

(49) Is there a missing element?

I think there may be a missing element in Kant's system insofar as it is viewed as a theory of the thought process. At no point in Kant's architectonic is there an interrogative. The Kantian judgments all begin with "I think." Where, in this system, does "the question" fit in? Where is the "why?"?

Of course, "the why" might be part of the motivator. Something in the process of reason must serve as an ordering element determining the subject matter of thought. After all, it is clear we do not think about everything all at once. In at least my own case, I think of things one thing at a time.

Kant lists for the "supreme principle":

1. The universal condition of all our judgments is that they do not contradict themselves (A149/B189)

Kant holds this as "the universal and fully sufficient principle of all analytical knowledge" (A151/B190)

2. "Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience." (A157/B196)

Kant holds this as "the supreme principle of all synthetical judgments."

These principles come into play during the process of the understanding but the subject matter of a judgment must be determined prior to the selection of the premise. What determines this? It is possible that the vague notion of "free will" enters the debate at this point. Is there a "free will"? If there is, I see no way to mechanize it. ~~One it has~~ If it is mechanized, it is no longer free?

Kant does discuss the "determining ground" of the "ultimate end" of pure reason (A802/B830). This is centered on three questions:

1. What can I know?
 2. What ought I to do?
 3. What may I hope?
- } (A804/B832)

Perhaps there are enough, but, on the other hand, is there a "why, what, who, when, where, or how" question laid at the beginning?

of each judgment "circle"? This bears exploring.

Hant does a marvelous job of describing the process of the understanding in the Transcendental ^{Analytic} Logic. His description of the process of reason is primarily described in the Transcendental Dialectic but, in this section, he seems to devote most of his effort to the larger issues of philosophy. What I need to clarify at this point is the nature of the regulation of the understanding by the reason.

It is all well enough to describe a "big picture" in terms of the laws of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms. It is altogether another problem to describe the regulative structure which identifies which concept is to be broken into species and how large a heap of specification is needed before we no longer have a continuity of form. (P442/A657/B685).

How is this to be accomplished? Our problem is the identification of the concepts which are to be analyzed for similarity under the principle homogeneity, analyzed ~~for classification into sub-species~~ for differences leading to classes of species under the principle of variety, and tested for continuity of form under the principle of affinity.

A possible approach can be hypothesized from Hant's discussion of the hypothetical employment of reason (P436/A646/B674), (P437/A648/B676). Hant describes a process (of homogeneity) in which empirical concepts are analyzed to produce an idealization under which these concepts are subsumed. He refers to this ideal form as a "fundamental power." As a fundamental power successfully unites more and more "lesser powers," it becomes established as the criterion of truth.

Now, these "powers" being united under ^a the fundamental power must possess some common attribute or attributes since the principle of homogeneity is based on similarities. One fundamental attribute of a low-level empirical concept is its relation (substance, cause/effect, or community). These three categories, however, are the primitive concepts of the pure understanding (P86/A80/B106). As such, they are themselves the end product of a process of generalization under the principle of homogeneity.

(46) For instance, cats, dogs, men, wind, sunshine, and so forth are objective concepts of "things"; substance is what they are deemed to have in common. Kant points out that we would have no reason to suppose these things have anything in common were it not for a pure concept of reason (a "transcendental idea") which predisposes us to believe that they do.

A like argument can be put forth regarding concepts classified as "causes" or for the very special class of "causes conjoined with substances" which is called the relation of community (P88/B110).

So, we may postulate that the selection of concepts to be united under a ~~fundament~~ fundamental power must share similar rules in the formation of judgments. But "substance, cause, and community" are too abstract to permit an immediate and obvious selection process to be stated. Rather, it makes much more sense to begin at a construct level which is more familiar in everyday experience, devise some rules, and attempt to generalize from there.

Now, human beings use language to convey thoughts and concepts and language is composed of sentences. Sentences have structure. It therefore seems clear that an analysis of sentence structure must contain and provide a model of thought structure.

I am not referring to grammar. ~~The~~ Different languages contain different rules of grammar. However, all languages must and do contain the same primitives (nouns, verbs, etc.). Analysis of any real language (English, for instance) must therefore provide clues from which we may be able to solve the problem at hand.

My own next step is clear. I must undertake some research on English sentence structure, see if I can obtain the necessary connection between this structure and the categories of relation (and perhaps the others as well), and attempt to derive a system under this "language ~~to~~ postulate". This may, in fact, lead to the "definition of the categories" which Kant omitted in the CPR (P87/A82/B108) and perhaps even the derived concepts (or predicables) ~~to~~ (P86/A80/B106) required for a complete system.

