

Notes for chaps. 8 : Chap. 7 Review

1. Chap. 7 begins w/ discussion of the appearances of actions grounded in hypothetical Duties to oneself. Emerson's "Prudence" and Adam's "Discourses" provide the examples. Bacon's idol of the theater illustrates the impatience of pure practical Reason in evaluation and ratio-expression.
2. Adam's discourse provides also an example of the cause of social contracting. He does this with his example of Benevolence (Discourses 340-341). The logic is straight forward. Spectemur agendo baits the bestowing of distinction by others, which feeds the passion for



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distinction. Despite Adam's specious teleology, it is an empirical fact that the esteem and admiration of others are bestowed on one who acts unselfishly (in outer appearance), while neglect and contempt are bestowed in response to nakedly selfish actions. (just as Adams said).

3. Chap. 8 probably ought to be called Analysis of Social Compacting Phenomena.

4. In Chap. 7 I said I'd return to the topic of gregariousness. Chap. 8 is where to do this and it is a good topic to begin that chapter with. I



said in chp. 7 that sociologists and psychologists are in 2 camps on this question: (1) Those holding gregariousness to be innate; (2) Those holding it to be acquired. I said neither view is correct.

The analysis is the place to debunk sociobiology (see Dic. of Sociology).

5. Prudence and the passion for distinction are two empirical exhibitions in socialized behavior. I must explain how this arises from mental physics. Piaget's studies of the stage of cooperation will help here. The link to obligation must be forged.



(4)

6. The analysis of socializing Triebfedern is essential for understanding the human-Nature of social compacting.

7. In chapter 7 I introduced the functionals of reflective judgment but I did not explain how to use them. I must do that in chapter 8. I said in ch. 7 (pg 208) that I do this. 8. In chap. 7 I explained the synthesis in continuity in terms of the animating principles of psyche. This should be an adequate explanation. In the "how-to" part of analysis in chap. 8 I can  $\therefore$  directly call upon the animating principles to explain



Things.

9. In chap. 7 I described the functions of appetitive power and practical judgment. The description is probably adequate enough. In chap. 8 we treat the feasible interpretations of human behavior, and for this it is enough to reference scope in the manifold of rules, as I did in Leadership. The lesson from chap. 7 is that the manifold of rules is made w/ a hierarchical structure and appetites are bound to the hierarchy. A person cannot disobey his own manifold of rules, although he can



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accommodate this manifold through ratio-expression.

10, The key "how-to" points in chap. 8 in regard to practical judgment and the manifold of rules are these:

(a) The manifold of rules is a value structure;

(b) Quality in practical judgment pertains to rules of validation, invalidation or re-evaluation of desiderations

(c) Relation in practical judgment pertains to <sup>maintenance</sup> ~~purpose~~ of purpose, ends that condition means, and means as coordination of rules. In regard to



point (c), There is no category of freedom for <sup>the</sup> conditioning <sup>of</sup> ends by means — which is something that appears to rule out virtue ethics altogether, yet to favor consequentialism. However, this is not correct. Practical Reason knows no objects, and all practical ends are subsumed under the categorical imperative and ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> only be regarded as instances of equilibrium states.

(d) The "how-to" discussions of chap. 8 will call directly upon ~~the~~ and pertain to critical contexts of the Redefinitions of the categories



(8)

of freedom (which are tabulated in chap. 7),

11. In chap. 8, <sup>(a)</sup> use The fact that compositions of rules wrt Quantity in the manifold of rules are constructed Policies of Pure Reason.

(b) use the fact that Quality in practical judgment is value assessment.

(c) use the fact that Relation gives the practical Real definitions of purpose, ends, and means.

(d) use the fact that the Modality functions are anticipations of practical goodness (or badness); the distinction here is that of Just vs. Unjust.



12. It must also be stressed in chap. 8 that the categories of freedom w.r.t.

Modality are essentially "negative" in the connotation that practical judgment can <sup>anticipate</sup> ~~judge~~ in expedience but ~~can~~ can not anticipate expedience of actions.

In chap. 7 I characterized Modality in practical judgment as "crisis modes."

13. In discussing The motivational dynamic and Weaver's model in chap. 7, I summarized by saying that the globally syncretic synthesis of higher-placed maxims, tenets, and hypothetical imperatives in the manifold of rules is what makes a theory of social compacting



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feasible. This observation is important for later discussions of obligation and the power of a person - topics that empirical gregariousness and personality traits will segue into.

14. From Webster's :

gregarious, a. [L. gregarius, belonging to a flock, from grex, gregis, a flock, herd.]

1. living in herds or flocks.
2. fond of the company of others; sociable.
3. having to do with a herd, flock, or crowd.
4. in botany, growing in clusters.