

First analysis of Interests (conjunction I) [F : a priori]

(48)

The General Notion of Interest : Kant says "The satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the existence [Existenz] of an object is called 'interest.'"

Now, the a priori modus of conjunction F is prior to the judgment of satisfaction. \therefore "interest" may perhaps not be the appropriate title of this conjunction. The first thing to do is to figure out just what is being teleologically judged in this conjunction.

First point: If feelings are the dual perception of intuition, must we conclude that a feeling in the transcendental perspective is a singular representation? If so, then my table of "primitive feelings" (see below) is inappropriate and might better serve as conjunction I.

Second point: If I adhere strictly to the principle of duality, then the logical perspective should a) structure the affective perception, and b) prepare ~~for the empirical~~ ^{the conditioned} structure for the empirical perspective.

Third point: Feelings in the transcendental perspective should serve to "get the attention" of the subject, while teleological judgments in conjunction I should establish the

Table of Primitive Feelings

(49)


<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Relation</u>
Somatic	Categorical
Anticipation	Hypothetical
Apprehension	Disjunctive
<u>Quality</u>	<u>Modality</u>
Pleasure, Pain	Arbitrium Brutum
Fulfillment, Disappointment	Arbitrium Praeception
Tranquility, Disquietude	Arbitrium Liberum

interests that prepare the desires.

Fourth point: "The satisfaction presupposes... the relation of (the object's) existence to my state, so far as this is affected by such an object." [CJ:41]. Now, the determinant judgment of experience (C) in the empirical perspective relies on the logical perspective to supply a distinct concept structure (which it subsequently unites under an indistinction notion). Arguing by analogy, the affective perception perspective in the empirical perspective should unite a distinct Perceptual structure given in conjunctio I under an indistinct "affective notion" (i.e., "satisfaction").

If I examine the table on pg 49, what I see is an analysis of what is contained in a primitive feeling. Let's ask the question: what is being combined in the teleological judgment of conjunctio I? It seems to me that what is being judged is the cognition in its relation to the state of the Subject. Therefore, it is not a question of structuring the "characteristics" of a feeling but, rather, the characteristics of a totality of a manifold which contains the connections of the complete system in thought.

Let's look at my model of intuitions. We have:



If apprehension only supplies the conscious association of a feeling and an intuition, then conjunctio I supplies a judgment

That characterizes the nature of this association.

What are the connections in imagination?

I'm finding it difficult to avoid confusing judgments and structures of judgment with the function of the faculty of Imagination. Completing the architectonic of the theory requires that our model of the faculty of the sensibility be made clear and distinct.

First, what do the connections made in the Imagination connect? In the case of intuition, the following things are either obvious or established:

1) ^A ~~the~~ function of sensibility is to transform somatic data into knowledge

2) We can divide knowledge into cognition and affective perception

3) Both types of knowledge are "filtered" subjectively. In cognition, the ~~a priori~~ ^{pure} intuitions of space and time provide the form of a cognition

4) Since affective perceptions are also representations, and represent "subjective knowledge" (feelings), they must also have a pure form.

5) Viewed in totality, the faculty of sensibility must be seen as a kind of "channel" or "mapping function" that transform "sense" into perception. We can represent "sense" as a set of "sense elements," each of which has an "identity," ~~and~~ ^{and} an intensive quantity. A pre-cognitive perception (sensational "picture") is the structure $\subseteq [\Sigma \times \Delta]$ where Σ is the set of sense elements and Δ is the set of intensive quantities.

6) "Pictures" ~~is~~ can only be represented as occurring in a sequence, one after another.


7) We can distinguish between the "5 senses" of perception (the "external sensations"), ~~and~~ the "internal senses" of posture, muscle feedback, body temperature, balance, and the "virtual senses" produced by memory.

8) The structure of intuition seems to be nothing but a structure of association that: first, divides the set Σ into subsets; second: associates particular subset states $[\Sigma_i, \Delta_i]$ with others $[\Sigma_j, \Delta_j]$.

9) It seems both obvious and necessary that the associations of Imagination include association ~~of~~ of the knowledge structure with the faculty from which the data originated.

Now, everything in the transcendental philosophy hinges on the notion of an unconditional unity of a system. Absolutely everything is subordinate to this one fundamental principle.

In a number of places, but most particularly in the Selbstsetzungslehre, Kant insists on a fundamental first distinction between The Self and The Not-Self



It is difficult to do, but let's try to imagine the state of mind of a Being that possesses consciousness but not self-consciousness. First of all, what could this possibly mean? The only answer is that what I call self-consciousness is only the cognition of the existence of a not-self. What distinguishes the Self from the Not-Self? This can only be the discovery of a class of appearances that is not responsive to the immediate Will. The distinction therefore rests in : 1) differentiation of substance; 2) differentiation of freedom and natural cause; 3) re-unification in

The relation of community,

The original differentiation of the world into a Self and a Not-self corresponds to what Kant calls the original apperception [CPR:102]

The first pure Knowledge of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere ~~sensibility~~ sensible intuition, is the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensible intuition ... affords us no knowledge; ... (In) order to know something in space (for example, a line), I must draw it, and thus produce synthetically a determinate connection of a given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness. ...


