to the knower *before* once can come to know a person. Furthermore, propositional knowledge may play an important *role* within interpersonal relationships by either encouraging us or discouraging us from going to deeper levels of intimacy, by providing the focus for certain interpersonal interactions, or by being produced by interpersonal interactions through insight or empathy; however, it is not a *part* of IPK. It cannot replace experiential knowledge itself, and IPK is experiential.

Fourth, I discussed the related issue of whether or not our conception of propositional knowledge is robust enough by considering whether embedded questions within knowledge claims could entail IPK reduction. I reviewed Jason Stanley's claim that knowing-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge by recognizing that certain propositional claims mean more than what we might think. By identifying the embedded questions within knowing-how

claims, Stanley argued that one can identify the richer caliber of propositional knowledge contained within knowing-how and also show that knowing-how is only a species of propositional knowing. I analyzed Stanley's method and attempted to apply it to IPK; however, I was able to show that any questions that might be embedded within claims of IPK do not elicit an answer that is the IPK itself. This is because IPK is non-transferable. Questions and answers are simply not the correct vehicles by which IPK can be acquired.

Fifth, I discussed how the irreducibility of IPK entails that it is also nontransferable. Propositional knowledge is the sort of thing that one can share with another person through explanations, testimony, demonstrations, etc. However, IPK cannot be shared in this way. It cannot be transferred from one person to another at all. I cannot share my knowing of my mother with anyone else. Either they come to know her for themselves by interacting with her themselves, or they do not know her. Even then, their knowledge of her will be different than my knowledge of her.

I concluded this chapter by examining the nature of the qualia as irreducible elements within IPK. After reviewing a classic argument for the existence of experiential qualia, I argued that they could be used to explain various aspects of IPK. Qualia must be experienced in order to be known, and it is this that marks the character of IPK. However, I also asserted my earlier finding that, since IPK is the experiencing of another person by experiencing an interaction with their consciousness and qualia exists for every experience we have—whether or not another consciousness is involved—the qualia of IPK must be understood as arising within these unique parameters. IPK requires experiential qualia, but of a particular kind.

Chapter Four: A Critical Analysis of IPK's Nature and Acquisition

At this point in our study, I have argued that IPK is experiential rather than propositional and that one cannot have IPK apart from experiencing interpersonal interactions with the person one claims to know. These considerations emphasize the *interpersonal* character of IPK, but we still need to evaluate why IPK counts as *knowledge* as opposed to some other state, such as belief. Additionally, it is important to evaluate IPK according to how it pertains to truth and how it is justified. I do this here. In the previous chapter, I discussed the character of IPK as a form of experiential knowledge that arises from the following necessary conditions: one, an interpersonal interaction between two human individuals and, two, recognition of one another as persons. Our working analysis up to this point in this study, then, is as follows:

(1) S has IPK of X iff S and X have engaged in interpersonal interactions.

However, this definition is not yet precise enough, as it permits cases that are clearly not cases of IPK. Therefore, in the second portion of this chapter I defend the view that the interpersonal interactions cited in this analysis refer to interpersonal interactions that are personal and directed. In this way I narrow the scope of our analysis so that it covers only those cases of true IPK.

I. Belief and IPK

Traditionally, belief has been taken to be a necessary condition for (propositional) knowledge.[135] The agent must believe *p* in order to know that *p*, where *p* is a true proposition. Must our analysis accommodate belief in this way? If we introduce the belief requirement on knowledge into our analysis of IPK, we immediately run into a number of interesting problems. "S knows Becky if, and only if, S believes Becky…." This cannot be right. We

[135] Zagzebski, 2009, p. 129; Sosa, 2011, p. 88; Lehrer and Paxon, 2009, p. 31

have already established that I could claim IPK of Becky, even if I did not believe Becky. It is immediately plain that, in this sentence, when we exchange a person for a proposition, the meaning of the word 'believes' changes. To say, "I believe that p," is vastly different from saying, "I believe Becky." When a person (as opposed to a proposition) becomes the object in this sentence, the belief portion of this statement immediately attaches to whatever propositions that person may say, that is, his or her testimony. Believing a proposition amounts to believing that the proposition is true; however, believing a person amounts to believing the propositions they assert. Believing a person is, then, in a sense reducible to believing propositions, but it is one step removed. If IPK involves the TAK restriction that knowing requires believing, then to know Becky would be (at least, in part) to believe Becky. This, of course, is not the case. Therefore, belief of the sort required by the TAK is not a necessary condition on IPK. This suggests that belief is not a condition on IPK in the same way that it is a condition on propositional knowledge and may not have a primary role in any critical analysis one might provide for IPK.

However, this conclusion is unsatisfying. It does seem that, when it comes to other people we know, we do have certain beliefs about them and about our relationships with them. As we saw in the previous chapter, propositional knowledge is a pre-condition for IPK. Since belief is a necessary part of knowledge, belief would also be part of this pre-condition. If we know that the person with whom we are interacting is a *person* (as opposed to an animal or a potted plant, for example), then we must also believe as much. Therefore, belief must play a role as a pre-condition for IPK. Furthermore, we might ask, "Is it necessary for me to believe that I know X in order to know X?" Now, though, we are dealing with a second-order belief—beliefs about our IPK. The claim, "I believe that I know X," does not

express IPK; rather it expresses a proposition, and it's truth or falsity is dependent on whether or not one has IPK. Given this, I set this second-order belief aside for the time being and move on to another attempt to determine whether or not belief plays an integral role within IPK. To this end I examine certain sentence forms in order to discover how propositions function in connection with belief relative to IPK and to propositional knowledge.

A. Belief About

Given common usage, it is unnatural and meaningless to say, "I believe about Becky." This type of sentence requires a proposition inserted after the object to make any sense. For example, "I believe Becky is a chronic liar about Becky," though awkward, makes sense (of a sort). Here the 'about Becky' clause becomes a prepositional phrase, meaning either that I believe Becky is a chronic liar about herself or that she is a chronic liar in general. Here, though, we have a propositional attitude, namely, the attitude of belief toward the proposition *Becky is a chronic liar about Becky*. While this could be a pre-condition on IPK, it is not itself a candidate to *be* IPK, as I have argued above. Another way to formulate the sentence is to insert an appropriate noun in that place. For example, "I believe facts about Becky" makes sense and there is no redundancy or awkwardness. Still, though, we are left with the same problem. A third way to formulate the sentence would be to say, "I believe about Becky that p." Again, this statement describes a propositional attitude. As stated earlier, mere propositions do not capture the fullness of IPK, nor do propositional attitudes, as one can have both without ever having experienced an interpersonal interaction with Becky. Therefore, to believe x *about* Becky is not to know Becky.[136]

[136] The same may be said if we exchange "about" for "regarding" or "corresponding to," so nothing more will be said of those synonyms.

B. Belief In and Belief Of

To believe "in" someone is suggestive of the problem I identified above—trusting what the person says. This, of course, is the wrong way to think of IPK, as my experience with the real Becky shows. However, to believe in someone might also take the form of faith in the potential and/or goodness of another person. For example, if my son comes to me worried about at test he has to take, I might say, "I believe in you," meaning I believe he will do well on the test. I justify my statement by reflecting on how much he has studied, my understanding of how he thinks under pressure, my knowledge of his previous test scores, my recollection of helping him with his homework, etc. But knowing these things *about* my son is reducible to propositional knowledge. Therefore, to *believe in* someone is to believe positively about someone's capacity to perform some action (either physical or cognitive), where this belief is merely propositional. However, IPK can also exist between people with negative, joint, past experiences—people whom you truly don't "believe in." Then, to say, "I believe in X" would be a false claim, even if I know X. Therefore, we cannot say "S knows Becky if, and only if, S believes in Becky…" because to *believe in* someone is reducible to propositional belief.

A possible second way to interpret 'belief in' relates to how we might understand 'belief of', and that is in the sense that we believe in someone's existence. For example, my saying, "I believe in Becky" may be tantamount to saying, "I believe in God," as far as belief in mere existence is concerned. To say, "I believe of Becky" is ungrammatical, but not completely meaningless. If it is used in the same sense as 'about' and we can arrive at meaning by merely inserting propositional content (e.g., "I believe certain facts of Becky"), then 'of' should be understood in the same way as 'about' above. However, if we are

referring to our belief that Becky exists, the phrase still lacks the robustness that we intuitively expect of IPK. I believe President George W. Bush *exists*, but I do not know him.

