

The Sensorimotor Idea

Its purpose: It is the idea ~~which unites~~ of the real unity of nous and soma. [What about psyche?]

Its 2LAR: • In Quantity it must be Integration because it unites nous and soma.

- In Quality it must be subcontrary because the appearance of nous (mind) and the appearance of soma (body) are contraries. Nous implies the aphysical, soma implies the physical.

- In Relation it must be transitive. Mind and body are coexistent

— Hmm... is this so? Coexistence implies we have two substances. Do mind and body fall under different substances? If so, does this imply a real division? A real division cannot be permitted.


- In Modality it must be determining factor.

Let's consider the coexistence issue first. Why is a real division not permitted? Because this would be a positive assertion of the essence of the I of transcendental apperception and no positive assertion of this is permitted by Rational Psychology.

A phenomenon is the unity of multiple appearances. Nous and soma are different appearances of the 'I'. These appearances are not successive, however. ~~The occupy~~ (there is no necessary order to their cognition. Both are subsumed under the Self, which is the persistent in time (the substance))

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In Relation, this would \therefore seem to be the Internal rather than the transitive. But I'm not looking at this correctly. The internal would be




This division comes about because our awareness of thinking does not appear to be connected to anything we posit in the body. (Likewise w/ our emotions).



But in fact nou and soma do not develop first. They are ~~not~~ brought about because they are generalizations of many specific feelings and cognitions. Therefore nou and soma arise from uniting appearances. This means nou and soma are substances (and Self is the substance that unites these substances).

~~The Self is the This makes Self the~~

Is 'self' the transitive? No. 'Self' ~~is the~~ can be nothing other than substance (it is the persistent in all apperception)



① The logical self is logically determined by elimination (self is not-not-self)




Nous, soma, and psyche cannot be considered except under the unity of the self because it is the Self which gives to these three the only context under which these ideas have objective validity.

For the process of breaking down the empirical self, we have:

1. Axioms of intuition — the self has extensive magnitude
 \therefore division into parts is permitted provided these parts can be ~~appearances~~ exhibited in appearance. This is so directly w/ soma (it is actual). Nous is not an object of outer sense but it is connected to outer sense through willful actions. \therefore its modality is necessary. (Indeed, this is what gives

rise to the idea of soma since not-self is that which does not respond directly to the causality of freedom. The process follows the logical progression of



2. Anticipations of Perception: nous and psyche do not violate the principle of ^{the} intensive magnitude of the Self


3. The connection of body and mind wrt Relation is community and this is the psyche. This makes nous the substance of mind and soma the substance of body (substance is a notion)

4. Soma is actual. Nous is the ground for determining that soma is actual i.e. nous is necessary. (w/o nous we get the Sci. Am. guy's meaningless babble).

① body is not immediately given. Piaget has shown this. How do we separate mind from body? Mind is that ~~which~~ to which is attributed the chap. 1 characteristics of mind. This is logical division; it contains that which is not represented in outer sense

Logical vs Real Divisions


Much of what I'm presently trying to understand comes down to what it means to say something is a real division as opposed to something being a logical division. I need a more precise explanation of this.



Logical judgments are analytic when they are merely descriptive of a mathematical (in the Kantian sense) structure and make abstraction of the ~~the~~ transcendental matter from the structure, leaving only its form. It seems clear to me that my "cycle of reason" model relegates the logical functions of judgment to the analytic perspectives (analytic a priori and analytic a posteriori). [Of course, my model also seems to require two "brands" of logical function to distinguish the analytic a priori from the analytic a posteriori; but perhaps it is also possible that the distinction between these two is made by reflective judgment rather than the determinant logical judgment].

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Can (and should) determining judgment be represented in terms of the following ILAR?



If I do this, it ~~would~~ ^{might} pretty well demolish the "cycle of reason" model, because this representation requires that both "wings" of the ILAR be present at every act of construction of a concept. On the other hand, the cycle of reason model does not allow any "breaks in the process" in its two phases, i.e.:

analytic a priori \longrightarrow synthetic a posteriori *

analytic a posteriori \longrightarrow synthetic a priori *


Since this is so (and the "breaks" are always based on aesthetical reflective judgment) it becomes possible to view the difference between "real" and "logical" divisions in terms of the categories of modality, e.g.

- a logical division is assertoric and possibility
- a real division is assertoric and actuality

Of course, this picture is not complete and I have to look at the other moments of judgment involved. However, I do feel that modality is the key here because the distinction between logical and real division ultimately is determined by the connection of the representation to the Subject's faculty of cognition.

