

§ 4. Empirical-Judicial Aesthetic Judgment

- Symbolism belongs to the empirical-judicial perspective.
- The connection of feelings to ~~an~~ consciousness (aesthetic apperception, attention) and ~~the~~ ^{experiencing} the feeling of satisfaction belongs to the transcendental-judicial perspective.
- Reflective judgment is the bridge between sensibility and Reason. Aesthetic reflective judgment is the bridgehead on the side of sensibility.
- Aesthetic judgment marks intuition with the transcendental scheme of Modality. From the empirical-judicial perspective, it is the determining factor distinguishing an inference of analogy from an inference of induction. The latter goes to subjective necessity; the former goes to subjective possibility. Here we have an issue because Kant's *Logic* does not provide a third inference of judgment to go with subjective actuality. A judgment of subjective actuality is immediate and goes directly to Lust and Unlust (a feeling of being?); its relationship to intuition does not extend into concepts and the only way we can regard such an intuition is as the representation of an undetermined appearance. What should we call such a judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective? It is not an inference at all because all inferences require two ^{or more} terms - ~~is it~~ ^{is it} merely a determination of attention or non-attention (Lust and Unlust)? ~~But~~ This does not fit the form: ~~if~~

possibility + attention \rightarrow necessity

whereas

Possibility + actuality \rightarrow necessity.

(possibility viewed as actuality = necessity) ~~or is it actuality~~

- Apperception: from ad percipere, to perceive
 1. perception
 2. consciousness by the mind of its own consciousness; self-reflective perception applied to metaphysical ends.
 3. the interpretation of new ideas by past experience.

wrt (2), the dictionary quotes Baldwin: Apperception is the essential mental act in the three great stages of mental generalization: perception, conception, and judgment.

The synthesis of apperception is an idea that cannot pertain directly to the Self because the Self is the cognition of the Existence of the I of transcendental apperception.

It merely determines the perceiving subject in terms of: I think, I feel, I desire; it does so for all three and does so in the same moment in time. This is congruent with Kant's triad: what can I know?, what should I do?, what may I hope?

The Piaget section helps refute the Aristotelian tradition of possibility and necessity (Piaget says these words are meaningless w/o reference to the Subject and the subjective). With this support of the Critical Theory's position that their Realdefinition is grounded in the schemata of Modality, we can move on to the limited meaning of subjective possibility etc.