C. Belief as a Pre-condition and a Product of IPK

As I have shown above, correctly believing *p* about Becky does not entail that I know Becky. However, propositional knowledge and, therefore, propositional belief, does play a role corresponding to IPK by serving as a pre-condition. One must know X is a person in order to get to know X. Additionally, propositional knowledge is often produced by our IPK—particularly as our relationships develop. In this way, belief is also a product, since it is an integral part of propositional knowledge. (I have argued for both of these conditions as they apply to propositional knowledge in Chapter Three.) However, it would be wrong to say that either propositional belief or knowledge is a *part* of IPK.

II. Truth and IPK

Certain difficulties arise both from our language and from the notion that truth is not attainable in nonpropositional knowledge because it requires propositions, which may be one reason why nonpropositional knowledge is often ignored by epistemologists.

> The requirement that knowledge be true also seems to require that knowledge be propositional. Although there are different theories as to what truth consists in, truth values are generally held to accrue to propositions or sentences. It is not clear what other kinds of entities could be counted as true or false.[137]

Notice, though, that the claims "I know that p" and "I know Becky" are different, and so are the claims "I know that p is true" and "I know that Becky is true." In the first sense, we are claiming that some proposition is true. In the second sense we are claiming—not that Becky is true in the way a proposition is true but that she has an either loyal or honest character. (In her case, of course, it would have to be the former, since she was anything but honest.) Like

[137] Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1990, p. 225

the concept of belief, truth attaches differently to things or factual claims than it does to people. One concern regarding the veritistic value of nonpropositional knowledge of this kind is in how we should understand knowing a person as an "object of knowledge." A related concern is that, if experiential knowledge is neither true nor false, must we adopt a sort of relativism? In this section I address both of these issues. I explore the ways in which people qualify as objects of knowledge for which truth and falsity apply and defend the position that experiential knowledge (and IPK in particular) is veritistic in nature.

A. People as Objects of Knowledge

When talking about IPK, people are not "objects of knowledge" in the same way as a fact is an object of knowledge. There are several reasons why, when we label a person an "object of knowledge," we mean something different than when we label a claim or a thing an "object of knowledge." This is in part due to the fact that the *person* object of knowledge is attained only through experiential interactions of two consciousnesses while the *fact* object of knowledge can be attained through a variety of means (e.g., testimony, perception, experience, reasoning/inference). Labeling a person an object of knowledge also raises ethical concerns. We shy away from treating people merely as objects because, as beings of individual unique consciousnesses like ourselves, we value people much more highly than other kinds of objects of knowledge, and we recognize that confusing the two often leads to serious moral issues.[138] I proceed here in a manner that is consistent with the view that people—even as objects of knowledge and perhaps, in part, *because* we can be known—are significantly more valuable in the moral sense than other kinds of objects of knowledge.

My concern here is to identify how we can know our claims of IPK are veridical. One obvious way we might say such a claim would *not* be veridical is in the case where I claim to

[138] Kant, 1993, p. 43

know someone who I do not, in fact, know. The truth value attaches to the proposition, "I know X." Since this is propositional knowledge and is one step removed from actual IPK, this is only one part of what I am trying to identify. I want to know if experiential knowledge is the sort of thing that can be considered veritistic. Does the truth or falsity of the propositional knowledge that applies to IPK lend IPK itself a veritistic nature? Below I provide three areas of investigation that can provide us with a better understanding of the veritistic nature of IPK.

B. People Are Multifaceted

Much of our propositional knowledge is multifaceted. The popular philosophical maxim, Occam's Razor ("Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity"), is often quoted to encourage us to assume the simplest explanation first and then build from there. However, the clause "beyond necessity" allows that it is in the nature of some things to be rather complicated. Propositional knowledge can be this way, such as when one considers the truths associated with the ecosystem, human DNA, or the solar system. Sometimes multiple layers of facts must be taken into consideration before the whole can be understood. People are also this way. People, as objects of propositional knowledge, are multifaceted. However, knowing a person is quite different from having an understanding of even a complicated body of propositional knowledge *about* that person, as we have seen. Lorraine Code recognizes that propositional knowledge is "implicated in the process" of coming to know other people, but that IPK also admits of qualitative differences. She says,

> Knowledge of other people develops, operates, and is open to interpretation at different levels; it admits of degree in ways that knowing that the book is red does not. Hence it is qualitatively different from the simple observational knowledge commonly constitutive of epistemological paradigms. It is not easy to subsume it under the analyses appropriate for empirical paradigms. 'Knowing how' and 'knowing that' are implicated in the process, but they do not begin to tell the whole

> story. These considerations may create the impression that this kind of knowledge is philosophically unmanageable. Yet the contrast between its multidimensional, multiperspectival character and the stark simplicity of standard paradigms raises questions, rather, about the practice of granting exemplary status to the standard paradigms.[139]

Quite obviously, there are multiplicities of facts that can be known *about* another person. Therefore, as propositional objects of knowledge, people are multifaceted. But since IPK and propositional knowledge are not the same thing, this tells us very little about IPK itself. Does IPK accommodate this multiplicity?

IPK is a kind of experiential knowledge; it is knowledge gained through experience. Therefore, IPK should be able to easily accommodate a great deal of complexity in the same way as our perceptual abilities accommodate complexity in everyday experience. Consider the experience of getting caught in the rain. We simultaneously acquire experiential knowledge of what it is like to feel the drops hitting our skin, sense the temperature of the droplets, smell the humidity in the air, see a million tiny daggers of moisture attacking us from a darkened sky, and hear the splish splash as it rebounds off leaves, concrete, our clothing, and any number of other surfaces. These are only a few of the many bits of sensory input we can process in the matter of a few seconds with barely an effort. Active experience is, therefore, uniquely suited to accommodate a multiplicity of differing stimuli. The experiential knowledge arising from interacting with another human being, then, should also be able to accommodate a good deal of complexity.

Then question, then, is how does the multiplicity found in human beings affect the veriticity of IPK? Again, it makes little sense to say, "My experience of getting caught in the rain is true" or "My knowing what it is like to get caught in the rain is true." However, we could truthfully say, "I know what it is like to get caught in the rain," and we could truthfully

[139] Code, 1991, p. 37

report certain propositions gained from the experience, such as, “Getting caught in the rain made me cold.” These facts can be based on experiential knowledge and as long as we are referencing a real experience and reporting on it accurately, there is no reason to claim that veriticity does not apply to knowledge of this kind. If we are lying about our experience, we certainly could not claim experiential knowledge. IPK, as a form of experiential knowledge, is also veritistic in this way. Either I have engaged in interpersonal interactions (experiences) with X or I have not, and I can describe my IPK accurately or not. While the claims themselves are propositions, the propositions must accurately reference real life experience—meaning that truth applies, even in cases of experiential knowledge and even when the experience is of something that admits of multiplicity.

C. People Withhold Information

Although things like the solar system, as propositional objects of knowledge, admit of a great deal of complexity which can cause certain truths to remain hidden from us, it is not the case that the solar system ever *intentionally* hides anything. People do, though. This kind of intentionality requires a consciousness. People can intentionally hide a truth by withholding information or actively disguise a truth by asserting an untruth in its place. Additionally, we may accidentally put forth falsehoods by simply repeating misinformation, by being imprecise in our language so as to create misunderstanding, or by making poor guesses. We may cite something that is true at the time but subject to change, we make mistakes in judgment, and we sometimes speak with more confidence than we should on a given subject. When it comes to self-knowledge, we often feel we should know more than we do. We are easily manipulated by emotions and our physical surroundings, we change over

time, we adjust to various dynamic circumstances, and all of this contributes to the possibility for a great deal of confusion.

Suppose I know Bruce Wayne as a guy I play tennis with twice a week. During these meetings we discuss all kinds of things, including some personal things. However, even over the course of many years, he never reveals to me his alter ego: Batman. I have, of course, heard of the masked vigilante, but I do not claim to know him. I do, though, claim to know Bruce Wayne—quite well, in fact. Then, one fateful afternoon, I catch a glimpse of Batman in an alley fighting bad guys. His mask is ripped off, and I gasp as I recognize my tennis buddy, Bruce Wayne! What is my next thought? "Wow! You think you know a guy! I guess I didn't know Bruce as well as I thought I did!" It might even be the case that I would think or say something like, "I guess I never really knew him," or "I didn't know him at all." But this would be an exaggeration. Of course, I knew him—at least to some extent—or I wouldn't have any reason to react the way I did. What I am trying to express here is my surprise at learning that the *level* of IPK I had of Bruce was not as deep as I had imagined it to be. In this way, what I learn *propositionally* about the people I know helps me gauge the level or depth of intimacy of my *IPK*. The more valuable or central to the person's character the propositional knowledge discovered, the less I will feel I really knew him.

