

The analytic of the teleological judgment gets off to a slow start. In §62, Kant distinguishes between objective purposiveness (which is "merely formal") and material purposiveness. In §63, he draws a distinction between "relative purposiveness" and "the inner purposiveness of nature."

I say this is a slow start because, in true Kant fashion, he spends many words to lead the reader down paths which, eventually, end abruptly as Kant cries triumphantly, "See! This goes nowhere!" Rather than getting to the point and telling us where to go, he seems most intent to talk about where not to go.

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines teleology as: The study of the ends or purposes of things. It follows that a teleological judgment is a judgment of an end or a purpose. In §63, Kant says, "Experience leads our judgment to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness (i.e., the concept of a purpose of nature) only when we have to judge of a relation of cause to effect which we find ourselves able to apprehend as legitimate only by presupposing the idea of the effect of the causality of the cause as the fundamental condition (in the cause) of the possibility of the effect."¹ Kant says there are only two ways such a judgment can take place: 1) as a purpose; 2) as a means (toward the purposive employment of other causes).

The first of these (judgment of a purpose) "is an inner purposiveness of the natural being." In other words, the efficient cause of judging that a purpose exists is because the mind itself requires the existence of a purpose to achieve a unity in consciousness.

The second of these is "merely relative" and "relative purposiveness, although it hypothetically gives indications of a natural purpose, justifies no absolute teleological judgment" (Pg 213, ps 215)

¹ Another first-rate Kantian sentagraph

§65. "Things regarded as natural purposes are organized beings" (218)

Causal combination as thought by the understanding is a connection in an ever-progressing series; things which as effects presuppose other things as causes cannot reciprocally be causes of these earlier things at the same time. (219) These are called "real causes"

A causal combination according to a concept of reason (of purposes) can be thought as a series leading in either direction (either forward or backward). Such a causal connection is called a connection of final causes (*nexus finalis*) or the ideal cause. (ps 219)

For a thing to be a natural purpose,

1) The presence and form of its parts must be possible only through their reference to the whole;

2) Its parts must ~~combine~~ so combine in the unity of a whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form.

In this case, the connection of effective causes may be judged as an effect through final causes" (CS 220)

"The organization of nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality we know." (ps 221)

"The concept of a thing as in itself a natural purpose is therefore no constitutive ~~principle~~ concept of understanding or of reason, but it can serve as a regulative concept for reflective judgment, to guide our investigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with our own causality according to purposes

generally." (ps 222)

Important note: Kant argues that external purposiveness can not be used as purposes of nature in order to explain their presence and for regarding their contingently purposive effects as the grounds of their presence according to the principle of final causes. (§67, ps 224)

"To judge of a thing as a natural purpose on account of its internal form is something very different from taking the existence of that thing to be a purpose of nature" (pp 224-225)

The concept of a natural purpose (in, say, a blade of grass regarded as an organized being) leads necessarily to the idea of collective nature as a system in accordance with ~~rules~~ the rule of purpose. All the mechanisms of nature must be subordinated to this ~~idea~~ idea according to principles of reason. The principle of reason belongs to it only as a subjective principle (maxim): "Everything in the world is good for something; nothing in it is vain" (ps 225)

This sets me thru the analytic. The main new idea seems to be the justification for use of teleological judgment as an organizing principle, and for thinking of certain things (organisms) as organized beings, and for thinking of nature collectively as an organized system. Teleological cause augments physical cause. The former is regulative, the latter constitutive. The former is used in reflective judgment, the latter in determinant judgment. Determinant judgment belongs to understanding ~~and~~ alone. Reflective judgment belongs to the judgment faculty alone.

Kant does not, however, specifically say when a teleological judgment is to be applied. A reasonable hypothesis is that teleological judgment comes into play ~~at~~ concurrently with The Satisfaction of The Sublime.

The TL does not set ends and means, though. The only legitimate use of TL is grounded in internal purposiveness and never in external purposiveness. (e.g., the purpose of a river is not to give fish a place to swim).

In the CJ up to this point, Kant has identified only two "interests": ~~Satisfy~~ Representation of an object for the purpose of Satisfaction of the Pleasant and representation of an object for the purpose of Satisfaction of the Good (see pg 97 of this book). He also introduced one "desire" in reaction to the feeling of pain associated with the sublime. This is the ~~Want~~ "wanting" to bring order out of the chaos ~~represented by~~ symbolized by the sublime. (see pp 39-40 of the notebook). Kant calls the "pain" of the sublime "the source of ideas." (CJ

It is quite feasible that Kant buried the "how to" and "what for" of judgment within The Analytic of the Sublime. - I must now ~~to~~ turn back to it.

Analytic of the Sublime

§23 "The satisfaction [belonging to the beautiful and the sublime] does not depend on a sensation, as in the case of the pleasant, nor on a definite concept, as in the case of the good; but it is nevertheless referred to concepts, although indeterminate ones" (CS pg 82)

"The beautiful seems to be regarded as the presentation of an indefinite concept of understanding, the sublime as that of a like concept of reason" (pg 82)

On page 83, Kant specifically called the feeling of the sublime an "emotion" (in his definition of the word, repeated on pg 83). The sublime is a "negative pleasure."

Wrt the division of moments, the sublime is represented in the same ^{manner} ~~way~~ as the beautiful: (but w/ slightly different headings)

~~Quantity~~:

Quantity: Universally valid

Quality: Devoid of interest

Relation: Subjective purposiveness

Modality: necessary (pg 85)

However, it also divides into the mathematically and dynamically sublime.

One great puzzle about Kant is the business about the beautiful and the sublime being devoid of interest yet, at the same time, calling up "wants." If they were devoid of all interest of every kind, wouldn't they be dead ends?

This kind of staggering contradiction usually means that Kant has pulled (or will pull) another of his magic change of

Perspectives tricks. Let's review his definitions:

1. Interest: The satisfaction which is combined with the representation of the existence of an object. All interest either presupposes or generates a desire which becomes the determining ground of will. (CJ ps 38)
2. Interest (of a faculty): A principle which contains the condition on which alone the faculty is called into exercise (CPrR ps 145)
3. Interest (of Practical reason): The interest of practical reason is ~~bound up~~ the determination of the will in respect to the final and complete end.
4. Interest (of speculative reason): The interest of speculative reason consists in the cognition of the object pushed to the highest a priori principles (CPrR ps 145)

And, "just like that," the mystery solves itself. Aesthetic judgments of taste are disinterested in the sense of def. (1). However, this does not mean that the practical reason is not interested. Def (2) contains no desires; only an a priori principle which gives the condition for the exercise of (practical) reason. The Beautiful is "the symbol of the good"¹ (because it is a pure satisfaction) and will spur practical reason to the contemplation of the beautiful in its search for the summum bonum. The sublime will stir interest in (3) or (4) ~~to~~ by means of the principle of purposiveness of nature in general (internal purposiveness).

So, judgments of taste are devoid of (objective) interest but are grounds for practical interest.

¹ CJ: 196 §59.