

I have confirmed (from In Kant's Schriften:
Kant's Werke, vol. 3, pg 87, Berlin: Druck und
 Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911) that the
 translation of Kant's tables is accurate and
 That modality is indeed positioned in opposition
 to Quantity in the table -

Some notes from I. Kant, "A new exposition of The
 first principles of metaphysical knowledge,"
 in Kant's Later Writings: Translations, Commentaries,
and Notes, L.W. Beck, et. al., New York: Peter Lang
 Publishing, 1986 (This is Kant's Thesis talk)

In Proposition IV, Kant says, "To determine
 is to affirm a predicate in conjunction with
 The exclusion of its opposite." Kant gave this
 This in 1755 at age 31. This demonstrates that
 his pre-occupation with "opposites" dates back to
 his earliest days. He ~~was~~ also showed his concerns
 for unity & necessity thru out this Thesis.

^{From} ~~By~~ his proposition X, Kant derives his later
 "logical consequence" that, "The amount of absolute
 reality in the world is not subject to alteration
 either through increase or decrease."

Proposition XII contains the seeds of Kant's later "law of community": "Substances are capable of change only to the extent that they are connected with other substances, their reciprocal dependence determining the mutual change of state."

Some notes from H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1936.

~~H Judgment uses, for the purpose of knowing the object,~~

- Paton's definition of what Kant means by 'category': "A pure concept of the necessary synthetic unity which is present in every object of experience." (vol. I, chap XII, pg 258).

The category is not limited to be a concept only of an object in general but as a concept of synthesis in general. To be so used, the categories must be schematised. (ibid)

- Time and space are extensive quantities (chap XIII, pg 275)

- Paton's Thoughts on "what gets united" in specific judgments (chap XIV, pp 281-
 - a) categorical unites S-P
 - hypothetical } oppr. He stopped at
 - disjunctive } categorical.
-

Enough of Paton. He's not helping. Back to Kant and the Axioms of Intuition (pg 175+)

In the proof of the Axioms, Kant begins by talking about a "synthesis of the manifold" where representations in space and time are generated; this he puts as a synthesis of the whole form of the intuition from "pieces". Parts are brought together into the whole.

The whole proof seems to turn around the notion that we're synthesizing (thru geometry?) the "whole picture," that this picture is a unity of parts, and thus Intuitions have extensive Quantity.

Composition is synthesis of a manifold where the parts do not necessarily belong to each other. In this case, the manifold is intuition \Rightarrow content
 \therefore Quantity is our class w/ the Axioms
 (are the "axioms" of intuition geometry?)
 { on pg 178, Kant comes close to saying }
 { at least some of them might be! }

Anticipations of Perceptions

Perception involves sensations, i.e., are unpure. They contain the "materials" for an object. and the "real" of sensation.

The quantity of sensation is not an objective representation so this ~~quantity~~ quantity is intensive quantity.

Every sensation can increase or decrease (even disappear). The quality of sensation is empirical & cannot be represented a priori. What I think his whole boring, meandering, aimless "proof" is all about here is that the a priori side of the anticipations is the synthesis between ~~the~~ reality and negation of reality and intensive quantity (degree) is the unity of that synthesis. In this case, though, we are handed the content (sensation) and must go "backwards" to arrive at reality and negation. We are again dealing with parts not necessarily belonging to each other in a mathematical character, so this is composition. On the other hand, the unity of this synthesis is continuity, ~~it is~~ ^{the} ~~same~~ This synthesis is a priori and makes an "abstraction of its empirical quality" and so is therefore a form. (pg 185)

The anticipation of a perception is continuity which is a degree of reality.

It is worthwhile to stop every few hours and remind myself of what it is I'm trying to do. I'm working under the following hypothesis:

- 1) Kant began w/ a 2LAR model based on synthesis of an analytic of opposites;
- 2) and, he picked The Particular 2LAR from some "supreme principle"; I'm currently postulating it was form-content and connection-composition;
- 3) That he used this 2LAR to identify four classes (heads) of judgment
- 4) and that he identified what these judgment functions were from his four principles.

So far, it is conceivable the first two principles as analyzed in CPR are consistent w/ this picture.

It is possible Kant was a genius of the "magician" category, that he obtained some great leap of insight, and - having built his system from the consequences of that insight - found thru analysis that it had the correct philosophical credentials to be a philosophy.

What I'm trying to do is to recreate Kant's construction as 1) general 2LAR; 2) derivation of judgment type from principles; 3) comprehend just what each specific type of judgment is judging.

