

Conjunctio D

I now am ready to re-examine my hypothesis of the form of motiva in Conjunctio D. The Categories of Freedom concern the subjection of the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness; therefore, the concept of the Categories of Freedom presupposes the existence of a manifold of desires. It is the joint operations of the motiva of conjunctiones F that provides the fundamental basis, in teleological judgment, necessary for the possibility of the existence of a manifold of desires.

To deduce the motiva of Conjunctio D, we may work backwards by analyzing the Categories of Freedom. In doing so, we must bear in mind the following:

- 1) the affective perceptions under Conjunctio D are "desires" and constitute the affective part of the archetype that brings forth ideas in the hypothetical reflective perspective.

may be why they receive no elucidation in [KANT4], but are prominent in [KANT9] and [KANT11]

- 2) The teleological judgments of the hypothetical perspective pertain to knowledge viewed as analytical a posteriori.
- 3) The pure ground for these judgments lies in practical Reason, in accordance with the Principle of Final Purpose, and under the ~~pure a priori~~ legislation of Reason's pure practical law (the "moral" law).
- 4) The moral law is prior to the notions of good and evil; but it is in these pure notions of practical reason that the practical object of the causality of freedom is given a priori. ~~conseq~~
- 5) Consequently, the teleological judgments of conjunctio D concern the construction of ideas as actions and objective ends. These ideas obtain objective reality only through connection, via affective perception, to the pure notions we call good and evil. Therefore, conjunctio D is concerned with the reflective judgment in its connection of representations under these pure notions.

Quantity

The categories of freedom with regard to quantity are:

- Subjective according to maxims (Willensmeinungen des Individuums)
- Objective from principles (Vorschriften)
- A priori objective and subjective principles of freedom (Gesetze)

Willensmeinungen expresses "free opinions" of the individual (literally: "will-opinion" or "ready-opinion")

This category is neutral with respect to moral law and expresses individual rather than general or universal applicability of the action.

Vorschriften means rule, regulation, or precept.

This category aligns with the notion of Kant's hypothetical imperative in the sense that the maxim is regarded as objectively and generally applicable (i.e., leads to good or evil objectively in a given circumstance). We might say that this category expresses a prudential maxim.

Gesetze is "law"; The third maxim is akin to the categorical imperative in that the action is dictated by moral law.

Kant says the categories of freedom are practical determinations of the will "which concern the decisions of the free faculty of choice" [KANT 13: 68]. (Abbott translates this quite differently).

Now let us look at conjunctio D. This judgment:

- 1) Is the source of those "universal" concepts (i.e., relatively universal as genus to species) that we call ideas of the Understanding;
- 2) These judgments are concerned with concepts of actions: ends + means
- 3) But these judgments also serve to unite experiences

However, the objective reality of the objects of ideas, as ^{noumena} ~~phenomena~~ in which diverse phenomena find their unity, has its ground solely in the realm of pure practical reason. The object of Reason is the Understanding, and so we must distinguish the roles played by these two faculties (which the teleological reflective judgment serves to unite).

First, insofar as ideas are concerned, it is the Understanding which constructs ideas, ~~but~~ and the

Understanding does so entirely through analytical determinant judgement. Whether the idea is a substantive idea (the idea of a thing) or ~~is~~ is an idea expressing a maxim of action is a question to which the Understanding is entirely indifferent. The sole principle followed by the Understanding is the principle of conformity to the laws of Understanding.

Practical Reason, on the other hand, legislates based on the Principle of Final Purpose, and so teleological reflective judgement is concerned solely with the accordance of the idea with the pure principle of final purpose. Inasmuch as the "object" of final purpose is a general state of perfect happiness, teleological judgement is and can be nothing else than a determination ^{by} practical reason of the accordance of the idea with the perceptual instinct of the state of happiness.

§§ 1. The Standard of Perfection

Every judgement contains a necessary reference to an a priori standard of Perfection. Now, a

Perfection can be :

- a) an aesthetic perfection — agreement of ^{cognition} ~~perception~~ with the laws of sensibility
- b) a logical perfection — agreement of cognitions with the laws of understanding
- c) a moral perfection — agreement of affective perception with the formal and transcendental conditions of pure Reason.

Every reflective perspective involves both cognition and affective perception. In the transcendental and empirical reflective perspectives, the ^{subject} ~~understanding~~ judges synthetically, either in an intuition or in a pure a priori notion of the Understanding. Since in these perspectives, the cognition itself takes form in accordance either with the laws of the productive Imagination or the pure Understanding, no standard of logical perfection is required for the construction of the cognition. Rather, the role of perfection insofar as the cognition is concerned is aesthetic and directed toward the unity of the cognition with the subjective conditions of the perceptual instinct.

The Drive of Pure Practical Reason

In the logical and hypothetical reflective perspectives, however, a reference to logical perfection is necessary because the universal concept is not given by ~~the~~ The Understanding, but rather is given by Reason. The principles of Reason are regulative, not constitutive. Therefore, the formal structure of concepts must be judged in relation to conformity with the laws of the Understanding.

In both cases, however, the synthetic and the analytical, the reflective perspectives also involve the representations of affective perceptions. The reflective judgment, consequently, requires its own standard of judgment; this standard we call the moral perfection.

Returning now to the Quantity motive of conjunctio D, we are reminded that the outcome of the synthetic reflective judgment is an affective perception, ~~nature~~, which we call a desire. Viewed as composition in an aggregate, the judgment of Quantity must involve the connection of desire with the formal conditions

which ~~regulate~~ define happiness in terms of the perceptual instinct.

~~There are three modi by which desire may be contained in a universal archetype in the hypothetical reflective perspective:~~

~~1) The desire may be grounded in ^{the} aesthetical perception~~

1)