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At this point in time, I am still struggling to grasp the nature of the teleological reflective judgments. Kant does not provide a well-organized presentation of what these a priori functions are; he merely discusses their manifestations [CJ]. He scatters clues all over his many works, especially in:

Critique of Judgement

~~Practical~~ Anthropology from a Pragmatic P.O.V.

Religion w/in the Limits of Reason Alone

Lectures on Metaphysics

Critique of Practical Reason

Critique of Pure Reason

Metaphysics of Morals

Nowhere, though, does he systematize these clues. What the written record fails to do is to make clear their role and place in the operation of Reason.

The deduction of the motives of teleological judgment must proceed from axiomatic principles and be subject to the requirement that all pure a priori functions of judgment must be necessary for the possibility of something we can be certain

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does occur. In the case of teleological judgment, this "something" includes:

1. That the thinking subject forms concepts of objects as phenomena and as noumena; ~~based on~~
 2. That the thinking subject acts through its own faculty of will to bring about (or attempt to bring about) the actual existence of objects; These objects can relate to the Subject's own state of being in the "real" world¹ or they can relate to the construction of ideas;
 3. That these acts always have some reference to aesthetical outcomes, either as feelings or satisfactions;
 4. That teleological judgment is always related in some way to the Causality of Freedom, inasmuch as these judgments take as their matter something that does not yet have actual existence.
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¹ By "real" world, I mean "the real in sensation."

The Concept of Transcendental Topic

Teleological judgments belong to the class of Reflective Judgment. This means that they are always concerned with proceeding from the particular concepts to more universal concepts. Now, concepts belong to the faculty of Understanding alone; therefore, the outcome of a teleological judgment is itself never a concept. Rather, it is an affective perception necessary for the possibility of applying Understanding to the spontaneous generation of concepts. In this sense, teleological judgments are always objective, but only in a mediate sense of objectivity.

How should we approach the deduction of the synthetical functions of teleological judgment?

The issue ~~is~~ is one of knowing when a complete explanation has been obtained and its necessity from axiomatic principles established. Since Kant seems to suggest that teleological judgments intertwine with both objective and aesthetical representations, it would appear that these judgments are many-faceted - perhaps more

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so than the other conjunctions.

In reading Kant, I am struck by how often transcendental topic appears to lie implicitly at the most fundamental levels in his theory. This is why his tantalizing but wholly inadequate treatment of the transcendental topic in CPR is so frustrating. If transcendental topic is indeed foundational, we must explore it more fully; if it is not, we must demonstrate that it is not and thereby remove it as an impediment ^{to} my thinking. Accordingly, that is where I will focus my efforts for the present.

The Concept of Transcendental Topic

Kant's entire discussion of the Transcendental Topic is contained (so far as I know at present) in Critique of Pure Reason [CPR: 216-231 / B316-345]. Although this seems like a fair number of pages, it is not; Kant's actual discussion in this "appendix" to The Analytic of Principles is aimed primarily at the ideas of earlier philosophers (particularly Leibniz), and the transcendental topic itself is touched on only briefly in its own right. I will begin by summarizing what he does say about it.

First, he introduces the concept of the transcendental place. This term he defines as, the position we assign to a concept [Begriffe]. By "position," he means either position in sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] or position in the pure understanding [reinen Verstande]. Each concept "takes a position" "according to the difference in its use" [CPR: 220]. The "appointment of the position ... and the directions for determining this place to all concepts according to rules" is the transcendental topic [CPR: 220].

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The very first question springing from these words is : what does Kant mean when he says a concept [Begriffe] can have a position in sensibility ? As a representation, a concept can belong only to the Understanding, for the only representations of Sensibility are Intuitions (as far as objective representation is concerned).

This question Kant quickly clears up for us. If the origin (source) of a concept was given through appearance (by the sensibility), then its place is the sensibility. But if the concept arises from the pure understanding, such as is the case with noumena, then they belong to understanding. [CPR : 220]

The transcendental topic

1) appoints the transcendental place which

is to be taken by a concept, and

2) provides instruction [Anweisung] ~~for~~

according to rules for determining

The Place.

Kant does not say that transcendental topic is an a priori function. Rather, like the logical

topic of Aristotle, it is an acquired discipline for Theoretical reasoning - i.e., a doctrine for thinking.

That Kant follows such a doctrine slowly becomes evident in the repeated "themes" (e.g., quantity, quality, relation, and modality as structures) which run throughout his works.

But, Kant then turns around and says that transcendental topic "contains nothing more than the above-mentioned ~~titles~~ four titles of all comparison and distinction, which differ from the categories in this respect, that they do not represent the object according to that which constitutes its concept (quantity, reality), but set forth merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our concepts of things" [CPR: 220].

This passage seems to say that the "four titles"

Identity and Difference

I've I's Agreement and Opposition

The Internal and The External

The Determinable (matter) and The Determining (form)

are part of the a priori functions of reflection.

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Does this make transcendental topic also a part of the a priori system? No. Kant is clear that transcendental topic is a doctrine and it is a learned doctrine [CPR: 221]. His statement quoted on pg 7 therefore needs to be interpreted as saying the t.t. is the doctrine for understanding the "four titles" of comparison and distinction.

Support for viewing the four titles as a priori faculty is found in the notes from Kant's lectures [Metaphysik L, Lectures on Metaphysics § 61]:

"... we still must... treat of the faculty for comparing, and for cognizing objects in comparison. The formative faculty, or the faculty of cognition, are faculties for producing representations. But now we still also have a faculty for comparing representations, and that is wit and acumen. Wit is the faculty for comparing objects according to differences. ... In each judgment I cognize that something either belongs under the general concept or not; this is wit. ... But when I ~~find~~ have

a negative judgment, when I find that it does not belong to the general concept, but rather is different from it, then that is acumen. ... Through wit we broaden our cognitions; ... then acumen comes and distinguishes one from the other."

A similar (but briefer) comment also occurs in *Metaphysik Morgovius* [LOM: 253]. These seem to be the only two places where the faculty of comparison is mentioned in [LOM].

Admittedly, "wit" and "acumen" appear to apply only to the first title (Identity and Difference), but this is enough to lend support to my theory that the "four titles" describe the function of "comparison" in the three-step syncretical process.

I've got it! In logic, Kant described the three-step process of general reflection as:

- 1) comparison - The likening of representations to one another

2) reflection - the going back over different representations to see how they can be comprehended in one consciousness

3) abstraction - The segregation of everything else by which the given representations differ.

From the passage quoted from [LOM], step (1) is identical to wit; step (3) is identical to acumen. But Kant's four titles fail to mention step (2). Step (2), though, is precisely the generalization. It is, in other words, the procedure for going from given particulars to the universal, i.e., it is reflective judgment.

I have earlier made a "third element" hypothesis
wrt the four titles:

Difference + Identity \rightarrow Affinity

Opposition + Agreement \rightarrow Reconciliation

The External + The Internal \rightarrow ~~The~~ The Essence

The Determining + The Determinable \rightarrow The Determination