Back to the action: Analogies of experience

Experience is an empirical cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. But this means experience is a synthesis not contained in ~~the~~ perception and, therefore, is a formal.

Furthermore, ~~this~~ this synthesis must ~~write~~ "contain the synthetical unity of the manifold of perceptions." Synthetical unity must have the character of necessity and so is a connection. \therefore (++) is Relation

Kant even goes on to say this is relation and, as perceptions are contingent, the relations must relate the 3 moduli of time: permanence, succession, and coexistence. The analogies themselves are metaphysical principles.

This is the first overt proof of having to have a triad - (on pg 190 he has pertinent comments viz. The postulates as well.)

The 1st analogy ~~is~~ concerns Substance and the object in itself (as phenomenon). It \therefore corresponds to the unity of the synthesis (i.e., ++x)

The 2nd analogy concerns cause-and-effect w/out succession in time. He states, "it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event

There be found the condition of a rule.

The event itself is the conditioned and

The rule is the condition. When I say "sunlight warmed the rock" this is a hypothetical judgment of the event and therefore corresponds to the condition ~~(+)~~

Under Pg's notation, this would be $(+++)$.

The 3rd analogy deals with community. Kant says "a category of the reciprocal sequence... is requisite to justify us saying the reciprocal succession... has its foundation in the object." This seems to deal w/ the event and is \therefore the condition.

One trouble here is I don't see anything in this that leads from the category of community to the disjunctive judgment. The disjunctive says $p \vee q$ (but not both). The only thing that might do this is $(p \text{ and } q \text{ co-exist}) \vee \sim(p \text{ and } q \text{ co-exist})$

summarizing:

Substance $(++x)$

Cause $(+++)$

Community $(++-)$

Postulates of Empirical Thought

The modality do not pertain at all to the object ^{itself} ~~and, hence are free of content and therefore~~ but only pertain to its relation to the faculty of cognition. They \therefore relate content to connection and are \therefore (-t). They tell us how content is to be interpreted;

~~The 1st postulate deals w/ Possibility.~~
Kant says, "The categories of modality
 The 1st postulate deals w/ possibility and relates to agreement w/ intuition and conception. ~~The~~ "Criterion of character of possibility" is found only "in the synthesis" which implies it stems from the conclusion ~~of the~~ or unity of the judgment. If so, possibility is (-+X)

The 2nd postulate concerns the reality of material of sensation. However, Kant's discussion here veers off into a criticism of Descartes and Idealism, w/o really saying much directly about his own Theory. It is not possible to glean from CPR in this section if Existence is condition or conditioned.

Kant does say ~~to~~ in his discussion of the 3rd postulate (necessity) that given experience is condition and that

"nature ... is conditioned", This seems to suggest

Existence is condition (-++)

Necessity is conditioned (-+-)

Gathering the analogies & postulates together under the convention

unity : x

condition : +

conditioned : -

we have


Substance	(++ x)	?	(++-)
cause-effect	(+++)	?	(+++)
community	(+-)	?	(++ x)
Possibility	(-+ x)	?	(-+-)
Existence	(-++)	?	(-++)
Necessity	(-+-)	?	(-+ x)

Now, it strikes me as extremely strange that Quantity and Quality have no similar explicit 3-way "rule" to determine what is unity, what is condition, and what is conditioned. It is also strange that Kant mentions at least twice in CPR and PRO that the 3rd categories ~~are~~ "arise from the combination of the first two." This would make Totality, Limitation, Community and Necessity the unities of a synthesis and not the substance & the Possibility. These doubts are reflected in Green above

It may be that Kant really did derive the "functions of the unity in judgments" first. His main Thesis Thruout CPR is "The totality of the a priori cognition of the understanding" and he speaks of the need for the table of elementary a priori concepts to "fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding" [CPR pp100-101].


Assuming Kant used the postulated fundamental 2LAR,

Relation form, connection
(++)




the previous analysis shows we can logically associate the 4 "heads" with these positions.

Kant also would have known each synthesis calls for 3 ~~judgments~~ elements: condition, conditioned, and unity



Quantity and Quality would have been obvious to him



and he would have used the axioms and the anticipations to put the content into Quantity and the ~~form~~^{composition} into Quality. (as well as the composition).

He probably would have had a very good idea going into this about modality because Aristotle provided that particular "category." He would have needed the Postulates to supply the content here but the connection comes from formal logic.

Relation is entirely metaphysical and Kant would have needed the Analogies to define the 3 momenta and to specify the connection. The form would come from general logic. He would have gotten his metaphysics from his earlier work.