Notice that when the mask came off, Batman did not magically become Bruce Wayne. Batman has always been Bruce Wayne and Bruce Wayne has always been Batman (at least since I've known him, let's say). I did not come to know a new *person*—Batman—with the removal of the mask. I came to know something new about Bruce. So, did I know Bruce Wayne or did I know Batman? I knew both. I simply did not know Bruce well enough to recognize him dressed as Batman. But, now that I do recognize Batman as Bruce Wayne, I

will certainly notice some Bruce Wayne-ish stuff about Batman and some Batman-ish stuff about Bruce Wayne.

Furthermore, I can still interact with Bruce in the same way and at the same level of intimacy we had before (and perhaps at an even deeper level now), regardless of how he is dressed. This is because, despite my former lack of certain propositional knowledge about my tennis buddy, I still have IPK of him. My IPK is veridical (and, therefore, it admits of veriticity) because it is experiential knowledge that represents the real world—the real person, in this case—in an accurate way. It is the experiential knowing of the consciousness with whom I am interacting. Outer trappings matter as they may affect my ability, for a time, to feel free to interact with this person in different settings (i.e., before the unmasking, I wouldn't have felt comfortable asking Batman to play tennis with me), but ultimately, the two interacting consciousnesses do not change dependent on outer trappings (e.g., missing limbs, altered clothing, change of location, etc.). Therefore, when I claim to know Bruce Wayne (even before the unmasking), there is a real someone who I know, and the knowledge I am claiming faithfully attaches to his consciousness. His being Batman is beside the point to my right to claim IPK of Bruce Wayne. Though my lack of this bit of propositional knowledge, given its importance to the character of Bruce, will *limit* my IPK of him, it does not *eliminate* my IPK of him. What matters is the fact that we have interacted and that, in this way, I know him and I have accurate/veridical experiential knowledge of him through these interactions.

Notice also that one need not have exhaustive knowledge of a person to know a person. In fact, for IPK to exist at the lowest levels, one need only recognize the other person as a person and experience an interpersonal interaction with them. Then, coming to know a

person often results in a process that is cyclical in nature. One experiences interpersonal interactions with the person, learns propositional knowledge about the person as a product of those interactions, and the applies of that information to deepen IPK. In this way, levels of intimacy are established, strengthened, and deepened. Understood this way, propositional knowledge may play a critical role in deepening IPK; however, it is not clear that it can do so in the absence of further interpersonal interactions. Suppose I meet someone at a party but never interact with them again. Later, I read a great deal about them in a magazine. I might then want to say that the contribution of more propositional knowledge helps me to know them—or, at least, understand them—*better* in some ways. But I would not claim that my relationship with X had become more *intimate*. Going back to the earlier distinction made between people as objects of multifaceted propositional knowledge, one could know a body of propositional knowledge more or less well. However, IPK requires going beyond this into areas of intimacy—or, experiential knowledge of the person/the consciousness. Therefore, though propositional knowledge can play a significant role in deepening IPK by helping us process and understand our interpersonal experiences, it does not appear that it can do so in the complete absence of ongoing interpersonal interactions.

Perhaps Boër and Lycan discovered the best way to deal with this phenomenon with their insights regarding how people attain knowledge based on the purposes or projects of the knower, as described in chapter two. Just as it is possible to claim to know *who someone is* relative to certain projects,[140] so is it possible to claim to *know a person as a propositional object of knowledge* relative to certain projects. Therefore, based on my knowing of Bruce Wayne, I feel free to ask him to play tennis with me. However, I do not yet know him as Batman, so I do not feel free to ask him to beat up any bad guys. Bruce Wayne at this point is

[140] Boër and Lycan, 1986, p. 19

intentionally withholding his alter ego from me. So, there are some things I don't know about him. But, how is this any different from my knowing of anyone else? There will *always* be some facts I don't know about them. That does not mean I don't know them interpersonally. It simply means I don't know certain things about them propositionally, regardless of whether the facts are overlooked by me or hidden intentionally. Granted, some propositional facts do seem to be more important than others, and if the person I know is willing to be dishonest with me, I may take this fact as a reason to end the relationship. But, the existence of hidden information or even of a deceitful character does nothing to *eliminate* IPK—although it may do a great deal to limit IPK to lower levels. So, although I may come to feel I don't know Bruce Wayne very *well*, this does not mean I don't know Bruce Wayne *at all*.

Coming to know a person as an *interpersonal object of knowledge* could also be accomplished relative to certain projects. There might be, for example, someone I am actively seeking to meet relative to a certain secondary aim. For example, I might hear that the president of my company is going to be at a certain luncheon, so I maneuver myself into the seat next to her relative to the aim of climbing higher in my career. Or I may accept a blind date with someone for the purpose of discovering whether or not we are romantically compatible. Suppose that one of these people actively deceives me into believing they are something they are not—even to the point of undermining my original purpose for seeking them out. Perhaps the president of the company is actually an imposter and my blind date is already married. As in the Bruce Wayne case above, if I have interacted with this person, IPK has been established. The deceptions only serve to limit the depth of the level of IPK. They do not erase IPK altogether. In fact, once the deception is brought to light, I might even know them better than I would have. I now know they are people of deceitful characters and

this knowledge qualifies as part of knowing them as an object of propositional knowledge. This propositional knowledge can be used to evaluate and gauge my IPK of them up to this point, providing me with another perspective on the experiential knowledge gained through my interpersonal interactions with them. I may decide that my judgments about my IPK were inaccurate, and that I don't know them as well as I thought I did. But the experiences themselves and my memories of those experiences don't change (although I may now look back on them with negative rather than positive emotions). If I come to meet this person again, knowing them in this way puts me on a different, deeper level of IPK with them than I would be had I never met them at all. However, in this case, the IPK would likely be tinged with feelings of negativity.

What then does this show us about the veriticity of IPK? It shows us that, even in cases where there is intentional or unintentional deception regarding the propositional knowledge one has about another person, this cannot by itself eliminate IPK, once it has been formed. However, it may serve to limit the level of IPK to lower levels, create a quality of negativity between the persons involved, and/or eliminate any desire to pursue deeper levels of IPK. In this case as well, then, veriticity applies. This brings me to a third area of inquiry regarding how truth matters within IPK.

D. People Have Separate Minds/Consciousnesses

People are not objects of knowledge in the same way as facts are, in part, because we have unique perspectives on a situation due to the existence of a separate mind or consciousness. Two people who are good friends or even identical twins have differing perspectives and often have two completely different reactions to what others might deem the same situation. Because we have different consciousnesses and

different bodies, we also have different personal histories—memories and habits formed out of life experiences that have impacted and shaped our current personality and attitudes. No two people are exactly alike. However, as Townley asserts, we do have at least one means by which to gain some access or knowledge of the other person's subjective qualities. We do this through identifying with them, or through empathy.

In chapter three, I introduced the process of empathy as an important method by which IPK is experienced and developed. Cynthia Townley describes how it works:

> Knowing through empathy requires being a participant as well as an observer, interacting with the other person, responding to her, and developing understanding with her, not just observing and drawing conclusions about her. In other words, empathy demands that another agent be recognized as such, not merely observed from a disengaged point of view. It is knowing by being engaged with the person, listening to her express how she feels, taking it seriously and reflecting on it, and on one's own relevant experiences. Empathy requires a high level of sensitivity to one's own experience and position within the interaction. Empathic knowledge is not simply accurate descriptive knowledge about another person. When knowing through empathy, it is essential to consider the person known *as one with her own perspective*, not just with different information, and not as a person who, if she had the expert's information, would think about it in the same way (emphasis added).[141]

Townley tells us that "empathic knowledge" is not possible without recognizing the person as someone with her own perspective. Each of us is endowed with a separate consciousness with which we experience the world. When I engage in empathy, I must recognize that the other person has a unique point of view, and I use what I know about her circumstances, personality, and psychology to mentally picture myself *as her*—using my imaginations in combination with what I know of her to assume her point of view as closely as I can. Of course, no skill I possess will allow me to actually *become* her or literally

[141] Townley, 2006, p. 45

overtake her point of view, as in some weird brain or body-switching science fiction thought experiment we often find in the study of metaphysics. Still, skillfully performed empathy can yield deep understanding of how another person sees and judges the world, helping me to understand her reasons for reacting to various situations the way she does, even if I do not personally share her opinions. For example, a friend of mine doesn't trust men because of the abuse she has experienced at the hands of a few. By empathizing with her, I can certainly understand her reasons. I, of course, disagree that men, as a group, cannot be trusted. In fact, I could engage in the skill of empathy with someone and still maintain a great dislike for them.