The Ontology of Determining Judgment

On pg 6 I made a speculation regarding the representation of determining judgement. The ILAR division given there amounts to nothing more than the regarding of determining judgment in terms of composition (transcendental logic) and connection (formal logic).



Each of these divisions is expanded (in Kantian ontology) into its own 2LAR, giving determining judgment a 3LAR form of representation, ~~and~~ i.e., transcendental quantity and formal quantity, transcendental quality and formal quality, transcendental relation and formal relation, & transcendental modality and formal modality.

On pg 6 I also asked if making such a representation would demolish the cycle of reason model. There is an argument for concluding this is not so. The argument goes as follows.

First, time is not a perception. Subjective time is a pure intuition but objective time is merely an idea of a correspondence between a "clock" and "events." When a singular intuition is "broken down" by an analytic judgment and the resulting pieces are re-assembled in a synthetic judgment, we cannot speak with objective validity of a "time sequence" except in terms of Kant's transcendental schema. We can only exhibit our idea of the process of conceptualization in terms of time sequences

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(because to exhibit this idea requires its representation in an intuition), but this intuitive exhibition may not be taken as an immediate perception of the act of conceptualization.

It follows that the four perspectives of the cycle of reason are merely logical representations of "logical stages" thought under the ^{category} ~~notion~~ of causality and dependence and exhibited in intuition under the modus of succession in time. The modality of the idea of the cycle of reason is possibility in composition and problematic in connection. It is therefore quite permissible to represent the cycle of reason in terms of the logical succession of the synthetic a priori, the analytic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori, and the analytic a posteriori. Ideas can only be "born" in the ~~the~~ synthetic a priori and result from the synthesis in intuition of the "pieces" of the analytic a posteriori.

There is a theoretical consequence which follows from the ZLAR postulate of determining judgment - only those representations which result from a synthetic perspective (i.e., the transcendental synthetic a priori and the empirical synthetic a posteriori perspectives) can be objective - or, more accurately, be said to produce ~~objective~~ new objective representations. Consequently, the cycle of reason model can produce no "breaks" in the succession from an analytic perspective to a synthetic perspective - The succession

from the "beginning" of an analytic perspective to the "conclusion" of a synthetic perspective is an alteration.

It follows that a moment in time can be marked only at the "conclusion" of a synthetic perspective and therefore all reflective judgments are logically associated with a synthetic perspective.

This conclusion does have a consequence for the cycle of reason model because ~~but~~ heretofore I associated aesthetical judgments with the synthetic perspectives and teleological judgments with the analytic perspectives. I must instead place both "in the boundary point" between synthetic and analytic perspectives. In doing so, however, it is permissible to retain the idea of a logical succession in which the aesthetic judgment logically precedes the teleological judgment. This logical succession marks a change of state in the condition of the faculty of pure reason.

Another consequence of the 3LAR structure of determining judgment is that each connection of a determining judgment has eight momenta rather than four (four momenta of connection and four momenta of composition).

(Note: I must look up the arguments of those who mistakenly believe the categories were derived from the logical functions of judgment. Refuting these arguments will help me prove the model I am proposing).

Formal Determining Judgments and Kantian Logic I: Standard Logic

§1. Kant seems to have had his own way of looking at logic even with regard to formal logic. He defined logic as "the science of the necessary laws of the understanding and reason in general" ~~etc~~ [KANTBa: 528 (9:13)]. This contrasts with Aristotle ~~in some ways~~ Aristotle has no word for "logic" as a whole; he treated logic as "the study of argument" [BARN: 27] and as "a systematic treatment of correct inference" [ibid]. Aristotle divided this "system" into demonstration^① and dialectical argument^②. ~~Smith's argument (BARN: 28) for this division doesn't hold. See Soph Ref [ARIS14: 279 (165^a38-165^b11)]~~

"Our programme was, then, to discover some faculty of reasoning about any theme put ^{before} us from the most reputable premisses there are. For that is the essential task of the art of dialectic and of examination. ~~Now~~ we therefore proposed for our treatise not only the aforesaid aim of being able to exact an account of any view, but also the aim of ensuring that in defending an argument we shall defend our thesis in the same manner by means of views as reputable as possible. (Inasmuch ... ~~as~~ ^{that} it can conduct an examination not only dialectically but also with a show of knowledge,)

[ARIS14: 313 (183^a36-183^b6)]

① De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics

② Categories, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric

Andronicus of Rhodes: see [ZELL: 157] and [BARN: 10-11]

c. 60-50 B.C. was when Andronicus published his edition