But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible understanding, but only for that understanding by means of whose pure apperception in the thought I am, no manifold is given.

Kant distinguishes between "objective unity of self-consciousness" and "subjective unity of consciousness" in [CPR:103]:

It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold in a given intuition is united into a concept of an object. On this account it is called objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. ... (The) pure form of intuition in time, merely as an ~~int~~ intuition which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the I think ... which lies a priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis.

I think this is open to the following interpretation. Consciousness (a representation that a representation exists) is an absolute unity. But within this unity we can make a distinction between I feel and I think. This distinction is nothing else than a logical division of

consciousness into an objective consciousness and a subjective consciousness.



Let's jot down ~~some~~^a terms:

Apperception: Consciousness by the mind of its own consciousness. (Lat.: ad (to) + percipere (to perceive))

fn.: Kant does indeed use the word 'Apperception'

The fundamental distinction between feeling and cognition is merely the distinction of which division of consciousness they occupy.

- "Space" is "nothing else than the form of all appearances of the external sense" [CPR: 52]
- "Time" is "nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of ourselves and our internal [Zustandes: state; condition]" [CPR: 56]

This is unequivocal. ~~Objective~~ Representations of objective ~~not~~ consciousness have space as their form. Representations of subjective consciousness have time as their form.

A feeling, therefore, has absolutely no spatial representation whatsoever. It does have a pure representing form - namely, a feeling "in" time.

Now, Kant speaks of "the intuitions of ourselves and our interval state [or condition]". (Die Zeit ist nichts anders

als die Form des inneren Sinnes, d.i., des Anschauens

~~unserer~~ ^{unseres} selbst und ~~unferes~~ inneren Zustandes). Time is

the "form" of the inner sense. Without the intuition of "space," it seems to me that extension ^{can not be} ~~is not~~

represented. Does this imply that the "inner sense" contains quality, relation (time), and modality but not extensive

quantity? It would seem to be so.

Have we have a puzzle. Pain can be localized, i.e., represented in space. But if pain is a feeling, then no

localization is possible in intuition. How can we find a way out of this dilemma? It seems to me that this paradox

can only be resolved if we postulate a "faculty space"

as a pure form of the inner sense. Such a faculty space

is not "objective" (the mental faculties are supersensible objects of ideas), but such a representation is required if we

are to represent the representations of feeling and intuition.

If we accept the notion of a faculty space, then the "pain paradox" is resolved in the following manner:

- 1) The intensive quantity of sense is present in both "halves" of consciousness;
- 2) Pain is localized only through association of the "pain senses" with the ~~not~~ ~~motor sensory~~ sensorimotor perception that defines "space"

There is, in other words, a complete transformation that takes place in going from representation prior to apprehension and perception following apprehension. The structure $[\Sigma, \Delta]$ disappears completely and is replaced by a completely "mental" representation in which sense is represented only in the intensive quantity of the cognition or the affective perception. Intuition is **not** a partition of $[\Sigma, \Delta]$ into subsets but an entirely new structure given form by sensorimotor feelings and, in which, the distinctness of individual "nerves" is lost and replaced by a general sensation "placed" by the intuition of space.

The Soma and Perception

The soma and the nous are two radically different

"parts" of the Organized Being. However, between them there exists complete reciprocity (reciprocal cause and effect). If the soma is thought as affecting the nerv, then it must be equally true that the nerv affects the soma.

Now, the "external perceptions" (sight, hearing, taste, touch, ~~etcetera~~ olfactory) do not directly feed back to affect the body's sensory system. These must first pass through the limbic system, hypothalamus, etc. I would guess that a strong case can be made for the hypothesis that it is the affective perceptions which provide the "feedback taps" for "signals" traveling back to the physical soma after "conditioning" by nerv.

What is contained in feeling?

If I examine conjunctions I, A (a posteriori), and D, I find that a complete abstraction of all sensation has been made by the conclusion of the empirical reflective perspective. Only conjunction I has an immediate relation to feeling in the transcendental perspective. If I look at conjunction I, all that I find are:

1) Connection to the source of the perception, either as

Somatic, conceptual, or from the free play of the faculties of Imagination and Understanding;

- 2) binary-valued qualities in which intensive quantity has been removed
- 3) a connection to the Transcendental Ideas as to how the feeling is to be reasoned about
- 4) a connection to the Will as to how the feeling lies in relation to moral judgment. (self-love vs. self-respect)

This leaves in singular feeling in the transcendental perspective only:

- 1) The intensive quantity of the feeling (Quality)
- 2) The conscious association with an intuition (relation)
- 3) The connection to faculties of the noumenon (Quantity)
- 4) an undefined modality.

With regard to Modality: The one function that I can think of that is still missing from the theory is "attention."

In psychology, attention is "the psychological process of selecting only a portion of the available stimuli to focus upon while ignoring, suppressing, or inhibiting reactions to a host of other stimuli" [RUCH: 229]