Empathic knowledge is not, precisely, IPK. To say, "I know X" is not to say, "I understand her point of view."[142] Though these two kinds of knowledge may be linked or overlap in certain respects, to collapse the two would be to make a category mistake, given my analysis below. However, empathy is a very important channel through which one can gain knowledge about another person as well as experience a mental representation of what it *feels like* to be the other person. Since we share similar life experiences as members of the human species, we are capable of imagining how the other person thinks or feels about a given circumstance by "putting ourselves in their shoes," so to speak. It is knowledge of a feeling or perspective that arises, not merely from seeing the person's facial expression or from reasoning about what they must mean by their words, but from a conscious likening of our similar experiences to theirs and imagining ourselves as being that person and

[142] Townley does not provide us with a propositional statement that shows us precisely how empathic knowledge might be claimed. It could, perhaps, also be claimed as, "I can empathize," "I know what you mean," "I understand where you're coming from," etc. Whether the word 'know' or 'understand' is used here may be significant for someone conducting an in-depth study of empathic knowledge; however, for my purposes this subtlety need not trouble us, given my understanding that empathic knowledge is different in kind than IPK.

experiencing their situation. It is an act—something we do, and therefore, something we often do by conscious choice, and something that can be done with or without epistemic virtue[143]. That is to say that it can be done for the purpose of gaining accurate knowledge of and about the other person as who and what they are in reality and performed in such a way as to attain that goal, or it can be performed poorly by, perhaps, allowing a self-centered ulterior motive or a bias to undermine, cloud, or inhibit the process. For example, I might attempt to engage in just enough empathy to understand a person's point of view so that I can turn around and bash it. Or, my empathic process might be stunted because I am struggling to overcome certain prejudices (whether justifiable or not) against the person, such as when a Muslim man might try to empathize with a Jewish woman.

Empathy is a way to a deeper knowledge of the other person than we would gain by merely listening to a list of facts about them. We know how they feel about x because we are feeling it, too, vicariously. How accurate these empathic mental representations are depends on how skilled we are in empathy. Empathy, as a process that is very much like imagination, is also experiential. In this way we can, in a sense, vicariously *experience* the other person's point of view. By engaging in empathy about a person you already know, you can come to know the person *better*. Like propositional knowledge, empathic knowledge can push one's IPK to deeper, more intimate levels.

Admittedly, the differences between empathic knowledge and interpersonal knowledge may be difficult to distinguish. I have included a table below that shows some of the findings gathered from both my study in IPK up to this point and some of the findings regarding empathic knowledge borrowed from Townley.

[143] Here is one area of the study of IPK that overlaps with virtue epistemology.

Table: Empathic Knowledge vs. Interpersonal Knowledge

	Empathic Knowledge	Interpersonal Knowledge (IPK)
Acquisition	Produced by use of the cognitive *skill* of empathy: imagination/ personal identification.	Produced by experiencing interpersonal interactions.
Pre-Conditions	Must recognize that the other person has her own point of view.	Must recognize the other person as a person.
Metaphysics	This is both experiential knowledge and propositional knowledge. Contains both propositional and nonpropositional elements.	This is a type of experiential knowledge. It is nonpropositional.
Circumstances	Can be gained regarding someone the knower does not know.	Cannot be gained regarding someone the knower does not know. (This *is knowing* another person.)
Qualia	Admits of experiential qualia. Can be positive or negative.	Admits of experiential qualia. Can be positive or negative.
Produces	Produces nothing. (*Empathy* produces empathic knowledge.)	Propositional knowledge.
Quality	Admits of levels, dependent on how well the skill of empathy is applied.	Admits of levels, dependent on number and length of interactions, acquisition of empathic knowledge, acquisition of propositional knowledge, openness of both people involved, quality and value of the relationship, etc.
Veriticity	Yes, it can be accurate or inaccurate.	Yes, but it borrows its veriticity from the facts surrounding it: either one has experienced interpersonal interactions with the other person or not, one can report on one's knowledge accurately or not, and one's evaluations of the depth of the relationship can be accurate or inaccurate..
Propositional Statement	"I understand X's point of view."	"I know X."

As we can see, both kinds of knowledge admit of a variety of nuanced differences. In some ways they are quite similar, such as in their pre-condition. Empathic knowledge, according to Townley, requires that one recognize that the other person has her own point of

view, whereas for interpersonal knowledge, I have claimed that one must recognize the other person as a *person*. Both entail recognizing the presence of a separate mind/consciousness[144] and, for our purposes at least, these two may amount to the same thing. Furthermore, both kinds of knowledge admit of qualia, levels, and veriticity.

There are other ways these knowledge types differ. They are acquired differently and under different circumstances, they are metaphysically different, IPK produces other kinds of knowledge while empathic knowledge does not, and empathic knowledge is skill-based while IPK is not. However, perhaps the way the two are most obviously different is in how they are claimed. To claim IPK, one says something like, "I know X." However, this is not a claim of empathic knowledge. This is not saying, "I know how or why X thinks or feels such and such a way." However, empathy can be used within cases of IPK by allowing us to enter into a deeper and richer experience of the other person, helping us come to know the person *better* or *more intimately*.

In this way, empathic knowledge functions very much like propositional knowledge does in relation to IPK. Unlike propositional knowledge, empathic knowledge is, in part at least, experiential. Like propositional knowledge, it can serve as a means by which IPK achieves deeper levels. Accuracy—and, therefore, veriticity—applies to empathic knowledge and to whatever effect it has on IPK in that it can be accurate or inaccurate, dependent on how skillfully it is used. Since veriticity, then, applies to both propositional knowledge and empathic knowledge, which are both important ways IPK is deepened—that is to say, they both can be used to push IPK to deeper levels—the accuracy of these two kinds of

[144] Keep in mind, though, that it is not the case that the existence of a pre-condition entails the existence of or production of either kind of knowledge. The pre-condition may exist without the subsequent formation of either kinds of knowledge.

knowledge[145] determines whether or not we, in truth, know the person as well as we think we do.

Therefore, the fact that two separate consciousnesses are involved does nothing to undermine the fact that the knowledge gained through either interpersonal interaction and/or through empathy is veritistic. People can be known as objects of propositional knowledge (which is veritistic) as well as objects of interpersonal knowledge (the veriticity of which can be established in the same manner as we establish the veriticity of our experiences). The mere possibility that one can engage in empathy at all, as Townley asserts, implies that another point of view separate from our own exists and is recognized by us. Propositionally, one must know another person in point of fact in order to claim IPK even at the lowest levels. And, as the knowledge deepens through ongoing interpersonal interactions, one's evaluation of the depth of the relationship can be accurate or inaccurate. That is to say, one may know a person well or less well, one may believe one knows someone well who one does not, and one's judgments regarding one's experiential knowledge (IPK) may be affected positively or negatively as it is coupled with propositional or empathic knowledge in a way that truth and accuracy matter.

For example, it matters for my claim to know Bruce Wayne well, that when I discover he has an alter ego, I correctly learn that his alter ego is Batman rather than the Joker. For, upon discovery that he is Batman, the belief that my friend is a masked hero will meld more easily with what I already know of him. It might come as a surprise. I might feel I didn't know him as well as I thought I did, but I could certainly believe it, given what I already know of Bruce. In short order, my IPK would likely deepen as I think back and piece together memories of him that make sense with this new information. However, if I were told

[145] There may also be other kinds of knowledge that function with IPK in similar ways.

he was actually a psychopathic serial killer, this proposition would butt against everything I know of Bruce. Believing it would force me to reduce my claim to IPK down to the merest levels—as if he was only an acquaintance, or I might even find it impossible to believe at all—sending me into confusion and uncertainty.