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On Categories and Derived Categories

I've been studying sentence structure. It's clear to me I'm on the right track w/ this activity because I did not have to go very far before a host of very fundamental questions came to the fore. Here are some notes on where my thinking is at present.

First of all, the most fundamental form of a sentence is a subject combined with a verb

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This form structure is called a "predication." It has four basic forms:

1. The subject does something
2. The subject exists
3. The subject is re-named or described
4. The subject is acted upon.

In these forms, the verb clause V assumes the role of the predicate. It is not inappropriate to jot down some very fundamental definitions at this point.

Predicate: Any expression that is capable of ^{connecting} ~~linking~~ with one or more singular terms to make a sentence.

From this springs a host of very fundamental philosophical terms. Here are some relevant ones.

Predicable (praedicabilia) Lat. what can be predicated: The things that can be said about an object.

Aristotle classified the predicables in four families:

1. Definitions

2. Genus: A class of things that share the same character but divide into different subclasses or species. The genus summum is the most inclusive genus and does not (cannot) itself serve as a species in another more general class. To define per genus et differentiationem is to cite the genus and differentiated species to which a thing belongs.

3. Proprium: Any property belonging to all and only things of a certain kind but not part of their essence. Example: wearing clothes is a proprium of human beings (if we rule out people who dress their dogs in clothes!)

4. Accident: A property possessed by a thing but which is no part of the essence of the thing: something a thing could gain or lose without ceasing to be the same thing or substance.

Aristotle divided the "accidents" into "categories"

a) Quantity

b) action: place in the causal order or the ability to affect things or be affected by them

c) Quality

d) Space

e) Time

f) Relation

In scholastic philosophy, "quantity" is the way a body is made up of other bodies and how it owes its extension to theirs. This meaning of "Quantity" is clearly what Kant had in mind in his use of the term.

The correctness of making Aristotle's crisp distinction between "definition" and "proprium" has been the source of long debate in philosophy. To Aristotle, Nature itself draws real distinctions which define what a thing is and that these distinctions are neither arbitrary nor subjective. To Aristotle, "Socrates is a man" is a "real" definition whereas "Socrates is wise" merely describes one of his attributes.


To Kant, this distinction is untenable for a "true" definition requires us to know the noumena - which we can not do. Kant's system is wholly different from that of Aristotle. It is worthwhile to review the steps in Kant's process.

First, Synthesis is "The process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their multiplicity in one act of Knowledge" (P84/A77/B102). In order to accomplish this, we must be given, in the case of a priori knowledge of all objects,

1. The manifold of pure intuition;
2. The synthesis of this manifold through the imagination, and;
3. The a priori concepts which give unity to this synthesis

These a priori concepts are what Kant calls The Categories.

At the beginning of experience, the only predicables which are possible are those uniting the representations of intuition with the a priori concepts. The categories are primitive and Kant arranges them as



Note: An agent is one who acts; A Patient is one who is acted upon.

In the critical idealism philosophy, the Categories is the genus summum of all a priori knowledge and the 12 "momenta" are the species which make up this genus. For any given category, e.g. unity, it is then permissible to divide the genus of that category into species. Kant calls the result of doing so the derived a priori concepts. He provides an ~~an~~ incomplete set of examples (P86/A80/B106):

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Causality

—	Predicable of Force
—	" " Action
—	" " Passion

Community (or reciprocity)

—	Predicable of the Presence
—	" " Resistance

Modalities

—	Predicable of Origination
—	" " Extinction
—	" " Change

Here we face a seeming contradiction in the CPR. Kant is very explicit that only the 12 primitive concepts constitute the "original pure concepts" (P85/A79/B104). However, the derived concepts are also a priori concepts and we do not know their number or even if, logically, this number can be finite. Kant says their derivation "may be easily executed by anyone who will refer to the ontological manuals" (P86/A80/B106), and that for a "complete system of transcendental philosophy" this task must be carried out.

Does this mean we are faced with the task of having to generate a complete set of "wired in" a priori subcategories before our work can advance another step? ~~Do we~~ How do we even know ~~that~~ such a process is finite?

The first of the questions above is critical. (The second is critical if and only if the answer to the first question is "yes").

Now do we (how can we) proceed from here? This is where the study of sentence analysis comes in. The categories of the understanding must be capable of yielding up predications by the very definitions of "synthesis" and "predicate." Therefore, if the Kantian architectonic is complete and correct, we should be capable of mapping the sentence analysis of any natural

language on to it. If we can do so without the subcategories, then the subcategories are superfluous (although perhaps handy) in constructing a logical system. If we can not, then it will be a long year!

