Rational Knowledge

Kant believed that <u>motives</u> can have two sources: 1) empirical; 2) a priori by reason alone

→ If indeed there exists innate motives (motives a priori), then there exists a "pure will"

"The metaphysics of morals is meant to investigate the Idea and principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of human volition as such, which for the most part are drawn from psychology" [FMM:7]

Motives presented a priori by reason alone are the only motives which are moral "in the proper sense of the world." (world? or word?) "Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally (i.e., as a ground of obligation), must imply absolute necessity. ••• all moral philosophy rests solely on its pure part." [FMM:5]

↳ These innate motives must be those arising from pure reason (from Ideas) rather than from innate biological drives (such as the 'motive' to eat) which have an empirical basis. The a priori Idea at the root of morals is the Idea of Good and Evil. (See CPrR chapters II and III). Kant <u>does</u> point out (in CPrR: 82) that "the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it." He calls this 'the paradox of method in a critique of practical reason.' Kant's discussion of the solution to this paradox is given in CPrR: 82-87 and leads to the 'table of the Categories of freedom relatively to the <u>notions</u> of good and evil'
The a priority involved here seems to revolve around the existence of the <u>notion</u> that some things are good, some things are bad. Kant is clear about the following point: The causality of freedom (which determines actions) comes from the supersensible side while the objects that come to be regarded as good or evil lie in the sensible world. "The practical a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer, which is not the case with theoretical concepts" [CPrR:85]