Taking all three of the above considerations together, by comparing and contrasting the knowing of people as both objects of propositional knowledge and as objects of IPK, we discover the following: people are multifaceted as objects of propositional knowledge, but experiential knowledge can accommodate this multiplicity. Furthermore, propositional knowledge gained through and about one's IPK is veritistic and in this way, veriticity applies to IPK. By examining the fact that people withhold information either intentionally or unintentionally, we discover that even cases of extreme deception cannot eliminate IPK, but merely limit it to lower levels. IPK, as experiential knowledge, attaches to experiences of the consciousness of the other person. These experiences may yield accurate or inaccurate propositional knowledge, but the experiences themselves are what they are. Finally, by examining how people use empathy, we find that to the extent that empathy is performed skillfully and despite that two separate consciousnesses are involved, the knowledge yielded is veritistic. Truth matters in regard to our propositional knowledge. Moreover, though IPK is itself neither true nor false, truth also matters in that we know them and how well we know them.

Social epistemologist Alvin Goldman is very adamant that, in the field of social knowledge, neither our relationships with others nor the fact that knowledge is collective in nature (and, therefore, subject to certain subjectivities) should entail that the propositions themselves lack in veritistic value. Goldman complains,

> Mainstream epistemologists universally agree that knowledge implies truth, that knowledge is factive. If your belief isn't true, it isn't a piece of knowledge. Social constructivists, though they talk about knowledge, are characteristically dismissive or disparaging of truth. There are no facts, they maintain, only what is believed by this or that individual or community. For social constructivists, then, knowledge is simply what is believed, or at least what is communally believed.[146]

Goldman dislikes this attitude so much that he refers to social constructivists as *veriphobes*, because they "display an aversion or abhorrence of truth."[147] He goes on to point out the built-in contradiction between any so-called scientific study of a subject and a rejection of truth as an objective reality. "…[P]ersuasive rejection of truth cannot co-exist with their own scientific projects."[148]

However, Goldman would be happy to know that one need not appeal to relativism[149] to demand truth in all areas of knowledge—propositional and nonpropositional alike—despite their other differences and despite the semantic difficulties which may exist. With IPK, although it is nonpropositional, we do *not* want to claim that it is imaginary. There are certain facts we reference; for example, when I claim, "I know Becky," I am either telling the truth or I am not. Of course, I may have to clarify under what conditions, or for what purpose, or to what level of IPK I am referring, but within that context, the claim is either true or false. Also, the facts we learn through testimony produce a kind of propositional knowledge which is either true or false. Empathic knowledge of another person, dependent on how well it is performed, is either accurate or inaccurate. Additionally, our judgments regarding the depth to which we know someone can also be either accurate or inaccurate. Therefore, truth matters. It matters for any kind of knowledge. For propositional knowledge, what you believe must be (at least) true in order to qualify as knowledge. For

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[146] Goldman, 2009, p. 3
[147] Ibid
[148] Ibid, p. 4
[149] Ibid, p. 6

nonpropositional knowledge, the beliefs, understandings, and insights acquired through the experience or through participation in that interaction will either be accurate or inaccurate, veritistic or not veritistic.

III. Justification and IPK

One of the generally accepted conditions for propositional knowledge claims is that the belief involved be warranted or justified. For example, I may have the true belief that it is raining today, on my birthday. However, if I came by that belief by hearing a fortune-teller tell me twelve years ago that it would rain on this birthday and I have not verified the fact either by sight or hearing or by some other reliable means, I do not have knowledge. I have coincidence, at best. To have propositional knowledge, one's claim must be justified or warranted—that is to say, there must be some reliable means by which we can establish the truth of the claim. Although nonpropositional and propositional knowledge differ in many ways, this is one way in which they are alike. Both need to be justified in order to be accepted as knowledge. Interestingly, since IPK is an experiential form of knowledge and since its veriticity is, therefore, borrowed from the propositional knowledge that surrounds it, its justification also attaches to these same propositions.[150]

The justificatory process need not always be particularly rigorous for either kind of knowledge under normal circumstances, depending on the importance of the claim being made. In fact, some of the justifications we provide are quite subjective in nature. Consider introspection for a moment as a source of knowledge. If I were to claim, "I feel hungry," is this knowledge? Is it warranted belief? It is subjective in character. I have no way to prove it to anyone, but in most cases I would be credited with knowledge, regardless. As the "I" who

[150] Recall that the statement, "I know X" is itself a proposition. If this proposition is either untrue or unwarranted, the agent's IPK is likewise undermined.

inhabits this body, I have unique and sole access to certain propositional (and nonpropositional) truths regarding what it is like to inhabit this body. The fact of my feeling hungry, though it is a propositional fact, is not the sort of thing that is provable by any known means. However, I myself may have access to certain justifications, such as the aching feeling in my gut, remembering having skipped lunch, or hearing groaning coming from the depths. And, for most, even this limitedly accessible variety of warrant is enough to justify this particular knowledge claim.

Compare the warrant we grant ourselves for introspectively acquired knowledge with the warrant we claim regarding knowing another person. IPK, it seems, is much easier to substantiate. Most obviously, there is another person who can corroborate your claim to know them. And, usually, there are third parties who can also give testimony that they have observed the two of you engaging in interpersonal interactions on some level. This sort of testimony is easily admissible in court when it is important to establish the existence of relationships, such as whether or not there was communication between the suspect and the victim or between the main culprit and suspected accomplices. Consider, though, the non-transferable character of IPK—that is, I cannot pass along my knowing N to another person. Since IPK is based within an interpersonal relationship rather than within one individual, the way we go about discussing it or defending it will be different from the way in which we defend the facts we know. With the possible exception of "know how," which we may have to prove by performance in order to, for example, get a job in which adequate performance of that activity is required, other forms of nonpropositional knowledge are rarely defended. They are simply claimed and then credited as knowledge.

What is more likely to be defended or explained in the case of nonpropositional knowledge generally and in particular IPK is the *level* of our knowing. For example, if I say, "Yes, I know the checker at the grocery store," it is much more likely that I will be asked, "How well do you know her?" rather than challenged, "Prove it!" If my claim is true, I could most likely prove it, simply by walking over and having the checker corroborate my story. But, the question of "How well do you know her?" is likely to be motivated by a further purpose. Perhaps my interlocutor wonders if I know her well enough to convince her to go on a date with him. The question is then really the challenge for me to provide warrant for my IPK of the checker in the form of, "Do you know her well enough for the purpose of convincing her to go out with me?" The IPK is understood in this context to work both ways. To satisfy my friend, *I* have to have a sufficiently deep level of IPK of *the checker* to understand her personal situation and have the confidence to suggest that she date N, and *she* has to have a sufficiently deep level of IPK with *me* to trust that I would not set her up with a jerk. So, in this case and in most cases, the warrant I grant myself for my IPK is a feature of the couching of my IPK within a relationship and, as with self-knowledge gained through introspection, the knowledge is generally granted *ipso facto* as *existing*. The *level* of knowledge, however, may need further explanation or justification, which is easy enough to produce—at least, not any more difficult, in most cases, as proof of justification for propositional knowledge.

Let us now consider the question of knowledge transfer as it applies to the area of justification for IPK. With propositional knowledge, when we provide justification for what we know to another person, one of the expected results is that our hearer will not only credit us with knowledge, but will also come to know that information for themselves. For

example, if I provide proof or sufficient justification for the fact that I own a car, not only will they know that I know that I own a car, but they will themselves come to know that I own a car. In this case, our primary goal would be to transfer this particular piece of knowledge. We simply want them to come to know that I own a car; we do not consider the importance of whether or not they know that I know. That is assumed. However, with IPK, transference is neither an expectation nor a possibility. When I claim, "I know Becky," I am not expecting that, by providing proof of the fact, that my hearer will come to know her, too. In this case, we are only interested in that they know that *I* know her. They do not gain IPK through my justification of my IPK; they only gain another piece of propositional knowledge—knowledge of the fact that I know Becky.

However, although not all features of propositional justification, such as transference, are found in cases of IPK, that is no reason to believe that IPK is not justifiable. The argument above should suffice to show this; however, it might be helpful to add that, when I feel the need to evaluate my relationships (e.g., their depth or level of intimacy, my memories associated with them, whether or not the relationship is valuable to me or I to them), I do so in a variety of ways. I may review my memories of shared experiences or conversations, I may read old letters or discuss our interactions with a third person, or I may contact the person in question and talk things over with him or her. Although justification in the case of IPK is generally to establish *level of intimacy* rather than *fact of knowing* (since the fact of knowing may be insignificant in many cases), I do have at my disposal a variety of ways to do so. These ways will undoubtedly qualify for clinching entitlement[151] for myself concerning the level of intimacy as well as provide grounds for proper vouching to any third parties interested in the fact of the matter to the satisfaction of even the most hard-core

[151] Sosa, 2011, p. 72

empiricist. Furthermore, in the same way as IPK gains its veriticity by borrowing it from the propositional knowledge and facts which surround it, so too can it be verified or warranted by these same facts and propositions.