Now, from the sensibility we are given ~~on~~ knowledge of some particular intuitive relations, to wit (P65/A49/B66):

- 1) Place in an intuition (extension);
- 2) Change of place (motion)
- 3) "laws according to which this change is determined" (moving forces)

I speculate that it is from these 3 relations of the intuition that we may undertake a very fundamental operation, namely, drawing a distinction between objects and actions. This we must be able to do if we are to have any hope of cognizing action verbs.

I must also confess that, while (1) and (2) above have meaning which I find obvious, the meaning of (3) is quite unclear to me. This intuitive relation seems to be that of "force" but, obviously, one cannot see, hear, smell, or taste a force.

~~It~~ It follows that the intuitive relation (3) must arise from the tactile senses. If this is so, a reasoning agent must be equipped with tactile sensations if the concept of "force" as a causal agent of motion is to be possible.

[We can, of course, derive a "force" subcategory and put this in ourselves in specific applications; the important point here is the possibility of such a concept arising solely through the operation of synthesis, i.e., intuition \rightarrow imagination \rightarrow Categories].

This brings me to another of those delightful little seeming-contradictions the CPR is so amply equipped with: The use of the categories. In the *Analytic of Concepts*, Kant states the following (P107/B146):

- 1) "In knowledge there are two elements: the concept whereby an object is thought (category), and; the intuition whereby an object is given";
- 2) "The pure concepts of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions a priori, produce knowledge only in so far as the a priori can be applied to empirical intuitions";

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3) "Consequently the categories do not, even by means of pure intuition, afford us any knowledge of things; they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition";

4) "Consequently, Their application to objects of experience is the only legitimate use of the categories."

Why do I call this a seeming contradiction? In (P86/A80/B106) Kant tells us we may derive pure subcategories by combining the categories with the modes of pure sensibility [(1), (2), and (3) of pg 51]. However, since the subcategories are "pure," they are, by definition, divorced from the empirical. Therefore, they are not "objects of experience." Therefore, the use of the categories in deriving them contradicts (4) above.

I believe this truly is a contradiction. Kant himself never attempted it in the passages (1) → (4) quoted above do not appear in the A edition (1781) of The CPR. These passages appear only in the B edition (1787) which implies Kant had re-thought the role of his categories in the intervening years.


If this is indeed the case, then it is wholly welcome news because it would make "pure" subcategories a fiction. All subcategories would then become empirically-based and, hence, derived dynamically through experience.

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On The Schematism of The Pure Concepts

In the previous entry, the linkage between sentence analysis, as predication, and Kant's categories as pure predicables was discussed. Next we must take a look at how sentence analysis compares with Kant's schematism (P142/A136/B175) - (P148/A147/B187). Kant's system requires a means by which sensible intuitions may be subsumed under the categories. The problem being addressed is this: The representation of an object subsumed under a concept must be homogeneous with that concept; this means the concept must contain that which is represented in the object. However, the categories are pure concepts which contain no element of intuition. It follows that the intuitions themselves do not equate to the representation of them given to the understanding.

Instead, there is some mediating representation which lies between the intuition and the understanding which serves to transform sensible representations presented it on the one side to intellectual representations on the other. Kant calls this the Transcendental Schema.



Kant assigns the task of carrying out the schematism to the Imagination. He arrives at the conclusion that the schemata "are nothing but ~~a~~ a priori determinations of time according to rules" (P146-147/A143-145/B183-185).

Since these determinations must follow the arrangements dictated by the categories, the schemata must relate ~~to~~ every object to time in the following fashions:


- 1) objects related to the series in time;
- 2) ~~objects~~ objects related by content in time;
- 3) ~~objects~~ objects related by the order in time, and;
- 4) objects related ~~to~~ to the totality in time with respect to all possible objects.

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This conclusion regarding the schemata is sufficiently opaque in its presentation to warrant a different way of trying to exemplify it. Grant that "to think" is, in one instance, to affirm a predicate ~~the~~ to a subject. This is identical, then, to being able to form a sentence (a predication). A predication conjoins a subject with a verb

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Now, it is universally true, in any human language, that a verb must carry a tense (i.e., past, present, future). A tense is nothing more than a specification of the time (and possibly the duration) over which the indicated action takes place. Thus, verb tense can be diagrammed on a time line



In English, the verb tenses are as follows:

Present ? ... — X X X X X ... ? Existing now and either always, usually, or habitually, in the past and the future as well

Past — X — An event at one particular time in the past

Future — — X — An event which will happen at a particular time in the future

Present Progressive — X — X — ? An event occurring now which began in the past and continuing into the future. The beginning time of the event is indefinite