IV. Interpersonal Interactions

Given the interpersonal nature of IPK—being between persons—the *method* of obtaining IPK is of the utmost importance to our ability to justify that we have it. In chapter three I showed that I cannot, for example, claim to have interpersonal knowledge of Jane Austen from having read her books or studied her life story. I might say, "I feel like I know her," but this is not IPK. I might even convince myself, on some level, that I know Joan Cusack from having watched her movies and interviews, but if we have never actually interacted, that is not IPK. For propositional knowledge, this is less likely to be the case. My knowing that Joan Cusack is an actress is still knowledge, regardless of whether I heard it from a friend, saw her in a movie, or read about it in a magazine. However, for IPK, it is deeply important that the knowledge was acquired in the appropriate ways for it to count as IPK. This condition is built into the word *interpersonal*.

I have already argued for two conditions on IPK—one is the pre-condition that S recognize X as a person and the other is that S and X engage in interpersonal interactions with one another. Our working analysis up to this point in this study, then, is as follows:

(1) S has IPK of X iff S and X have engaged in interpersonal interactions.

However, the concern remains that this analysis may yet allow in cases that are clearly not cases of IPK. Recall that I admitted that it is possible for us to recognize a great many people we do not know as persons, such as people on TV. Furthermore, the idea of an "interpersonal interaction" is far too vague. Is attending the same party with someone, for example, an

interpersonal interaction, even if we do not speak or make eye contact throughout the event? If so, it might appear possible that, given analysis (1), that I could claim to know everyone who has ever attended any social event that I have; however, we intuitively know this is not true. So, we must ask: how *interpersonal* must the interaction be and how much *interaction* is necessary for IPK to be a result? These parameters are not, as of yet, clearly defined. Therefore, I will now spend some time defending the view that the interpersonal interactions cited in this analysis refer to interpersonal interactions that are personal and directed.

A. Personal

Something that is *personal* pertains to one individual, a particular person, as opposed to anyone else. It is about the "I" not the "we." An interpersonal *interaction* is one that is both focused on and stemming from individuals. Two separate "I's" are involved. However, even when two consciousnesses interact, each of them maintains their individuality, their privileged status in regard to their own perspectives, and their personal life experiences. Interpersonal interactions, though mutually experienced, are perceived from two separate points of view.

To say that IPK is acquired via an interpersonal interaction means that two individuals must participate in this mutual recognition of the other's personhood and subjective consciousness. This may be done in person, that is, in physical proximity to one another, or it may be done via written correspondence, or online chatting; however, the interaction must have the quality of being *from* and *to* the two individuals involved. For example, suppose I receive a letter from a person in China I have never met. She writes that she has a class assignment to find a pen pal from another country and she has chosen me and the letter is, in fact, addressed to *me*. Furthermore, I do recall signing up for this international

program, so there can be little mistake that her letter arrived at the intended location. At this point, I enter a stage of IPK formation with this Chinese girl. I might *feel* that I could claim a low level of IPK of her at this point, but due to the delay in communication, she could not yet claim to know me. Therefore, we are both locked in the IPK formation stage, having not *knowledge* of the other person, but something more like belief. From my perspective, I have interacted with her consciousness by reading her words that are *from* her and *to* me. From her perspective, she has simply sent out a plea to an unknown. She may *believe* that she is writing to a specific person (me) and, so, to the extent that her belief is a veridical recognition of me as a person, the pre-condition for IPK has been met. However, I may have died in the meantime, the name and address may be false, or her letter may have gotten lost in the mail. Only when I write her back and she reads my words *to* her is the IPK formation process complete.

As we know, IPK is formed through interpersonal interactions. However, as the pen pal case shows us, IPK formation is a process that may admit of time delays. Recall that interpersonal interactions are interactions of one consciousness with another and this experience provides experiential knowledge of, not only being seen by another, but of being seen and of seeing oneself through another's eyes. Although I am aware of my own reactions to receiving the letter and how I feel having the "eyes" of her consciousness upon *me*, I have not yet experienced *her* experience of my consciousness. Both people are still deprived of the full cycle of the interactive process. In fact, until she receives my letter to her and I receive a second letter in response, the cycle of conscious reciprocal experience is incomplete. Until a full cycle of communication is completed, the interpersonal interaction is still in process. In face-to-face meetings, this cycle usually happens with extreme rapidity. But when there is a

time delay caused by the method of communication or the presence of a mediator of some sort, the formation of IPK can be drawn out. Therefore, I think of this as a case of *IPK-in-formation*. What is important to recognize here is the lack of fulfillment. My Chinese pen pal will certainly sense this lack of fulfillment until she receives a letter in response, and this sense will likely even be present within me until I discover that she has heard from me as well. I liken this sense with the lack of being sure. At each stage in the communicative process, I become more certain that the interaction is a true interaction with another person. Therefore, were I to say, "I know X, but she doesn't know me," during this time delay, it would not represent a true case of knowledge, but rather of something more like belief. "I think I know X" or "I feel like I know X" or "I believe I know X" or "I'm getting to know X" may be more precise representations of this stage in the process of interpersonal interaction.

However, even when there is a time delay, as long as the interaction is eventually completed, there can be no question that IPK can be formed. Even when we meet someone face to face and talk in person, a short time delay may exist as I wait to hear how (or whether) my greeting was received. However, when I hear someone greet me, as soon as they have introduced themselves, I feel that I have come to know someone new, to a small extent, even before I tell them who I am. Even so, it is certainly plain that one can gain IPK through face-to-face meetings. Suppose, though, that someone comes up behind me and introduces himself to me while my back is turned. Before I can turn around, he is pulled away. I see the back of his head, but we never make eye-contact. The interaction here, like in the pen pal example, remains incomplete. However, even if eye contact was made, I cannot be completely certain that I know them until I have evidence that they, too, know me—until I respond or shake their hand or indicate some notice of them. Until the interpersonal

interaction is a full interaction *between* both persons, IPK remains in the formation stage. Therefore, it also seems clear that simply attending a party with someone would not be enough to qualify as an interpersonal interaction since there is no personal interaction of consciousnesses. The depth of the interpersonal interaction is dependent on the depth of the interactions of the consciousnesses. If the consciousnesses never interact, there can be no formation of IPK. Furthermore, the interpersonal interaction must be completed—fully experienced by both persons—for it to get beyond the formation stage.

B. Directed

An action is *directed* when it is intended for a particular individual and recognized as being received by that person. This qualification is intended to weed out cases of mistaken or hidden identity. For example, in Edmond Rostand's play *Cyrano de Bergerac*,[152] Cyrano, out of embarrassment over his oversized nose, is afraid to woo the beautiful Roxane, with whom he has fallen in love. However, he is enlisted to the aid of the handsome but vapid Christian, who is also in love with Roxane, to woo her on Christian's behalf. Cyrano woos Roxane in Christian's name in a variety of ways, such as writing beautiful letters and poems to Roxane, but signing Christian's name. Roxane believes the letters she is reading are directed at her from Christian, but, in fact, they are directed at her from Cyrano. Christian had almost nothing to do with it. So, though Roxane believes she is gaining interpersonal knowledge of Christian, she is not. To say, "I know Christian," based on the letters alone would be a false statement.[153] The interpersonal interaction is between herself and Cyrano, but this cannot yet qualify as knowledge, since she doe not know it is about—or personal to—Cyrano. To say, "I

[152] Rostand, Edmond. (2000) Cyrano de Bergerac. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc.
[153] In the actual play, Roxane had interacted with Christian previously, thus providing her with a low-level of IPK prior to the letter-writing ruse.

know Cyrano," would also be a false statement (assuming she had never interacted with him previously).

This almost appears to be a case of reversal—the interpersonal interactions are in progress; however, it is not clear that the pre-condition for IPK has been met: *S must recognize X as a person*. Roxane has not yet recognized *Cyrano* as a/the person within this context, but she certainly recognizes that the letters are coming from a *person*. The question then becomes, how important is it for the one to know the correct identity of person X[154] in order to recognize person X as a person?

The deception in this case is causing interference with the process of formation of IPK. Suppose, though, that we modify our example to remove the misdirection of Roxane's attention onto Christian by imagining that Roxane is simply receiving letters from a secret admirer. She has no idea who is sending the letters. At what point would Roxane say, "I know X," of her secret admirer? It is conceivable that Roxane, after having received several letters and recognizes that they are all coming from the same person, will eventually feel as if she knows this person—whoever he is. In fact, this is what eventually occurs in the play. However, as discussed in the section above, until the interaction is completed—until, that is, she is able to communicate back and knows that she is heard, this will be a case of IPK-in-formation. The deception is depriving her of fully participating in the interaction (she is a passive recipient), it is depriving the admirer of full participation as well (he has received no personal response from her), and it is thereby causing a time delay, and so the cycle of communication is incomplete.

Unlike the pen pal case, though, what is causing the time delay within Roxane's IPK formation process (concerning Cyrano) is a lack of directedness. The deception has

[154] See Boër and Lycan's conditions for knowing-who as described in chapter one.

misdirected her. She directs all of her beliefs about the writer of the letters, Cyrano, toward Christian. She *does* have a low level of IPK of Christian, of course; however, none of the letters contribute any additional propositional knowledge or experiential knowledge to her IPK of Christian—keeping her, in truth, at a very low level of IPK of him. Therefore, the *level* of her IPK (though not the *existence* her IPK) of Christian she vastly misjudges.

With regard to Cyrano, let us imagine that Roxane has had no prior connection with him at all until she receives her first deceptive letter from him. She does not even know he exists. To make our example stronger, let us also say that she even writes back to him multiple times, all the while thinking that Christian is the recipient of her epistles, when in fact Cyrano is reading them and responding. Can she come to have IPK of Cyrano in this case? What claims to knowledge does Roxane have? It does seem clear that she knows she is interacting with a *person*. She is also gaining a great deal of propositional knowledge about this person. However, if asked to state who she knows, she would say, "I know Christian," (which would be true of the existence of IPK but not to the level she would be intending to express with this statement). She would not say, "I know Cyrano." It does seem to matter, then, at least for our ability to make this paradigm claim, that Roxane must have some appropriately directed sense of the identity of X when she makes a statement of the sort, "I know X." Given our requirement that the interaction be interpersonal in nature, Roxane must be able to distinguish X from some other person. Interestingly, in the play, Roxane does eventually gain the ability to do so. What she learns of Cyrano does not, upon comparison, match up with Christian's character or personality. However, not until she is able to connect the letters with Cyrano does she know that she knows Cyrano. What is important to keep in mind, then, is that interpersonal knowledge is *knowledge*. It is veridical. It seems then that,

although Roxane had acquired a great many beliefs as well as some experiential qualia of Cyrano, until she was able to direct them onto Cyrano—recognizing the *person* within the personal—she lacked *knowledge*. She did not fully know *him*. Of course, all of this caught up with her in rapid fashion once she directed her beliefs onto Cyrano. Nevertheless, until that time the pre-condition for IPK had not been fully met and, therefore, her IPK was never able to escape the formation stage.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analyzed IPK according to how belief, truth, and justification apply. In our discussion of belief, we recognized that propositional knowledge plays a role as a pre-condition for IPK. This pre-condition is as follows: in order for S to be able to know X, S must first recognize X as a person. This recognition is a bit of propositional knowledge. If belief plays an integral role within propositional knowledge, it will be present by default within our pre-condition for IPK. For the same reason it will be present in all of our propositional knowledge claims about X that are produced through our IPK or developed in connection with it. Belief, then, is both a pre-condition as well as a product of IPK. However, given how belief attaches to IPK itself (e.g., "I know Becky" does not entail the truth of the claim, "I believe Becky"), it would be wrong to say that either propositional belief or knowledge is a *part* of IPK.

Next, I examined the truth condition as it applies to IPK by comparing and contrasting the knowing of people as both objects of propositional knowledge and as objects of interpersonal knowledge given each area of the following areas: people as multifaceted, people withhold information either intentionally or unintentionally, and people as bearers of a separate mind or consciousness. Each of these areas presents unique problems for the

attribution of veriticity to the claim of whether we can know a person. However, in each case I discovered that, where propositional knowledge applies its presence contributes veridicality, and in areas where experiential knowledge applies, these experiences can be judged either accurately or inaccurately—which also contributes veriticity to IPK. In cases where deception or misinformation exists, this lack of truthfulness or accuracy will limit IPK to lower levels. However, the having of an interpersonal experience even with a chronic liar does not negate base level formation of IPK itself as long as the pre-condition has been met and interpersonal interactions have transpired. Next, by examining how people can use empathy as a tool to vicariously experience the other person's point of view, we find that empathic knowledge is accurate dependent on the epistemic skill of the empathizer. Empathic knowledge is a kind of experiential knowledge that, like propositional knowledge, can be used in conjunction with IPK to push IPK to deeper levels. To the extent that empathy is performed skillfully and despite that two separate consciousnesses are involved, the knowledge yielded is veridical. Therefore, truth matters in regard to our propositional knowledge—what we know about them. Truth also matters in regard to our interpersonal knowledge—that we know them and how well we know them.

Next, I examined IPK in light of how it is justified and discovered that, despite that IPK is nonpropositional, our justificatory processes in regard to it are very similar and just as rigorous as for propositional knowledge. IPK *can* be justified and, if IPK *cannot* be justified, there is no reason to believe that we have it. However, interestingly, justification in the case of IPK is generally done to establish *level of intimacy* rather than *fact of knowing*. Both, though, can be justified using conventional means.

In the second part of this chapter, I examined the requirement of interpersonal interactions within our working analysis:

(1) S has IPK of X iff S and X have engaged in interpersonal interactions.

By providing the added conditions that these interpersonal interactions be of the sort that are both personal and directed, we narrow the scope in order to account for borderline cases, such as in cases where there is a time delay, mistaken identity, or misdirection. What we discover is that, even when there is a time delay, as long as the interaction is eventually completed, there can be no question that IPK can be formed. It is simply a case of IPK-in-formation. Cases of deception or misdirection also create a time-delay of sorts, causing the formation of IPK to be delayed. In the meantime, it is best described as either IPK-in-formation or of a case of interpersonal belief—where the belief pertains to certain *propositions* in connection with IPK—both the pre-condition and the propositional products of IPK. However, in neither case would we want to claim the presence of knowledge, since the claim of IPK cannot be justified at this point as veridical.

Based on the above, we can now extend our definition to the following:

(2) S has IPK of X iff S and X have engaged in interpersonal interactions that are personal and directed.

Chapter Five: What Is IPK?

In conclusion, this thesis has shown that IPK is nonpropositional knowing of another person acquired through personal and directed interactions within a relationship between two people. It is irreducible to propositional knowledge alone, and its character can be described as nontransferable, qualitative, pertaining to levels, veritistic, justifiable, and acquired through interactions between two people that are personal and directed. Specifically, my analysis of IPK is as follows:

> *S has IPK of X iff S and X have engaged in interpersonal interactions that are personal and directed.*

This analysis, of course, should be coupled with certain other clarifications of IPK's characteristics that we have learned through critical analysis. These are summarized below:

1. **IPK is nonpropositional and irreducible.** IPK cannot be reduced to knowledge of propositions alone, nor should it be confused with testimonial knowledge. Propositional knowledge is a pre-condition for IPK (i.e., one must recognize the person as a person) and IPK may then produce propositional knowledge; however, neither of these roles for propositional knowledge entails the reducibility of IPK. Furthermore, while an utterance of the sentence, 'I know Becky,' expresses a proposition made true by my IPK, that does not imply that the knowledge referenced is itself propositional.

2. **IPK is nontransferable.** IPK cannot be transferred to others. When we claim IPK of X to some third person Y, Y acquires second-order propositional knowledge (i.e., Y knows that we know X) rather than IPK (i.e., Y has IPK of X). This is because one must have an interpersonal interaction with X to have IPK of X, and that cannot be acquired by testimony

from someone else. This is another point of difference between IPK and propositional knowledge.

3. **IPK is associated with certain qualia.** Qualia exist within IPK, i.e., a certain understanding of "what it is like." These qualia arise from the experience of the other individual. Qualia cannot be explained or understood propositionally; they must be experienced to be known.

4. **IPK admits of levels.** IPK is never exhaustive. It admits of levels of intimacy. However, even partial knowledge of the propositional knowledge associated with an experience does not negate full knowledge of the experience itself. Propositional knowledge, empathic knowledge, and experiential knowledge can all serve to push IPK to deeper levels; however, further interpersonal interactions are also necessary to deepen IPK.

5. **Belief and Propositional Knowledge Are Associated with IPK, But Are Not *Part* of IPK.** Belief and propositional knowledge are necessary for IPK, such as within the pre-condition, within any propositional knowledge produced by IPK, and within the propositional claim to have IPK. However, neither are a part of IPK itself. IPK-in-formation is a state that is *like* belief in that this stage does not yet qualify as knowledge (i.e., one does not have the right to be sure); however, it should not be thought of as perfectly analogous to belief as it relates to propositional knowledge since this stage exists, rather, in connection with experiential knowledge.

6. **IPK is veritistic.** As truth applies to propositional knowledge, so does it apply to any propositional knowledge connected with IPK, such as the pre-condition and any propositional knowledge produced by IPK. Thus, falsehood of the pre-condition undermines an IPK claim. Furthermore, the formation of IPK requires actual interpersonal interaction;

claims of IPK are false if one has not had such an interaction with the mentioned individual. One's misunderstandings or misinterpretations do nothing to undermine the *existence* of IPK so long as one satisfies the analysis above, but inaccuracy and falsehood could do a great deal to *limit IPK to lower levels*. In this way, though nonpropositional, IPK borrows its veriticity from the state of the world and from the propositional knowledge that is in connection with it.

7. IPK can be justified. The level of IPK, rather than the fact of IPK, is generally what is justified. However, despite that IPK is nonpropositional, both the existence of IPK and the level of IPK can be substantiated by more vigorous methods. These methods are the same basic methods we would employ for the justification of propositional knowledge (e.g., perceptions, empirical evidence, corroboration, etc.).

8. IPK is acquired through interactions between two people that are personal and mutually directed. A key feature of IPK is the method by which it is acquired. Without interactions that are personal and directed, IPK cannot be created. Furthermore, when the cycle of interpersonal interaction is delayed or interrupted, IPK cannot escape the formation stage.

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Appendix: Applications and Suggested Areas of Further Study

Interpersonal knowledge is foundational. It begins in infancy and forms the framework and conditions for the acquisition of other kinds of knowledge. Our relationships, when healthy, contribute to both the possibility and the quality of life we seek. For these reasons, the study of IPK has broad applicability, not only for philosophical study, but for other areas of study as well. For example, understanding issues pertaining to IPK is likely to aid interdisciplinary research, given the human dynamic inherent in such collaborations, even when the primary aim of the research or project is not directly related to IPK. What we know about IPK could be addressed as either the object of study within varying contexts or it could be used as a gauge by which to evaluate aspects within other areas of research. Below I discuss two philosophical areas of study (viz., testimony and virtue epistemology) and two non-philosophical areas (viz., information technology and testimony) where the study of IPK could yield interesting insights. My purpose here is not to conduct an extensive study of the applicability of IPK within these areas, but to propose a few possibilities for further application of the work conducted in this thesis.

I. Testimony

Within any interaction involving the transfer of knowledge or beliefs via testimony (e.g., conversations, emails, letters, text books, history books, newspaper articles), trust plays a crucial and integral role.[155] If you cannot trust the source of the testimony (i.e., the testifier himself/herself) as either knowledgeable or trustworthy, neither can you trust the propositions themselves.[156] This phenomenon is applicable not only to individual instances of

[155] Townley, 2006, p. 41
[156] Russell, 1948, p. 190-191

knowledge transfer, but to knowledge transfer on the grand scale.[157] Humans are social beings, and this fact of nature often underscores how we acquire knowledge of varying kinds.

Currently, critical analysis of testimony and testimonial knowledge features objective standards and goals which adhere in the individual rather than in the relationship itself, such as individual knowledge acquisition, positive reasons for believing (such as an individual hearer's already held relevant background information), and/or whether or not psychological defeaters exist that do not necessarily include IPK or reference to trust between persons.[158] While there is certainly nothing wrong with garnering a better understanding of how individuals acquire knowledge via testimony, a consideration of the inherent social dimension provided in cases where IPK is involved might elucidate further epistemic truths regarding the transfer and acquisition of testimonial knowledge. Therefore, it might be interesting to consider whether testimony is more or less trusted in cases where IPK is involved versus cases where IPK is not involved or is a step removed. Then we might also ask whether trust in testimony, if motivated by IPK alone, is epistemically virtuous. For example, if it happens that I am more inclined to trust a friend's word over a stranger's word, even in the face of evidence that my friend may not be trustworthy in this area, what can this teach us about the power of IPK as it pertains to testimonial knowledge or belief?

II. Virtue Epistemology

Virtue epistemology combines elements of epistemology and ethics. One epistemologically relevant ethical concern arises when people are sources of information—we may be tempted to forget or fail to acknowledge their intrinsic value as unique, individual human beings with their own sets of perspectives, desires, and goals. Townley suggests that

[157] Anderson, 1995, p. 53
[158] For a discussion in which these topics feature, see Lackey and Sosa 1999.

when we objectify people and treat them instrumentally, as opposed to as ends in themselves, we not only endanger their personal well-being but we disrupt the *method*, or the channel, through which we are hoping to learn.[159] Momentarily setting aside the moral or ethical concerns raised, Townley is here concerned with the *epistemic* dangers this self-centered attitude creates. By devaluing the people, we cut ourselves off from them as sources of trustworthy information—perhaps even *important* information. For example, suppose I visit an indigenous people and think myself superior to them due to my possession of technology. They warn me that a flood is coming and offer to teach me how to figure out the weather patterns using natural means. However, my instruments show no rain in the forecast, so I tell them to shove off and I pitch my tent along the river. As I am washed away, clinging to a log, I realize my mistake. Of course, by then it is too late. People can be incredibly important sources of information as well as guides for acquiring new epistemic skills; however, if they are devalued, we may cut ourselves off from both.

It is important to note that virtue epistemologists view knowing as an act—an act which can be done either skillfully or poorly. Generally, epistemologists in this area focus on propositional knowledge; however, propositional knowledge affects IPK and IPK can function as an important source of propositional knowledge. Therefore, we might ask, in what way does IPK affect the virtuosity of our epistemic practices and, conversely, in what way might virtue epistemology inform how we evaluate IPK? Is IPK something that can be acquired or maintained in a virtuous or non-virtuous way? If so, what standards should we strive to fulfill in order to have better IPK? What would a "better" IPK look like? How do we avoid treating people instrumentally and protect our human relationships, both for their own sake and for the information they provide?

[159] Townley, 2006, p. 39-40

III. Information Technology

Interpersonal relationships and the way people go about them are changing drastically today with the advent of social networking. We now distinguish friends from "Facebook friends," for example. Now we can be "friends" with people we've never met. You can add a "friend" on Facebook and then never communicate with them in that arena or in any other. As our communication styles change, so do our relationships. People in ancient times only communicated face-to-face or via a personal messenger. Then they began writing down their messages on pieces of broken pottery, clay, or parchment. Now we use phones, videos, and the internet. How do these changes affect how we understand IPK? Who are our *real* friends? Who do we claim to know? Do we know someone better or less well if our interpersonal interactions with them are mediated by technology? Consider also corporate relationships that are highly affected by information technology as well as by social networking. Is IPK involved in this sort of setting? If so, to what degree and between whom? How might this affect group social dynamics? In what ways has today's information technology and social networking aided or damaged the ways in which we gain IPK and the value we place on it?

IV. Theology

One of the most interesting ways the study of IPK might be applied is in the area of theology, in which there great interest in discovering what it means to know God or a god. Theoretically, if God is a person—or, at least, a being that has characteristics that allow him to interact with people in a way that is personal and directed—then, there should be no reason, in principle, to deny that we could have IPK of and with God. Some questions might be: What sorts of interactions with an unseen being could qualify as being personal and directed? Can we know that these supposed interactions are coming from God and are not

being imagined or produced by people? What kinds of justifications could serve to establish the veriticity that these interpersonal interactions are occurring or have occurred? How do we communicate with God and know that He is receiving our communications? If we can know God, what does this imply regarding our lives as humans?